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Los Pinos, New Mexico:
Civil War Post on the Rio Grande
DARLIS A. MILLER

During the Civil War, hundreds of soldiers and thousands of Navajos
encamped on the military grounds at Los Pinos, New Mexico, located
eighteen miles south of Albuquerque near the village of Peralta. The
post was established in May of 1862 on land leased from Governor
Henry Connelly and his stepsons, Jose Francisco and Jose Bonifacio
Chaves. Los Pinos served briefly as a supply depot, then as a staging
area for the Navajo campaign, and finally as a forwarding post for
Navajo prisoners enroute to Bosque Redondo. In addition, soldiers at
Los Pinos scouted for Indians, retrieved stolen stock, performed escort
duty, and helped maintain public order during an emotion-charged
election. When the lease expired in 1867, the post was abandoned,
primarily because army officials considered the rental fee exorbitant.
But political differences should also be mentioned. J. Francisco Chaves,
elected delegate to Congress in 1865, had become one of the military's
most vocal critics. Despite the prominent role that Los Pinos played
in New Mexico's Civil War experience, the post's history has never
been completely documented.
The decision to establish a sub-depot on the Connelly property
was made in the wake of the Confederate invasion that had left the
Darlis A. Miller, professor of history in New Mexico State University, is the author
of The California Column in New Mexico (1982) and co-editor of New Mexico Women (1986).
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Plan of quarters at military post, Los Pinos, New Mexico. Courtesy National Archives.
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army's transportation system disorganized and its source of forage and
foodstuffs uncertain. During the fall of 1861, while Confederate soldiers
bivouacked in Mesilla, the army transferred its main supply depot from
Albuquerque-designated a sub-depot-to Fort Union, located twentyfive miles northeast of Las Vegas on the Santa Fe Trail. For several
months massive confusion prevailed at the new depot as stores from
the states became mixed with those transferred from Albuquerque, and
all were piled haphazardly around the post while additional storehouses were being constr.ucted. Before the new system was perfected,
the depot quartermaster received orders to concentrate supplies at
Albuquerque and Fort Craig, where Union soldiers were preparing to
meet the Confederate advance.!
General Henry Hopkins Sibley and his Texas-Confederate soldiers
subsequently claimed victory over Union troops at the Battle of Valverde in February 1862, butfailing to capture federal stores that had
been stockpiled at nearby Fort Craig, they were forced to confiscate
food and other supplies from villagers as they marched up the Rio
Grande Valley. Governor Connelly's residence at Los Pinos was only
one of many that the Confederates plundered. Connelly later described
his losses in a letter to Secretary of State William H. Seward: "My own
house, 90 miles from Santa Fe, was despoiled of its entire contents,
including a valuable stock of goods, together with everything in the
way of subsistence."2 In the face of the Confederate advance, Union
troops evacuated Albuquerque, setting fire to government storehouses
to prevent supplies from falling into enemy hands. The Texans continued north but after being defeated on March 28, near Santa Fe at
Glorieta Pass, Sibley gave orders to evacuate the territory. On their
retreat south about five hundred Texans led by Colonel Thomas J. Green
camped on Governor Connelly's grounds the night of April 14. While
soldiers slept, officers staged a noisy fandango in the governor's residence. Sounds of song and violins were clearly heard by Union soldiers
who had overtaken Green's command without being detected and were
awaiting dawn to launch an attack. There followed on the Connelly
property the Battle of Peralta, an artillery duel with few casualties.
1. Darlis A. Miller, "Military Supply in Civil War New Mexico," Military History of
Texas and the Southwest, 16 (number 3, 1982): 180-83. The best account of the Confederate
invasion of New Mexico is Martin Hardwick Hall, Sibley's New Mexico Campaign (Austin:

University of Texas Press, 1960).
2. Connelly to Seward, March 23, 1862, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union 'and Confederate Armies, Series 1 (53 vols., Washington, D,C.:
Government Printing Office, 1898), 9: 651-52.
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Late in the afternoon of April 15, Green's forces evacuated the area
under cover of a blinding sand storm. 3
Sibley's entire command was soon on the road to San Antonio,
but its foray into New Mexico had been costly to area residents: lives
had been lost, families uprooted, and considerable personal property
destroyed or confiscated. Sometime in April or May Governor Connelly
visited Los Pinos to assess the damage to his home. He later informed
Seward that the Texans seemingly had devoted their time "to the destruction of everything of value about the premises." He estimated his
losses at $30,000. "Much of this," he said, was "through a pure vandalic
spirit. There was much about the house of goods and furniture that
they could put to no useful purposes, yet all was taken or wantonly
destroyed. "4
A few weeks before Connelly made this report, Assistant Quartermaster John C. McFerran informed his superiors in Washington that
the Department of New Mexico was in deplorable condition: "Most of
our supplies have been consumed, captured, or destroyed." Grain was
exhausted in the area of troop movements, and little forage could be
obtained for animals. Since most military transportation was broken
down and unfit for service, private wagon trains were seized to reestablish Union posts. 5 It was at this juncture, while Union officials
were still feeling the aftershocks of the Confederate invasion, that
Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, commanding the department, instructed
Captain Herbert M. Enos of the quartermaster's department to establish a depot at Peralta if suitable buildings could be obtained. 6 The only
site appropriate for a depot in or near the village was Governor Connelly's property at Los Pinos.
The rancho known as Los Pinos encompassed more than 7,000
acres. It was bounded on the north by the Pueblo of Isleta, on the west
by the Rio Grande, on the south by the village of Peralta, and on the
east by the lomas (hills).7 Connelly had established his residence there
3. Don E. Alberts, "The Battle of Peralta," New Mexico Historical Review, 58 (October
1983): 369-79.
4. Connelly to Seward, May 17, 1862, War of the Rebellion, Series 1, 9: 672-73.
5. Miller, "Military Supply in Civil War New Mexico," 184.
6. [unsigned] to McFerran, April 27, 1862, Letters Sent, Department of New Mexico,
Microfilm Publication M-1072, roll 2, Records of the United States Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393, National Archives (hereafter LS, Dept. NM, M1072, RG 393).
7. Contract for Rent of El Bosque de Los Pinos, May 12, 1862, enclosed in Ashurst
and Elkins to Carleton, [early 1866], Letters Received, District of New Mexico, Microfilm
Publication M-1088, roll 2, RG 393, National Archives (hereafter LR, Dist. NM, M-1088,
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after marrying Dolores Perea, a widow whose late husband, Mariano
Chaves, had owned the property.8 William W. H. Davis, who visited
Los Pinos in 1854, penned this description: "A few miles from Peralta
we came to the residence of Doctor Henry Connelly, an American....
His house is a large establishment in the old Spanish style, and the
buildings for his peones and other purposes which surround it make
up quite a little village." The main residence was surrounded by a
dense forest of trees, mainly cottonwoods, which extended "in every
direction for at least a half a mile." Adjoining fields were ~risscrossed
with irrigation ditches and adobe fences. 9
The grove of cottonwoods figured prominently in the report that
Enos submitted to Canby on May 3, 1862. A supply of fuel close at
hand, Enos believed, made Los Pinos a more desirable site for a supply
depot than Albuquerque. Based on the previous winter's expenditures,
Enos calculated that the army's yearly rental fees in Albuquerque for
depot buildings, quarters, and a hospital would amount to $4,284 and
that an additional $5,500 would be needed to supply the depot with
fuel. On the other hand, Governor Connelly was willing to rent Los
Pinos for $6,000 per year, although Enos believed he would accept
$5,500. Fuel would be a minor expense. In addition, Enos reported
that about 1,000 costals. (1250 bushels) of corn had been raised on the
rancho in previous years. He believed that under army management
the amount raised would be increased and that the government could
either divide the crop with a renter or buy the entire amount. Moreover,
a ferry could be established at Los Pinos that during high water would
be "much superior to the one at Albuquerque." In commenting upon
housing facilities on the Connelly property, Enos wrote: "Additional
buildings will have to be constructed ... , but there are enough already
built for immediate use. One company can now be quartered, and
RG 393); Peralta, Valencia County, Agricultural Schedules of the Ninth Census of the
United States, 1870, State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe.
8. Dolores Perea brought to her marriage with Connelly the Los Pinos property,
but there is some confusion in the literature whether her first husband was Mariano
Chaves or Jose Chaves. See Marc Simmons, Albuquerque: A Narrative History (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), 160, 399. In presenting a petition to James
Carleton, attorneys Merrill Ashurst and Stephen B. Elkins clearly identified their clients,
Dolores Perea, J. F. Chaves, and J. B. Chaves, as "heirs at law of Mariano Chaves."
Ashurst and Elkins to Carleton, [early 1866], LR, Dist. NM, M-1088, roll 2, RG 393.
9. W. W. H. Davis, El Gringo; or, New Mexico & Her People (New York: Arno Press,
1973), 356; Connelly to Seward, April 20, 1862, War of the Rebellion, Ser(es 1, 9: 665.
Apparently pine trees as well as cottonwoods grew in the area. (Los Pinos means The
Pines.)
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there are storehouses sufficient to contain what stores will be likely to
accumulate at that point before other buildings can be put Up."lD
After receiving Enos' report, Canby carried out his plan to establish
a sub-depot at Los Pinos and to abandon the one at Albuquerque. The
lease for the property, which was signed by Henry Connelly, J. Francisco Chaves, and J. Bonifacio Chaves, went into effect on May 15,
1862. The government agreed to pay the lessors $5,500 annually for
five years, reserving the right to renew the lease for an additional five
years. The army also obtained the right to cut and use wood and brush
growing on the premises; permanent improvements made by the quartermaster's department would revert to the owners at the end of the
lease. ll Canby's decision to relocate the supply depot at Los Pinos was
based in part on the knowledge that government warehouses in Albuquerque had been destroyed during the Confederate invasion. The
report Enos submitted seemingly justified the change. But Canby may
also have wanted to repay Governor Connelly for losses sustained
during the invasion. Albuquerque residents implied this or a similar
motive in a joint letter to Canby protesting the loss of the depot. They
'claimed that the army had bowed to the wishes of "interested persons,"
obviously referring to the govern,or and his stepsons. Canby insisted,
however, that the removal "was determined upon some months ago
from consideration of interest and economy."12
Captain Enos, who served as quartermaster at Albuquerque both
before and after the Confederate invasion, was assigned as quartermaster at Los Pinos, where he arrived to assume his new duties on
May 13. By this date, he had rented the farm land on the rancho for
one-third of the crop, received permission from Canby to advertise for
construction material, and arranged to transfer the government ferry
boat from Albuquerque to Peralta. 13 During the next several weeks,
large numbers of civilians-Hispanos and Anglos alike-found employment at the new depot. Enos advertised in the Santa Fe Weekly
Gazette for fifty "American" teamsters to drive oxen at the depot; the
10. Enos to Canby, May 3, 1862, LR, Dept. NM, Microfilm Publication M-U20, roll
16, RG 393. A costal weighed about seventy pounds, i.e., one-half a fanega, which
weighed 140 pounds. A fanega was equal to about two and one-half bushels.
11. Contract for Rent of El Bosque de Los Pinos, May 12,1862, enclosed in Ashurst
and Elkins to Carleton, [early 1866], LR, Dist. NM, M-1088, roll 2, RG 393.
12. Canby to Clark and Others, May 12, 1862, LS, Dept. NM, M-1072, roll 2, RG
393. The Albuquerque letter-writers would not have been surprised had they learned
that the amount of rent that Connelly requested for the five-year-lease was the same as
his estimated loss to the Confederates.
13. Enos to Canby, May 10, 13, 1862, LR, Dept. NM, M-U2D, roll 16, RG 393.
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pay would be $25 per month and a daily ration. An unknown number
of masons, painters, plasterers, and laborers were hired, as well as
four (and possibly more) carpenters, who received $50 per month, a
superintendent of laborers, who received $30 per month, and a superintendent of mechanics at $60 per month. 14
Several of the laborers and some of the teamsters were Hispanos.
They received the standard salary of $25 per month plus a daily ration.
Lieutenant Robert H. Hall, who commanded the depot guard, considered this a good wage and predicted that richer Hispanos would have
to raise their price for labor or "lose their peones" to the army. Moreover, he believed that the government's practice of paying well for
labor was responsible for an ugly disturbance that occurred in Peralta
on the morning of June 15, 1862. At sunrise Hall had received a message
that Hispanos "had attempted to kill all the white men in town, and
were assaulting a house into which they (the whites) had been driven."
With a detachment from his command, Hall went to investigate and
found that the inob had dispersed. After giving chase, he captured one
of the ring leaders, Lupe Analla, who had been observed with a pistol
shouting to others to follow him and "kill the Yankees." Hall was
convinced that richer Hispanos were fostering a bitter feeling against
the government to prevent "by popular feeling any of the poor people
working for government employ." Two Hispanos, he reported, had
been beaten by this gang, one because he cooked for an Anglo and the
other because he was a teamster in the quartermaster's department. 15
Despite the influx of civilian laborers, records indicate that the
quartermaster's department constructed few buildings on the Connelly
property. General James H. Carleton, in fact, halted all construction at
the post shortly after he assumed command of the department on
September 18, 1862. Carleton was unsure whether he had authority to
build a depot on private grounds without sanction of the war department, and he would not authorize further construction until the matter
was clarified. 16 The most imposing structure that the army projected
was a large storehouse which never was completed. Major Henry D.
Wallen, who inspected the post in February of 1863, stated that the
building had cost at least $6,000 but was now of "no value to the
14. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, August 2, 1862; McFerran to Enos, November 11, 1862,
Letters Sent, Chief Quartermaster, Department of New Mexico, RG 393, National Archives (hereafter CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393).
15. Hall to Chapin, June 18, 1862, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 16, RG 393.
16. Carleton to Enos, September 26, 1862 and Carleton to Meigs, September 26,
1862, LS, Dept. NM, M-10n, roll 3, RG 393:
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Government" since the depot had been discontinued. In October of
1864 part of the structure was being used as a sutler's store, but the
rest stood vacant. 17
Buildings already on the property included a church, a store, Connelly's ten-room residence, a dwelling house (which the army used as
a hospital), two rows of buildings (used as company quarters), one
building sixteen feet by fifty feet (used for shops), four small buildings
(three used as stables and one as a carpenter's shop), and a small
gristmill. No new quarters were erected for enlisted men, even though
for a short time many soldiers were stationed there. In a report to
Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas dated September 30, 1862, in which
Carleton discussed plans for a campaign against hostile Indians, he
indicated that six companies of the Fifth Infantry would be located at
Los Pinos, which, together with a smaller number of troops at Albuquerque, "will be considered as in a central position to be moved in
any direction which the exigencies of the service may require."IB Nineteen officers and 496 enlisted men were present for duty at Los Pinos
on October 31. Thereafter their numbers declined: five officers and 131
enlisted men were present on December 1; seven officers and seventynine enlisted men on April 30, 1863. In following months the number
of enlisted men present for duty would fluctuate between thirty-eight
and 174. 19
On February 11, 1863 Major Wallen reported that the two companies stationed at Los Pinos were housed in quarters holding six or
eight men each and were without suitable mess areas. He issued instructions to cut through the adobe walls between two rooms, the
enlarged areas to serve as dining rooms, which were to be furnished
with tables and benches. With this slight change, he said, "the companies can then be seated at their meals and thereby made vastly more
comfortable than at present. H20 Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Rigg,
commanding the post, painted a dismal picture of enlisted men's quarters in a report dated June 21, 1866:
17. Wallen to Cutler, February 11, 1863 and Butler to Cutler, October 30, 1864, LR,
Dept. NM, M-1120, rolls 21,22, RG 393.
18. Report on subject of lease of buildings and lands owned by Governor Henry
Connelly, April 11, 1863, "Los Pinos," Consolidated Correspondence File, Records of the
Quartermaster General, RG 92, National Archives; Carleton to Thomas, September 30,
1862, LS, Dept. NM, M-1072, roll 3, RG 393.
19. Returns from Los Pinos, New Mexico, Microfilm Publication M-617, roll 649,
Records of the Adjutant General's Office, RG 94, National Archives (hereafter Returns,
Los Pinos, M-617, RG 94).
20. Wallen to Cutler, February 11, 1863, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 21, RG 393.
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Territorial Governor Henry H. Connelly, ca. 1865. Courtesy Museum
of New Mexico.

James H. Carleton. Courtesy University of Oklahoma Western History Collection.

The storehouses, quarters, and stables are built of adobe with dirt
roofs and are old and in a very dilapidated condition; so much so
that when the annual rains commence (about 20th July) there is
great danger that many of them will fall down of their own weight,
besides being poor protection to the public stores. There can be
two companies indifferently quartered here if the coming rains do
not wash the quarters down .... 21
21. Rigg to Jones, June 21, 1866, LR, Los Pinos, RG 393. The following is a partial
list of commanding officers at Los Pinos compiled from Returns, Los Pinos, M-617, RG
94, which includes returns for September 1862 through August 1866.
Name
Ullit
MOllths of Commalld
First Lieutenant Henry B. Bristol ,Fifth U.s. Inf.
September 1862
Captain Joseph Updegraff
Fifth U.S. Inf.
October-November 1862
First Lieutenant Martin Mullins
Fifth U.S. lnf.
November 1862-January 1863
Captain Samuel Archer
Fifth U.s. lnf.
January-February 1863
First Lieutenant Martin Mullins
Fifth U.s. lnf.
March 1863
Captain Samuel Archer
Fifth U.s. Inf.
April-October 1863
.
First Lieutenant Martin Mullins
. Fifth U.s. Inf.
October 1863-March 1864
Captain Thomas L. Roberts
First Inf., Cal. Vols.
March 1864
First Lieutenant Charles Speed
Fifth U.s. Inf.
April-May 1864
Captain Thomas L. Roberts
First Inf., Cal. Vols.
May-September 1864
First Lieutenant Edmond Butler
Fifth U.s. Inf.
September 1864-March 1865
First Lieutenant Franklin Cook
Fifth U.s. Inf.
March-April 1865
First Lieutenant Nelson Thomasson.Fifth U.s. Inf.
April-November 1865
Colonel Oscar M. Brown
First Cav., Cal. Vols.
November-December 1865
Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Rigg First Vet. Inf., Cal. VoIs. January-September 1866
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During the summer of 1862 Assistant Quartermaster Enos was
kept busy furnishing supplies to troops stationed at Los Lunas, Cubero,
Polvadera, and Albuquerque and replenishing the nearly depleted storehouses at Fort Craig, 100 miles to the south, where Canby hoped to
concentrate supplies to support a movement against retreating Confederates. Enos was hard pressed to provision these posts with the few
wagons he had on hand. His work was rendered even more difficult
by the high state of the Rio Grande. All the stores for Los Lunas,
Cubero, Polvadera, and Fort Craig had to be transported across the
river. Enos first tried to cross supplies using a rope or flying ferry, but
sand banks and the ever-shifting channel soon ended his attempt at a
rapid crossing. He then used two flat-bottomed ferry boats, which in
following weeks carried approximately three million pounds of supplies to the west bank. Between July 1 and December 31 government
wagons transported most of the goods being shipped from the depot
but hired wagon-trains carried 478,899 pounds at a cost to the government of $11,216. Enos also furnished transportation to troops changing
stations, including Captain Edward H. Bergmann's company of New
Mexico volunteers enroute to Fort Stanton and troops under command
of Lieutenant Colonel J. Francisco Chaves, who in October established
a new post, Fort Wingate, eighty-five miles west of Peralta. 22
Los Pinos' days as a supply depot were numbered after Captain
John C. McFerran was appointed chief quartermaster of the department
on September 18, 1862. A conscientious officer, McFerran worked diligently to reduce government expenses by promoting efficiency and
eliminating defects in the supply system. Among his many recommendations was one to move the sub-depot from Los Pinos to Fort
Craig, which already served as a source of supplies for posts south of
the Jornada del Muerto. Fort Wingate and Albuquerque, he suggested,
could as easily receive supplies from Fort Union as from Los Pinos.
With Carleton's approval, McFerran directed Enos on December 4 to
break up the depot and transport the bulk of its property to FortCraig,
with lesser amounts being distributed to Fort Wingate and Albuquerque. Enos also was instructed to retain at Los Pinos sufficient supplies
for a two-company post and to send his laborers and mechanics to Fort
Craig to help construct storehouses. 23
22. Enos to Meigs, October 1, 1863, LR, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393; Cutler to Enos,
October 11, 1862 and Carleton to Chaves, October 12, 1862, LS, Dept. NM, M-1072, roll
3, RG 393. Los Lunas was located on the west side of the Rio Grande about three miles
south of Peralta; Cubero was about fifty-five miles west of Peralta; and Polvadera was
about forty miles south of Peralta.
23. McFerran to Cutler, November 28, 1862 and McFerran to Enos, December 4, 8,
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Meanwhile, rumors had it that Texans were raising a force in San
Antonio to reinvade New Mexico, and Carleton issued detailed instructions for resisting a second Confederate advance. On December 3 he
ordered the commanding officer at Los Pinos to put his command "at
once into the best possible fighting condition and have it ready to
march at a moment's notice."24 Two days later McFerran urged Enos
to transfer supplies to Fort Craig as rapidly as possible, hiring civilian
transportation to effect the move if necessary; especially needed at Fort
Craig were spades, hoes, axes, and other entrenching tools. He also
sent Enos a check for five thousand dollars for the purchase of corn to
be sent to Fort Craig where stores were being stockpiled to enable its
troops to withstand a siege. "Find out ... if any persons are hoarding
corn or wheat that might be of use to us or the enemy," McFerran
advised, "but do not seize it or let them suspect that we intend to."
By moving rapidly and prudently, McFerran hoped "to avoid the confusion and loss that occurred [during] the last invasion."2s The Confederate offensive failed to materialize, however, and Enos, having
completed the removal of the depot at Los Pinos, received orders in
January to assume duties in Mesilla as chief quartermaster of the District of Arizona.
About the time that Enos left for his new assignment, officers at
Los Pinos, with the aid of two former civilian employees, recovered
from Isleta Pueblo approximately twenty wagon-loads of government
stores, the disappearance of which apparently had gone unnoticed in
the rush to concentrate supplies at Fort Craig. Lieutenant Martin Mullins, then commanding at Los Pinos, arrested and confined in the
guardhouse two Indians in whose house the goods were stored, but
it is unlikely that they ever intended to defraud the government. They
told Mullins that an Hispano had given them the supplies in August
for storage, promising to pay them ten dollars a month. Upon further
investigation, it was learned that a wagonmaster had tried to deliver
these goods to Captain Enos, who would not receive them because
they were invoiced to the quartermaster at Fort Craig. Thereafter the
wagonmaster returned to Isleta where he deposited the contents of his
wagons. A former army storekeeper, a Mr. Hoberg, who recently had
moved with his family to Isleta, had discovered the supplies by accident
1862, LS, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393. Troops at Los Lunas, Polvadera, and Cubero were
withdrawn soon after Carleton assumed command of the department.
24.. Carleton to Commanding Officer, Los Pinos, December 3, 1862, LS, Dept. NM,
M-1072, roll 3, RG 393.
25. McFerran to Enos, December 5, 1862, LS, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393.
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and found that a number of the boxes had been opened and several
coats, flannel shirts, and other items of clothing had been stolen. 26
News of the change in Los Pinos' status apparently did not reach
Governor Connelly until after the depot had been dismantled, and
even then the news was garbled. Connelly had left New Mexico to
seek medical attention shortly after Carleton assumed command of the
department. In mid-January the governor wrote the general from St.
Louis expressing his concern about attempts "among interested persons to change the Government Depot from [Los Pinos] to Albuquerque." With remarkable lack of candor, Carleton replied that the governor's
letter was "the first intelligence or hint of such a movement which I
have heard." Less reassuring, he promised that the government would
not abandon Connelly's property before he, the governor, returned to
New Mexico. 27 Nonetheless, Carleton believed that the rent being paid
to Connelly was exorbitant, and a short time later he wrote to Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs questioning whether the contract for Los Pinos should continue. 28
But Carleton soon dropped the matter because Los Pinos acquired
new importance during the Navajo campaign and the movement of
Indian prisoners to Bosque Redondo. Indian raids had increased in
frequency with the outbreak of the Civil War, and the Navajos were
one of the tribes that Carleton wanted to subdue. On June 15, 1863,
he ordered Colonel Christopher Carson to establish a supply depot in
Navajo country and then to wage vigorous war against those Navajos
who failed to surrender at Fort Wingate by July 20. Carson's command,
which would consist of twenty-seven officers and 726 enlisted men,
assembled at Los Pinos early in July, with Carleton present to oversee
their departure. 29 Juan Perea of Bernalillo sent 2,000 head of sheep to
Los Pinos to accompany the troops as they moved into Navajo country.
Civilian freight contractors transported supplies and equipment to Carson's supply depot, soon named Fort Canby, located about twentyfive miles southwest of old Fort Defiance. Some freighters would later
refuse to proceed further than Los Pinos without strong military escort. 3D

26. Mullins to Cutler, January 12, 1863 and Wallen to Cutler, February 11, 1863,
LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, rolls 19, 21, RG 393.
27. Carleton to Connelly, February 12, 1863, LS, Dept. NM, M-1072, roll 3, RG 393.
28. Carleton to Meigs, February 21, 1863, ibid.
29. William A. Keleher, Turmoil in New Mexico, 1846-1868 (Santa Fe: Rydal Press,
1952), 303-04.
30. Cutler to Garrison, June 23, 1863, LS, Dept. NM, M-1072, roll 3, RG 393; McFerran
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By August 23 nearly all of Carleton's troops were in the field.
Soldiers from Los Pinos scouted the country east of the Rio Grande
from Abo Pass north along the eastern slope of the Manzano Mountains
to Tijeras Canyon; they operated under Carleton's orders to "kill every
[male] Navajo or Apache Indian large enough to bear arms." On September 7 Lieutenant Martin Mullins and his command of one officer
and twenty enlisted men proceeded to the east side of the Manzano
Mountains in search of Indians who had run off stock from Serafin
Romero's ranch near San Pedro. The men traveled about sixty-five miles
in four days, but they saw no Indians. Later that month Carleton again
ordered Los Pinos soldiers to proceed through Abo Pass and scout
along the eastern side of the mountains north to Tijeras Canyon. This
command marched about 230 miles in twenty days without sighting
Indians. In late November Lieutenant Charles Speed led a small detachment in pursuit of Indians who had stolen cattle from the vicinity
of Valencia. These Los Pinos soldiers recaptured about 100 head of
cattle near Abo Pass but saw nothing of the Indians who had stolen
them. And on Christmas day Carleton instructed the commanding
officer at Los Pinos to send a force of twenty men to Abo Pass to remain
in the area for twenty days to watch for Navajo raiding parties coming
from the direction of the Pecos. He believed they would try to recross
the Rio Grande near the mouth of the Puerco. 31
The task of outfitting these scouting parties fell to Lieutenant Nelson Thomasson, quartermaster at Los Pinos, who performed other
duties as well. He purchased grain from valley farmers, forwarded it
to Fort Canby, and arranged to winter at Los Pinos a large number of
unserviceable horses and mules belonging to Forts Canby and Wingate.
In late November and early December, Thomasson helped assemble
the supplies and transportation that accompanied Arizona's first civil
officers enroute to Fort Whipple to organize a territorial government. 32
to Craig, June 12, 26, 1863, LS, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393; Endorsement on letter signed
William Craig, October 1, 1863, Endorsements Sent, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393.
31. Carleton to Archer, August 3, 1863, U.S., Congress, Senate, "Condition of the
Indian Tribes," 1867, Senate Report 156, (Serial 1279), 39th Congo 2d sess., 1867, p. 123.
Archer to Cutler, September 7, 1863 and Mullins to McDermott, September 14, 1863,
LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 18, RG 393; Carleton to Archer, September 18, 1863, LS,
Dept. NM, M-1072, roll 3, RG 393; Speed to McDermott, October 10, 1863, LR, Dept.
NM, M-1l20, roll 18, RG 393; Speed to Mullins, November 29,1863, LR, Dept. NM, M1120, roll 20, RG 393; Carleton to Commanding Officer, Los Pinos, December 25, 1863,
LS, Dept. NM, M-10n, roll 3, RG 393.
32. McFerran to Thomasson, September 25, 1863, McFerran to Cutler, November
23, 1863, and [name unclear] to Thomasson, December 5, 1863, LS, CQM, Dept. NM,
RG 393; Carleton to Butcher, November 23,1863, LS, Dept. NM, M-10n, roll 3, RG 393.

14

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

JANUARY 1987

By this time, however, Los Pinos was about to take on additional
usefulness as a receiving center for Navajo prisoners, and Lieutenant
Thomasson would playa key role in providing for their maintenance
and survival both at the post and on the overland march to the Pecos
River.
Carleton had informed Carson as early as September 19 that all
Navajos who surrendered had to be sent to Bosque Redondo by way
of Los Pinos. Among the first Navajos to encamp on Governor Connelly's property were the thirty-nine whom Lieutenant Joseph Laughlin escorted from Fort Wingate in late November. Much to the lieutenant's
chagrin, fifteen others had escaped when a sentinel fell asleep at his
post while the command was encamped at Cubero, located about fiftyfive miles west of Los Pinos. On December 4 Carleton instructed the
commanding officer at Los Pinos to have the Navajos that Laughlin
brought in "carefully guarded and kindly treated while they are at
[your] post. They will be fed on bread and meat, and occasionally are
to have some sugar and coffee."33
Earlier in the campaign, Carson's command had destroyed all crops
in Navajo country within a forty-mile radius of Fort Canby. Carleton
had intended to shorten the campaign by starving the Navajos into
submission but his strategy worked sooner than he expected. Starting
in January 1864, cold and destitute Indians surrendered in such large
numbers that the army was hard-pressed to care for them. Carleton
soon instructed officers at Forts Canby and Wingate to forward all
captives as rapidly as possible to Los Pinos, as it would be cheaper to
feed them on the Rio Grande than at their posts. Enroute to Santa Fe
late in January, Carson himself escorted about 225 Indians to the Los
Pinos receiving center. 34
, On February 8, these and other Navajos were started on their way
to Bosque Redondo under charge of Lieutenant George H. Pettis of the
California volunteers. In a letter written to his wife from Los Pinos,
Pettis indicated that he was dreading the long march to Fort Sumner,
the military post situated on the Bosque Redondo reservation. He
described the Navajos in his charge as having been "nearly all naked"

33. Laughlin to Adjt. Genl., December 1, 1863, with endorsement by Carleton, LR,
Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 19, RG 393.
34, Carleton to Commanding Officer, Fort Wingate, February 26, 1864 and DeForrest
to Commanding Officer, Fort Canby, February 19, 1864, LS, Dept. NM, M-1072, roll 3,
RG 393; Shaw to Cutler, January 31, 1864, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 25, RG 393.
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before the army issued them blankets. 35 Pettis left the post with fortyfour men of his company and 243 Navajos, eighty-one of whom were
men and the balance women and children. Twenty-five Hispanic teamsters were in charge of the sixteen eight-mule wagons that carried supplies and baggage. Pettis and the Navajos would follow a route that
would take them through Tijeras Canyon, then northeast passing the
villages of San Antonio and San Pedro to Kozlowski's Ranch, about
twenty-seven miles from Santa Fe, and then southeast to San Jose,
Bernal Springs, and Anton Chico. Pettis later described the ordeal in
a letter to his wife written shortly after he reached Fort Sumner.
[We were] on the road 15 days, long weary days, most of the time
in the mountains, three ranges of which I crossed over-the total
distance in that time was 242 miles. While in the mountains we
experienced very cold weather and some of the time having no
water, but what we obtained by melting snow, and part of the
time, we had no wood either to keep us warm, or melt our snoweverything must have an end; so we finally arrived here safely. I
had fed the last of the Indian provisions the day before, and my
company were quite without provisions. Four of the Indians died
and were buried on the road, so I got here with 239 of the Red
Skins, they causing me very little trouble other than feeding such
a large number every day. 36
In the meantime, hundreds of other Navajos had joined the forced
exodus from their homeland. Lieutenant Mullins, the commanding
officer at Los Pinos, reported on February 24 that 2,019 Indians had
already arrived at his post enroute to Bosque Redondo. This included
1,445 who were there now awaiting transportation and who had with
them about 200 horses and between 300 and 400 sheep and goats. 37
Described by one officer as "the most wealthy of the tribe," these
Indians were soon on their way to the Pecos, the army providing them
subsistence for fifteen days of travel at the rate of one pound of flour
and one pound of fresh meat per day for each person plus a small
35. Pettis to wife, February 8, 1864, George Henry Pettis Letters, Western Americana
Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University.
36. Pettis to wife, February 26, 1864, ibid. The route Pettis took to Bosque Redondo
was the favored mountain route. There were other routes, however, by which Navajos
reached the Pecos. See Frank McNitt, "The Long March: 1863-1867," in Albert H. Schroeder, ed., The Changing Ways of Southwestern Indians (Glorieta, N.M.: Rio Grande Press,
1973), 145-69.
37. Mullins to Cutler, February 24, 1864, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 24, RG 393.
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amount of coffee and sugar for the chiefs. They reached Fort Sumner
on March 13, although Captain Joseph Berney, in charge of this contingent, reported losing fifteen prisoners on the road. Three were stolen
by residents of Tecolote and Anton Chico; two strayed from the command; and ten others died from the effects of cold and exhaustion. 38
Los Pinos was soon inundated by even more captives as Captain
Asa B. Carey, commanding Fort Canby, sent forward 2,138 Navajos
on March 4. When they arrived at Los Pinos on the 19th, they had
with them about 473 horses and 3,000 sheep.39 Others arrived with
little or no stock. On April 4, Captain Francis McCabe brought into the
post 720 Navajos, who were described as being in a "very destitute
condition," possessing only sixteen horses and 100 goats and sheep.
McCabe had started from Fort Canby with 800 Indians; forty died
enroute, and a similar number strayed after the command encountered
severe weather and was reduced to half rations. Those who reached
Los Pinos were given fifty brass kettles, 400 blankets, and 372 yards
of prints and muslin, all the blankets and cloth that the quartermaster
had on hand. 40
Hundreds of Indians, like those that McCabe brought in, were
given blankets and other materials to help them survive cold winter
temperatures. Quartermasters at Los Pinos, Albuquerque, and Santa
Fe purchased coarse Mexican blankets from local merchants for about
two dollars each, as well as jerga, a coarse woolen cloth, which they
had made into blankets. On March 1, McFerran issued guidelines for
Lieutenant Thomasson to follow when issuing supplies at Los Pinos:
"A blanket to each Indian who absolutely requires it to prevent suffering. Three or four yards of manta or calico to each Indian over ten
years of age. And one camp or brass kettle to every family, or to every
eight or ten Indians."41
Among Thomasson's most pressing problems was that of locating
transportation for the march to the Pecos. Most Navajos walked all the
way, but the army utilized ox and mule wagons to carry food, a few
38. Campbell to Carleton, February 21, 1864, Berney to Cutler, March 14, 1864, and
Berney to Cutler, April 7, 1864, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, rolls 22,23, RG 393.
39. Carey to Cutler, March 6, 1864 and Thompson to Cutler, April 15, 1864, LR,
Dept. NM, M-1120, rolls 23, 25, RG 393.
40. Roberts to Cutler, April 5, 1864, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 25, RG 393.
41. Lewis to Butler, February 2, 1864, [name unclear] to Thomasson, February 25,
1864, McFerran to Thomasson, March 1, 1864, and Enos to Thomasson, March 16, 1864,
LS, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393.
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family possessions, small children, and some of the old people. 42 Thomasson received orders in February to hire whatever transportation he
needed to move the Indians: "get it at all ev~nts, whatever price you
may have to pay." When he subsequently hired wagons at more than
$10 each per day, he was told that in the future no such amount would
be paid as even $5 per day was considered a high price. Later Chief
Quartermaster McFerran instructed Thomasson to refuse the patronage
of the quartermaster's department to freighters James M. Whittington
of Los Lunas, Ambrosio Armijo of Albuquerque, and valley resident
Jose Jaramillo, who "[had taken] advantage of the necessities of the
service to charge exorbitant prices for their wagons. 1143 In March, McFerran
sent Captain Enos to Los Pinos to either hire or purchase additional
wagons from local businessmen. But the army continued to lack transportation. On April 19, Carleton issued instructions to Captain Thomas
Roberts, then commanding at Los Pinos, to forward only those Navajo
families that had men in them, so that they could plant crops at Bosque
Redondo. The aged and infirm would be sent forward whenever transportation became available. Carleton also authorized Lieutenant Thomasson to hire a man to explore a shorter, more direct route, going by
way of AbO Pass and Punta del Agua or by way of Tijeras Canyon,
Chilili, and Agua Negra. After reaching the Pecos, this individual would
serve as guide for any wagonmaster who wanted to return to Los Pinos
by the shorter route. 44
The most critical problem for Carleton and his subordinates was
that of finding sufficient food to keep the captives from starving. In
early February more than 100 head of cattle and 1,500 sheep were
enroute to Los Pinos for the Indians, and Thomasson later bought
whatever additional stock and grain he could find along the river. These·
supplies were sadly inadequate. On March 10, Carleton placed all troops
in the department on half rations to conserve food. The ration for
Indians at Los Pinos was also cut in half and would consist of one
pound of flour, meal, or meat per day made into ato/e. This was not
enough, and Carleton soon instructed the commanding officer at Los
42. Ruth Roessel, ed., Navajo Stories of the Long Walk Period (Tsaile, Arizona: Navajo
Community College Press, 1973), 84, 114, 119, 172, 214, 260.
43. Lewis to Thomasson, February 2, 12, 1864, LS, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393;
Endorsement on letter of Nelson Thomasson, February 29, 1864, End. S, CQM, Dept.
NM, RG 393.
44. McFerran to Enos, March 1, 1864, Enos to Thomasson, March 16, 1864, Enos to
Wallen, March 27, 1864, LS, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393; Carleton to Roberts, April 19,
1864, LS, Dept. NM, M-1072, roll 3, RG 393.
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View of Los Pinos, New Mexico, from the north, ca. 1860. Courtesy National
Archives.

Pinos to feed the Indians "if necessary" one pound of meat and one
pound of breadstuffs per day.45
Some Navajos spent only two or three days at Los Pinos before
continuing their trek but others remained much longer. As a rule, the
Indians were placed under guard at some distance from the post proper.
In late July of 1864 more than 1,200 were encamped about three-quarters of a mile north of the post near an acequia, from which they
probably obtained drinking and cooking water. Soldiers at the post
obtained their water from a similar acequia, which ran about fifty yards
to the east of the Indian camp. These Indians had arrived with 357
horses, nineteen mules, and about 2,000 sheep and most likely turned
their stock loose in nearby cornfields. The army erected no shelters for
the Indians. The 522 captives who arrived on October 12 either during
or just following a heavy morning rainfall had to make themselves as
comfortable as the elements would allow. They, too, brought with them
a large number of horses, sheep, and goats. A strong guard was placed
over their camp to keep civilians away.46
45. DeForrest to Rigg, February 7, 1864, Carleton to Commanding Officer (all posts),
March 10, 1864, Carleton to Commanding Officer, Los Pinos, March 14, 1864 and April
8, 1864, LS, Dept. NM, M-I072, roll 3, RG 393.
46. Roberts to Cutler, August 2, 1864, McNulty to Bryan, August 22, 1864, LR, Dept.
NM, M-1120, rolls 22, 25, RG 393; Santa Fe Weekly New Mexican, November 11, 1864;
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Unfortunately crops on the Indian farm at Bosque Redondo were
a total failure that fall, and in late October Carleton ordered post commanders at Fort Wingate and Los Pinos not to send any more Indians
there until more food could be obtained. He further instructed Lieutenant Edmond Butler, the commanding officer at Los Pinos, to put the Indians at his post "in as sheltered a place as possible, and have them made
as comfortable as circumstances will admit." "Are there not some buildings or corrals that could be used as shelter for the children?" Carleton
asked. 47 Butler assured the general that he would do all he could to
make the Indians comfortable. The only location that might be used
for sheltering women and children, however, was the vacant portion
of the recently built quartermaster's storehouse, though, Butler added,
it was desirable to have Indians at a greater distance from the post. As
an alternative he suggested that future parties arriving at the post erect
lodges made of sod, branches, and brush to protect themselves from
the weather. By this time, however, the Navajo exodus was almost
over. On December 31, 8,354 Navajos were living on the Bosque reservation, nearly all of whom had passed through Los Pinos. 48 Thereafter, only a small number would make the "Long Walk" to the Pecos.
Even during the months of the Navajo removal, garrison life at
Los Pinos was probably characteristic of that throughout the West. On
a typical day in September 1864 reveille sounded at daylight. Breakfast
call was at 6 a.m., followed by surgeon's call, fatigue call, guard mounting, and at 9 a.m. drill call. Dinner was at 12:30; fatigue duties consumed most of the afternoon; and taps sounded at 8:15 p.m. 49 When
Major Wallen inspected troops there in 1863 he found them "sadly
deficient" in infantry and light infantry drills, and he ordered soldiers
to drill twice a day until they became proficient. But drills sometimes
were dispensed with because of the amount of fatigue duty required
of enlisted men. Soldiers at Los Pinos policed grounds, cleaned corrals,
cut and stacked wood, and hauled coal from nearby mountains for use
as an additional source of fuel. Some soldiers were allowed extra-duty
pay for their labors. Those employed on extra duty in September of
Butler to Cutler, October 12, 1864, Speed to Post Adjt., October 14, 1864, LR, Dept. NM,
M-1120, roll 22, RG 393; Special Orders, No. 106, October 13, 1864, Los Pinos, RG 393.
47. Carleton to Butler, October 28, 1864 and Carleton to Commanding Officer, Fort
Wingate, October 27, 1864, LS, Dept. NM, M-10n, roll 3, RG 393.
48. Butler to Cutler, October 30, 1864, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 22, RG 393;
Gerald Thompson, The Army and the Navajo: The Bosque Redondo Reservation Experiment,
1863-1868 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), 71.
49. Orders, No.4, September 28, 1864, Los Pinos, RG 393.
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1863 included one clerk, one carpenter, and one blacksmith, each receiving 40 cents per day extra; and four teamsters, two herders, and
seven laborers, who received 25 cents per day extra. Five of the laborers
manned the government ferry, and two worked in the corrals. 50
Most frontier soldiers grumbled about the quality of food they
were served, and enlisted men at Los Pinos probably were no exception. Captain Carey, who inspected the subsistence department at the
post in October 1864, reported that the beef delivered by contractors
was of poor quality. 51 Foodstuffs quickly deteriorated in the primitive
storage facilities then available. A board of survey that convened to
examine commissary supplies in September 1866 found that 1,471 pounds
of shoulder meat was "in bad condition being full of worms and totally
unfit for use" and that 62,907 pounds of flour from the states had been
stored in a vermin-infested room. Moreover, the board found considerable wastage of hominy, beans, rice, coffee, and Mexican flour. During a second inspection one officer reported that the post's bacon was
piled "in. a large mass" and was in danger of spoiling. 52
Although several enlisted men had become ill with scurvey soon
after the post was established, this deadly disease ceased to be a problem in later months as a garden attached to the post hospital furnished
an abundance of fresh vegetables. Probably some enlisted men improved their diets by purchasing eggs, chickens, and milk from villagers
like Ventura Toledo, who visited the post daily to sell farm products.
The most prevalent diseases at Los Pinos were gonorrhea and syphilis,
and soldiers afflicted with these and other ailments were housed in a
well-ventilated and lighted hospital ward of eleven beds. The hospital,
which was described as "a cool, commodious building," also contained
a kitchen, mess room, storeroom, dispensary, and steward's room.
Medical stores sometimes were limited, however, and on one occasion
in 1863 the post's surgeon, Dr. E. J. Whitney, was forced to borrow
medicine from Albuquerque. 53
During July 1864, a new post surgeon, Dr. John Downing, reported
50. Wallen to Cutler, February 11, 1863, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 21, RG 393;
Orders, No.4, September 28, 1864 and Special Orders, No. 14, January 21, 1866, Los
Pinos, RG 393; McFerran to Thomasson, January 14, 1864, LS, CQM, Dept. NM, RG
393; Returns, Los Pinos, M-617, roll 649, RG 94.
51. Carey to Bell, October 29, 1864, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 23, RG 393.
52. Proceedings of Boards of Survey, September 4, 1866, Los Pinos, RG 393; Davis
to DeForrest, April 10, 1866, LR, Dist. NM, M-1088, roll 2, RG 393.
53. Hall to Chapin, June 3, 1862 and McNulty to Bryan, August 22, 1864, LR, Dept.
NM, M-1120, rolls 16, 22, RG 393; Santa Fe Weekly New Mexican, November 11, 1864;
Wallen to Cutler, February 11, 1863, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 21, RG 393.
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eleven cases of miasmatic diarrhea, four cases of miasmatic fever, and
ten cases of gonorrhea and syphilis. He attributed the miasmatic diseases to unsanitary conditions, including drinking water that had been
contaminated by Indians who used a nearby acequia as a "place for
answering the calls of nature" and the presence of a marsh or swamp
on the eastern and southern outskirts of the post in which several
decomposing bodies of cattle and mules were partially submerged.
Some health problems, he believed, stemmed from a privy at the rear
of the officers' quarters, which gave off such an offensive smell that
officers and their families could not sleep at night. 54 Dr. James M.
McNulty, medical inspector of the department, traveled to Los Pinos
to investigate Downing's charges and concluded that for the most part
they were an outgrowth of a feud between the surgeon and the post's
commanding officer. McNulty rejected the notion that Indians had
. contaminated the post's drinking water, but he confirmed the fact that
perhaps five or six acres of land at the edge of the post were covered
with water, the accumulation resulting from heavy rains and the overflowing of acequias. He also agreed that the officers' privy was in a
filthy condition and recommended that it be relocated. In addition,
however, he reported that Downing kept a number of chickens at the
rear of his quarters and that their droppings added considerably to the
offensive odor coming from the officers' compound. "In point of cleanliness," McNulty concluded, "some of the officers' quarters do not compare favorably with those of the men." Soon orders were issued forbidding
anyone to dump water or garbage or to dry bedding in front of officers'
quarters. 55
Despite the dispiriting picture that these reports engender, soldiers
who were stationed at Los Pinos found the post attractive. Lieutenant
George H. Pettis, whose stay there was brief, described Los Pinos in
a letter to his wife dated January 25, 1864 as "a very pleasant place,"
and later he referred to it as "a beautiful place."56 Musician Andrew
Ryan was stationed there for about six months, and his description
was similar. In a letter to his brother dated July 27, 1864, Ryan wrote:
"This is a very pretty place." He also noted that his company had files
of newspapers from several large cities, including New York, Boston,
and Washington, which enabled him to keep abreast of national news.
54.
55.
Orders,
56.

Downing to Roberts, August 8, 1864, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 25, RG 393.
McNulty to Bryan, August 22, 1864, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 22, RG 393;
No.3, September 23, 1864, Los Pinos, RG 393.
Pettis to wife, January 25, 1864 and February 26, 1864, Pettis Letters.
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The reason for Ryan's satisfaction with the post, however, is revealed
several lines later:
We have fine amusements out here. There is a little town about
half a mile from the Post where we have dances almost every
night. The Mexican gals are very gay. However, I do not mix with
them much as I am getting too old. [He was 32 years 0Id.]"7
Soldiers had easy access to alcohol at Peralta, and some were
courtmartialed for drunkenness. Others joined the Lincoln Lodge of
the International Order of Good Templars and dedicated themselves
to temperance and the reduction of whiskey-drinking at the post. Like
enlisted men elsewhere, Ryan and his comrades spent some time at
the sutler's store where they could purchase hickory shirts for $1.50
each, a plug of tobacco for $1.00, razors for $1.50 each, and razor strops
for 75 cents each. Part of Ryan's wages went to pay his laundry bill,
which at Los Pinos amounted to $1.50 per month. The six laundresses
who resided on the post in May 1864 did washing for five officers and
120 enlisted men. 58
Violence and death were characteristic of frontier military life, and
Los Pinos had its share of both. A tragic death occurred one night in
July 1863 when a sentinel shot and killed an express rider who failed
to identify himself. About a year later Private James Jellings died instantly, shot in the neck by another soldier who had accidentally discharged a revolver. On the night of March 6, 1865 Joseph Bennett, an
employee in the quartermaster's department, was murdered at the
post's boat house, and his body was thrown into the Rio Grande. A
resident of nearby Los Lentes who was suspected of having committed
the crime was arrested and confined in the guardhouse. Severat months
later Private Daniel Diamond of Company C, First Veteran Infantry,
California Volunteers, was accused of killing a man near Belen, and he
too was lodged in the guardhouse while civilian authorities debated
which county had jurisdiction. Diamond lived to be tried, convicted,
and hanged by a committee of miners in 1867 for having killed a resident
of Pinos Altos. 59
57. Ernest Marchand, ed., News from Fort Craig, New Mexico, 1863: Civil War Letters
of Andrew Ryan with the First California Volunteers (Santa Fe: Stagecoach Press, 1966), 7172.

58. Evans to A.A.A.G., October 15, 1862, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 16, RG 393;
Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, September 30, 1865; Proceedings of Boards of Survey, March 17,
1866, Los Pinos, RG 393; Returns, Los Pinos, M-617, roll 649, RG 94.
59. Albuquerque Rio Abajo Weekly Press, July 21, 1863; Marchand, News from Fort
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Other men met less violent deaths. A quartermaster's employee
died in the post hospital on July 27, 1862, although cause of death is
not recorded. Two California volunteers died at Los Pinos in 1863, one
from lung fever, and the illness of the other was diagnosed as "softening
of the brain." Nelson C. Smith, a recently discharged California volunteer, died at Peralta on January 9, 1866 apparently of natural causes,
and his remains were buried in the post cemetery with military honors.
That same month soldiers at Los Pinos served as escort to the remains
of Lieutenant Colonel Julius C. Shaw of the New Mexico volunteers
enroute to Santa Fe for burial. Shaw recently had left his wife and five
children at Fort Wingate to assume command at Fort Selden, where
he died of paralysis on December 27, 1865. 60
Soldiers in New Mexico provided many services, but for many
residents the greatest impact the army had on their lives was an economic one. Military posts like Los Pinos provided markets for forage,
foodstuffs, and building materials, and they employed sizable numbers
of civilians in their quartermaster and subsistence departments. As a
rule, the army procured local supplies through the contract system,
advertising for bids and awarding contracts to the lowest bidder, but
during emergencies military goods were purchased in open market.
Shortly after the depot was established at Los Pinos, Captain Enos
requested bids for the delivery of 2,000 fanegas of corn at Albuquerque;
some, if not most, of this amount was intended for Los Pinos. Only
two bidders responded, each offering his corn at $10 per fanega, which
price Enos rejected as being too high. Thereafter corn for Los Pinos
was purchased in open market at prices ranging from $6 to $9 per
fanega. 61 The post experienced little difficulty in securing forage as it
was located in a rich agricultural region. Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A.
Craig, 72; Cook to [Adjutant General), March 13, 1865 and Stevens to Luna, January 31,
1866, LS, Los Pinos, RG 393.
60. McFerran to Meigs, May 16, 1863, LS, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393; Special Orders,
No.9, January 9, 1866 and Stevens to Hubbell, January 15, 1866, LS, Los Pinos, RG 393;
Richard H. Orton, comp., Records of California Men in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1867
(Sacramento: Adjutant General's Office, 1890), 370, 679; Special Orders, No. 109, December 30, 1865, Special Orders, No. 12, January 15, 1866, and Rigg to Carleton, January
16, 1866, LS, Los Pinos, RG 393.
61. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, October 18, 1862; Enos to McFerran, October 27, 1862,
LR, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393; Endorsement on letter of Captain Archer, October 23,
1862, End. S, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393; Estimate of funds required by the quartermaster
at Los Pinos in May 1864, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393. During the war, the cost of supplies
escalated. In 1859 the average price of corn purchased under contract in New Mexico
had been about $4 per fanega. After the war, prices fell. In 1868 the contract price for
corn at Fort Union was $3.15 per fanega.
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Jose Francisco Chaves, ca. 1903.
Courtesy Museum of New Mexico.
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Kit Carson. Courtesy Massachusetts Commandery, Military Order
of the Loyal Legion, and the U.S.
Army Military History Institute.

Rigg, in a report submitted to the inspector general's department in
1866, stated that "probably more wheat, corn and beans are produced
within a radius of 20 miles from this post than in any other portion of
the upper valley of the Rio Grande...." Nonetheless, the army made
an effort in 1863 to enhance the quality and yield of the local crop by
selling improved or "American" seed corn at cost to valley farmers. 62
Only a few civilians who furnished grain at Los Pinos are identified
in the records. The majority of those named were well-to-do Hispanic
entrepreneurs like Santiago Baca, partner and son-in-law of Salvador
Armijo, one of Albuquerque's wealthiest merchants and farmers. Baca
received $1,305 for an unspecified amount of corn that he delivered
during January 1866. Two months later seven Hispanic residents were
paid a total of $1,058 for their corn. Daniel Green, employed as a
purchasing agent for the quartermaster's department, mixed dirt with
the corn he turned in at Los Pinos. After the deception came to light
he was barred from further employment with the government. Undoubtedly there were many other valley residents who furnished grain
for the large number of animals fed at Los Pinos. During the month
of January 1864, Lieutenant Thomasson estimated that he required
31,440 pounds of grain to feed thirty post mules and 3,000 transient
mules at a cost to the government of $1,796. Two months later he
requested $4,306 to purchase 81,220 pounds of grain to feed the 166
62. Rigg to Jones, June 21, 1866, LR, Los Pinos, RG 393; Carleton to McFerran,
February 25, 1863, LS, Dept. NM, M-1072, roll 3, RG 393.
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horses and 120 mules then attached to the post. These expenditures
would directly benefit valley residents. 63
In 1862 and 1863 the army purchased hay for Los Pinos in open
market, paying local suppliers from $25 to $45 per ton. In 1864 Salvador
Armijo signed a contract to deliver 100 tons of upland hay at $18.75
per ton and 200 tons of grama hay at $39 per ton. The following year
William Brentlinger received a contract for delivery of 250 tons of hay
(probably grama) at $33.20 per ton. Corn fodder was also obtained by
contract. One Los Lunas resident, Santiago Luna, and two residents
of Albuquerque, Melchoir Werner and Simon Rosenstein, received contracts between 1862 and 1864 to deliver a total of 500 tons at prices
ranging from $13.50 to $15.60 per ton. 64
At least nine different individuals or firms held contracts to furnish
Los Pinos with such subsistence stores as potatoes, salt, sauerkraut,
pickles, vinegar, corn meal, onions, flour, beans, and beef. Charles S.
Hinckley, a former Denver resident, was the major beef contractor,
providing fresh beef to the post in 1862, 1863, and 1864, at 11, 16 1h,
and 22 cents per pound for the respective years. Santa Fe merchant
Joseph Hersch received more contracts than did anyone else. He contracted to deliver 1,000 bushels of potatoes and 500 bushels of fine salt
in 1863, 200,000 pounds of flour in 1864, and 100,000 pounds of flour
in 1865. 65
After Carleton halted construction at Los Pinos, few civilians (other
than laundresses) found employment there. Only one was on the payroll in February 1863, and he was hired at $60 a month to search nearby
.villages for stolen government property. As the Navajo campaign progressed, however, the army hired additional civilians as artisans and
laborers so that extra-duty soldiers could be released for other assignments. During October 1864, the post employed one clerk, one assistant
wagonmaster, one blacksmith, one carpenter, four teamsters, two laborers, and two herders at a total cost of $490. The civilian payroll
63. Payments in January and March 1866, cashbooks of the post quartermaster, Los
Pinos, RG 393; Enos to Carey, March 25, 1864 and Enos to Thomasson, April 1, 15, 1864,
LS, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393; Estimate of funds required by the quartermaster at Los
Pinos in January and March 1864, ibid. The estimate for 3,000 transient mules would
allow one ration per day for 100 mules temporarily attached to the post.
64. Wallen to Cutler, February 11, 1863, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 21, RG 393.
The contracts are in Registers of Contracts, Records of the Office of the Quartermaster
General, RG 92, National Archives (hereafter Reg. Cont., QMG, RG 92). Most of the
grama hay was obtained from the hills located about ten miles east of the post.
65. The contracts are in Registers of Beef Contracts and Register of Contracts, Records of the Office of the Commissary General of Subsistence, RG 192, National Archives.
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reached a high point in April 1865 when twenty-seven employees were
paid a total of $1,075. 66
Only a few muster lists of civilian employees at Los Pinos have
been found. The one for July 1865 shows that ten of its twenty-one
employees for that month were Hispanos. Juan Chavez, the chief boatman, received a salary of $75 per month, which made him the third
highest paid employee on the post. Four Hispanos were employed as
teamsters at $30 per month, two as laborers at $30 per month, and
three as herders at $25 per month. The army discharged most of its
civilian employees as an economy measure in January 1866, and only
three civilians were employed at Los Pinos in February: one clerk and
one carpenter in the quartermaster's department and one clerk in the
commissary department. A few more civilians were hired in later months,
but in August 1866, the last month for which records are available,
only six were on the payroll. 67
Civilians who resided nearby or who had business dealings on the
post found that military rule was exacting and sometimes unjust. In
September 1864 Ventura Toledo was arrested and put in the guardhouse
after he crossed an acequia on his way to the post by a makeshift ford
rather than using the main road. 68 Shortly thereafter the provost marshall seized some mules from local freighters on suspicion that the
animals were government property; after further investigation, at least
some were returned to their owners. Several months later, when one
member of the prominent Armijo family sought help from civil authorities in regaining a mule, the acting quartermaster for the District
of New Mexico instructed his subordinate at Los Pinos to "pay no
attention to the civil process.... Tell [Armijo] the United States holds
the mule as property belonging to the U.S. Government. Martial Law
is not yet suspended in the Territory of New Mexico." But, he added,
"let Mr. Armijo prove the mule to be his and he will get it. "69
Even Antonio Jose Otero, who had been appointed by General
66. Wallen to Cutler, February 11, 1863, LR, Dept. NM, M-1120, roll 21, RG 393;
Returns, Los Pinos, M-617, roll 649, RG 94.
67. Master List of Citizen Employees, July 20, 1865, LR, Los Pinos, RG 393. During
the war years, the army raised the salary of teamsters and laborers from $25 to $30 per
month. Returns, Los Pinos, M-617, roll 649, RG 94. The clerks were paid $85 each per
month, and the carpenter $65 per month.
68. Santa Fe Weekly New Mexican, November 11, 1864.
69. Special Orders, No. 107, October 13, 1864, Los Pinos, RG 393; Santa Fe Weekly
New Mexican, November 11, 1864; Carey to DeLong, June 1, 1866, LS, CQM Dist. NM,
RG 393. The acting quartermaster was in error; Carleton revoked martial law in July
1865. See Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, July 22, 1865.
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Stephen W. Kearny as one of the justices of New Mexico's first superior
court, received an official rebuke from post commander Lieutenant
Edmond Butler for allowing his acequias to overflow. Butler believed
that such negligence would engender "miasmatic diseases" in the garrison. He informed Otero, who farmed lands adjacent to the post, that
unless measures were taken to drain away the excess water and to
prevent overflows in the future, he would "shut the water off from
[Otero's] acequia and not allow it to run through the post any longer. "70
Additional friction between the military and civilians may have stemmed
from army regulations that were designed to protect the resources of
Los Pinos. For example, citizens were forbidden to take firewood from
any portion of the military reserve on penalty of arrest and confinement
in the guardhouse. And animals belonging to Civilians that were found
grazing on the reserve were to be seized and impounded. 71
By the fall of 1865 Carleton's military rule and the Bosque Redondo
reservation had become major issues in a hard-fought political campaign in which J. Francisco Chaves, the anti-Carleton candidate, 'hoped
to unseat New Mexico's delegate to Congress, Francisco Perea. Shortly
after Chaves received his party's nomination, however, news of Abraham Lincoln's assassination caused military and civil authorities to join
in paying tribute to the fallen president. A public meeting for this
purpose held at Peralta on May 7 was widely attended by citizens of
Valencia County and officers from Los Pinos. Lieutenant Nelson Thomasson served as one of four vice-presidents at the gathering and J.
Francisco Chaves presented one of the eulogies. 72
As the summer advanced, the intensity of the political campaign
increased. Chaves supporters were calling for an end to martial law
and for the return of Navajos to a reservation in their homeland. In'
mid-June Carleton and the Perea party, which supported Carleton's
Bosque Redondo experiment, were chagrined to learn that a large number of Navajos had escaped from the reservation in a desperate bid to
return to their own country. Carleton instructed commanding officers
at all military posts to intercept the fleeing Indians and either capture
or destroy them. Troops from Forts Craig and Wingate were ordered
to Los Pinos where they would be given transportation for a movement
onto the plains east of the mountains. Within a week, however, Carleton learned that most of the runaways had been forced to return to
Bosque Redondo for lack of food and water. Carleton and many of his
70. Butler to Otero, February 14, 1865, LS, Los Pinos, RG 393.
71. Orders, No.4, September 28, 1864, Los Pinos, RG 393.
72. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, May 13, 1865.
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officers suspected that people who opposed the reservation for political
reasons had enticed these Indians to leave. 73
On election day, September 4, the anti-Carleton party won an
overwhelming victory, electing Chaves by a 2,000 vote margin. The
day was marred in typical New Mexico fashion by acts of violence in
the villages of Peralta and Los Lunas, which caused some residents to
petition the commanding officer at Los Pinos for assistance. Vicente
Otero, justice of the peace at Peralta, claimed that Chaves men would
not allow a single Anglo to vote for Perea and had assaulted John
Brownell, the post's civilian carpenter, as he attempted to vote for the
pro-Carleton candidate. In response to these appeals, the commanding
officer sent a small detachment from the Fifth Infantry to each village
with instructions to "restore and preserve order till the polls are closed
and the votes are counted before the people."74
Following Perea's defeat, Carleton seemed determined to withdraw troops from Los Pinos and to return the property to its owners.
He told his superiors that the post no longer served a military function
and that the company stationed there to see that the place "does not
go to ruin" was greatly needed elsewhere. In contrast, he recommended
sending an additional company of cavalry to Albuquerque, where forage was cheap and where troops would be in a central position to
conduct scouts in any direction. These attributes were also characteristic of Los Pinos, as Peralta residents quickly pointed out when they
learned of Carleton's decision to abandon the post,7s
The lessors would not bend to Carleton's will. They threatened to
make a claim for damages against the United States for violation of
contract should the army abandon the post before the lease expired.
Furthermore, early in 1866 attorneys Merrill Ashurst and Stephen B.
Elkins, on behalf of Dolores Perea de Connelly and her two sons,
presented a petition to Carleton requesting that a board of officers
ascertain the amount of wood that Navajos had destroyed while they
were encamped at Los Pinos. The petitioners believed that in leasing
the property they had authorized troops only, and not several thousand
Indians, to use wood on the premises. Timber was scarce along the
Rio Grande, and they wanted reimbursement. On Carleton's orders,
73. Wood to Commanding Officer, all posts, June 18, 1865, Carleton to Lewis, June
19, 1865, and Cutler to Lewis, June 25, 1865, LS, Dept. NM, M-1072, roll 3, RG 393;
Lewis to Thomasson, June 20, 1865, LS, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393.
74. Special Orders, Nos. 68, 69, September 4, 1865, Los Pinos, RG 393.
75. Carleton to Drum, September 15, 1865, War of the Rebellion, Series 1, part 2, 48:
1230-34;' Lewis to Adjutant General, February 28, 1866, LR, Dist. NM, M-1088, roll 3,
RG 393.
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a board met at Los Pinos on March 15, but a record of its proceedings
has not been discovered. 76
Despite Carleton's efforts, Los Pinos functioned as a fully operational military post for twelve months following the election, during
which time the post quartermaster continued to employ civilians as
clerks and laborers and to purchase corn from valley farmers. Soldiers
periodically left the post on Indian scouts, including the one that Major
James H. Whitlock led in April 1866, which returned without seeing
any signs of Indians. Prior to their departure, the post mustered only
six officers and fifty-three enlisted men. About five months later, however, two companies of California volunteers arrived, raising its strength
to seven officers and 151 enlisted men. In September many of these
soldiers were discharged, and others left the post for California where
they were mustered out. With the departure of the California volunteers, the military post at Los Pinos was broken up, and a picket of
two non-commissioned officers and twelve men was sent there from
Albuquerque to guard public stores and to maintain the premises until
the lease expired. On April 22, 1867 the picket was withdrawn and the
property was turned over to Dolores Connelly; three soldiers remained
behind (living in a tent) to guard some government hay until it could
be removed to Albuquerque. 77
J. Bonifacio Chaves had been absent in the states when the army
deactivated Los Pinos, and upon his return he sought additional compensation for damages. In a letter dated July 11, 1867, he informed
Colonel Herbert M. Enos, now chief quartermaster for the District of
New Mexico, that when the army returned Los Pinos to his mother,
"the principal house and the outhouses were in a most dilapidated
condition, and presented rather the appearance of ruins than inhabitable places." Nevertheless, the owners were willing to accept this as
"the natural wear of its lease," but they wanted reimbursement for a
small water-driven gristmill, worth five or six thousand dollars, which,
Chaves alleged, the government had received in fine running order.
It was now a complete wreck. Enos rejected Chaves' claims. The army
76. Carey to Meigs, September 23, 1865, LS, CQM, Dept. NM, RG 393; Ashurst and
Elkins to Carleton, [early 1866], LR, Dist. NM, M-1088, roll 2, RG 393; DeForrest to Enos,
March 12, 1866, LS, Dist. NM, M-1072, roll 3, RG 393. Unlike his stepson, Governor
Connelly supported Carleton's military regime. It seems likely that the Chaves brothers
took the lead in thwarting Carleton's attempt to cancel the lease.
77. Returns, Los Pinos, M-617, roll 649, RG 94; DeForrest to Commanding Officer,
Albuquerque, September 25, 1866, LS, Dist. NM, M-1072, roll 3, RG 393; Commanding
Officer to Connelly, April 19, 1867, LS, Post of Albuquerque, RG 393.
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had never used the mill to any extent, Enos stated, and its sorry condition was the result of the action of the elements. 78 No record has
been located to suggest that Dolores Connelly and her sons received
compensation for the mill. The last major action taken by the army in
relation to Los Pinos was the awarding of a contract to William Rosenthal in October of 1870 to remove bodies of deceased soldiers from
the post cemetery for reinterment at Santa Fe. 79
Los Pinos was only one of many western posts that the United
States army occupied during the Civil War, but its history fully reflects
the army's important role in developing the American West. Once the
Confederate threat had ended, the primary task of soldiers at Los Pinos
and at other frontier posts was to subdue Indians and protect western
settlers. The army frequently was called upon to escort civilian supply
wagons, retrieve stolen stock, and even guard farmers working in their
fields. During sporadic outbursts of frontier lawlessness, the army
functioned as a local police force, as it did at Peralta in the 1865 election.
Soldiers became an integral part of western society, frequenting village
dances, imbibing at local saloons, and settling and raising families in
western communities once their enlistments had ended. Frontier posts
like Los Pinos served as an economic stimulus to the surrounding
countryside, providing markets for local crops, building materials, fuel,
skilled labor, and the transportation of men and supplies.
The story of Los Pinos, however, also forms a unique chapter in
New Mexico's Civil War history. The post was located on private property, controlled by the highest government official in the territory,
Governor Henry Connelly, and his stepsons. The price for leasing the
property was enormous, higher than any other rental fee the army
paid in New Mexico during or after the war. In authorizing the lease,
General Canby may have wanted to repay Connelly for losses he suffered during the Confederate invasion, but Canby's successor, General
Carleton, recommended that the lease be annulled to reduce expenditures. Closing the post would also give Carleton an opportunity to
harass a political foe. More important was the role Los Pinos played
in Carleton's Indian program, serving first as a staging area for the
Navajo campaign and then as a forwarding post for Navajo prisoners
78. Chaves to Enos, July 11, 1867, LR, CQM, Dist. NM, 393. Governor Henry
Connelly died August 12, 1866. Enos to Chaves, July 25, 1867, LS, CQM, Dist. NM, RG
393.
79. Contracts made by Quartermaster's Department during year ending December
31, 1870, Senate Exec. Doc. 21 (Serial 1440), 41st Cong., 3d sess., 1871, p. 26.
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enroute to Bosque Redondo. For thousands of Navajos Los Pinos offered a brief respite from the grueling overland march to the Pecos.
Although nothing remains at the site of Los Pinos to remind us of its
military past, the post and the men who served there deserve to be
remembered for the important roles they played in New Mexico's Civil
War experience.
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Heroes or Cowards? A New Look
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at the Battle of Valverde
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Misconceptions and errors regarding the role played by New Mexico's
Hispanic soldiers at the Battle of Valverde have survived for more than
a century, reflecting poorly on the reputation of a whole segment of
the population. Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, commander of Union
forces defeated on February 21, 1862, in that bloody battle on the banks
of the Rio Grande north of Fort Craig, laid the blame for the loss, like
a mantle of shame, over the shoulders of the native people of New
Mexico. In his official report Colonel Canby wrote:
The battle was fought almost entirely by the regular troops
(trebled in number by the Confederates), with no assistance from
the militia, and but little from the volunteers, who would not obey
orders, or obeyed them too late to be of any service. The immediate
cause of the disaster at Valverde was the refusal of one of the
volunteer regiments to cross the river and support the left wing
Charles Meketa has done extensive research on the New Mexico volunteer soldiers
during the Civil War era and is the co-author, along with Jacqueline Meketa, of One
Blanket and Ten Days Riltions (1980). Jacqueline Meketa is the author of Louis Felsellthal:
Citizen-Soldier of Territorial New Mexico (1982) and Legacy of Honor: The Life of Rafael Chacon,
a Nineteenth-Century New Mexican (1986).
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Battle of Valverde, February 21, 1862. Courtesy the authors.

of the army.... Large numbers of the militia and volunteers have
deserted, but this adds to rather than diminishes our strength. 1
Canby's allegations distorted reality to a considerable degree. He
failed to mention that mounted volunteer companies had been the first
Union troops to cross the Rio Grande and engage the enemy at sunrise,
and that five of them had fought throughout the day with courage and
valor. 2 He also seemed to overlook the fact that Colonel Kit Carson's
regiment, once he finally ordered it into battle, displayed exemplary
discipline and effectiveness and that a number of other volunteer and
militia units carried out their orders exactly.
1. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies, Series 1(53 vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), 9: 487.
Since the overwhelming majority of the men serving as volunteers or militiamen were
Hispanics who had been born Mexican citizens, the implications of racial prejudice in
the Anglo perceptions and treatment of them is inescapable.
2. Captain Rafael Chacon of the First Regiment, New Mexico Volunteers, stated
that he and his company, along with Captain James Graydon's Independent Spy Company, were the first two Union units to cross the Valverde ford against the Texans on
the morning of the battle. See Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa, ed., Legacy of Honor: The Life
of Rafael Chacon, a Nineteenth-Century New Mexican (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1986), 166-67. Captains Pedro Sanchez, Juan Sarracino, and Ricardo Branch,
all of the Third Regiment, New Mexico Volunteers, also fought as cavalrymen from early
morning under command of Colonel Jose M. Valdez.
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The pivotal point at which the Battle of Valverde was lost was the
capture of Captain Alexander McRae's battery of cannons by the Confederates. Colonel Canby not only claimed that volunteer troops assigned to its defense broke and ran in the face of the Confederate
charge but also that he could not get the necessary support from Colonel Miguel Pino's command and other Union troops to successfully
counterattack. This, he said, necessitated his order for a retreat from
the battlefield.
Not everyone else involved in the fighting that day agreed. Confederate sources, for instance, admit that their force, whose men and
horses were completely worn out, made a desperate charge from a
position where it was expected that "raking fire would slay the last
man of US."3 Even though the rebels were successful in capturing the
guns, they were further weakened by the casualties they sustained
and might not have been able to long withstand a Union counterattack.
More than one of the federal soldiers later said that they felt the order
to retreat had been unnecessarily premature and that the battle had
been lost at command level.
These opinions, of course, differed sharply from those of Colonel
Canby. He placed the onus of the defeat on the New Mexico volunteers
and militiamen. Over the years his words have been unquestioningly
used as the basis for most of the descriptions of events at Valverde.
The accounts of the few dissenters have been, until recently, mainly
overlooked. 4
Among those who spoke out in opposition to the official version
duiing the last century was A. A. Hayes, Jr. He wrote in 1880:
One cannot write the history of this remarkable campaign
without mentioning the strong opinion of some of Carson's fiery
fighters, and even at least one officer of distinction and experience,
that victory was within their grasp at Valverde and lost by mismanagement. s

3. Don E. Alberts, ed., Rebels on the Rio Grande: Civil War Journals of A. B. Peticolas
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 46.
4. There were, of course, exceptions. For some research that attempted to investigate
many aspects of the role played by the native troops at the battle, see William I. Waldrip,
"New Mexico during the Civil War," New Mexico Historical Review 28 (July 1953),163-82;
and Darlis A. Miller, "Hispanos and the Civil War in New Mexico: A Reconsideration,"
New Mexico Historical Review 54 (April 1979), 105-23.
5. A. A. Hayes, Jr., New Colorado and the Santa Fe Trail (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1880), 170.
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Captain Rafael Chacon commanded a company of mounted volunteers which was part of Colonel Carson's infantry regiment on the
right of the Union line. They successfully drove back two rebel attacks
on Robert Hall's battery just prior to the attack on McRae's battery.
Chacon, too, differed from Canby in his analysis of events:
At the hour the sun went down the order was given to retreat.
I, who already found myself very deep into the enemy zone because of the violence of our attack, did not understand the order
at first for we considered that our charge upon the enemy's main
cavalry had won the battle. I was so loath to leave the field that
my company was the last of our army to retreat and cross the_
river.... The regiment of Colonel Carson fought bravely on that
portion of the field assigned to them, and they would have retaken
the guns that the enemy had captured if the retreat had not sounded
just as they were advancing on the enemy for that purpose. 6
Another who disagreed was John W. Ellis, who served as a sergeant
in Company K, Fifth United States Infantry, during that battle. In May
1892 he recounted details of the fighting in a letter, which supported
the position that the brave and aggressive northern troops were thwarted
by bad decisions made at the highest level of command. Although
biased and not totally accurate, his letter said, in part:
At 7 0' clock in the morning the Battle of Valverde was fought,
and well and valiantly fought, while Col. Roberts of the 3rd
U.S. Cavalry was in command.... When he [Canby] did come
his first act was to move our batteries from their secure position
to one where they could the more easily be captured by the enemy-above a deep and heavy ravine, where Major Lockridge of
the Texas forces came up under the guns and captured them. Here
is where Ben Wingate and Col. Selden with 5 companies of the
5th made repeated charges to retake it, though Canby had three
or four times sent his aide-de-camp to tell him to retreat. But he
returned answer that he would never retreat until he again took
those guns. Finally, a cannon-ball striking him on a leg and shattering it, retreat was ordered and poor Ben was carried across the
river in a blanket and taken to the fort. Canby, that same evening,
went to see him (their rooms being opposite to one another in the
first block of officers' building at Fort Craig). He had no sooner
entered the door than poor old Ben tried to raise himself up, but
he was unable at all, and his last words were, "Leave me. You are
6. Meketa, Legacy of Honor, 169-70.
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E. R. S. Canby. Courtesy National
Archives.
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Benjamin S. Roberts. Courtesy
Massachusetts Commandery, Military Order of the Loyal Legion, and
the U.s. Army Military History Institute.

a traitor. Could I but live to get to Washington!" Thus died as brave
and true a soldier as ever wore the blue, respected and beloved
by his men and his superiors.?
Alonzo 'lckis, a Colorado volunteer, also complained that after
Canby assumed command affairs on the battlefield worsened and that
the fight was lost by bad management. He asserted that "The padre
told Col. Canby he was a traitor. Canby had him placed under guard
for two hours and then released."8
The account of William W. Mills, who had been assigned as an
acting second lieutenant on Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts' staff on the
day of the battle, also supports the position that Colonel Canby, rather
than the indicted New Mexicans, was responsible for the outcome of
7. J. Robert seynn, ed., "A Soldier in New Mexico, 1860-1885," £1 Palacio 65 (August
1958), 143-45. This is a bit theatrical. Captain Ben Wingate did not die immediately, but
lingered on before succumbing on June 1 to complications arising from his shattered
leg.
8. Nolie Mumey, ed., Bloody Trails Along the Rio Grande: A day-by-day Diary of Alonzo
Ferdinand lckis, 1836-1917 (Denver: Old West Publishing Company, 1958), 82.
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the Battle of Valverde. He described events, beginning at 2 p.m., as
follows:
The New Mexican volunteers were keeping the enemy from
the water and skirmishing briskly at times ... So far all was favorable for us except the repulse of Selden.
We had kept them from the water, McRae had beaten their
battery, and the Coloradoans had gained an advantage. We were
well posted and provided; their animals and men were weary and
without water. They could not retreat; they must surrender or
starve or fight quickly and desperately.... At three o'clock that
afternoon General Canby appeared on the field .... after a brief
consultation with Roberts he advanced our battery about five hundred yards, withdrew Selden from its support, leaving only two
companies to protect it, and opened fire. Carson's Mexican regiment had been moved to our right and advanced, and with one
company of Regulars repulsed a charge of Texas cavalry with some
loss. I observed Carson closely. He walked up and down his line,
quietly encouraging his men with such words as "Firme, muchachos, firme." [Steady, boys, be firm.] ... I admired General
Canby alike for his courage as for his amiable character, but I
believe that if Col. Roberts had been left to carry out his plans that
day Valverde would have been a Union victory and the campaign
closed. 9
Thus it would seem that there were manydisgruntled soldiers and
officers among the Union troops after the battle. They faulted Colonel
Canby both for his repositioning of troops upon his arrival on the
battlefield and also for what they saw as his premature order to retreat.
It is also true that Governor Henry Connelly asserted, at the time, that
as the battery was being overrun, Canby ordered other regulars in the
vicinity to advance to its defense but that they refused, setting an
example for some volunteer soldiers who then followed their lead. 10
Yet, even today, it is easy to find accounts by historians, even those
of national repute, who do not fault Canby's command decisions or
the actions of the regulars. Instead, they repeat the tired, old allegations
that the New Mexicans refused to fight.
Canby's degree of responsibility for the final fiasco needs to be
illuminated and the record corrected. After all, his decision to reposition
McRae's battery to a more vulnerable position and then withdraw some
9. William Wallace Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, 1858-1898 (Chicago: Press of W. B.
Conkey, 1901), 56-59.
10. War of the Rebellion, Series I, 9: 638.
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of its support to bolster Hall's cannons on the right was a tactical error.
The Confederate charge against Hall was made by a small diversionary
force and a rebel contingent at least three times larger overran the illfated McRae position. Furthermore, if the facts are impartially examined, those groups of volunteers that Canby specifically cited as responsible for the Union loss can be partly or wholly exonerated.
Two volunteer units that have long been castigated for their role
in the Battle of Valverde were the two companies of New Mexicans
which formed part of the support for McRae's battery-those of Captains Santiago Hubbell and William Mortimore. Captain P. W. L.
Plympton, a regular army officer, in explaining why his battalion had
failed to save the guns from the rebel charge, reported that at the
moment of the attack "a body of Volunteers (Mexican) were seized with
a panic who broke from their positions immediately in front of a portion
of my command and rushed precipitously i~to the river and, I regret
to say, took with them a portion of the left of my battalion in spite of
my individual efforts to stop that flight."11 This accusation was subsequently repeated by Canby in his official report to Washington. This
report resulted in the wide-spread belief that the men of the two volunteer companies ran, thus losing both the battery and the battle.
For many, Canby's report supplied an easy, pat explanation and
named the culprits. No one asked obvious questions such as why
volunteer troops, criticized for months previously by most of the Anglo
professional soldiers as incompetent, would have been placed in a
strategically significant position by Captain Plympton. Also unasked
was what sort of casualty rate the two companies suffered during the
action, and who else, on either side, reported that the first line of
defenders broke and ran.
Eyewitness accounts of the charge upon McRae's battery fail to
make mention of Union troops assigned to defend it as panicking and
deserting in the face of the enemy. Union Colonel Roberts said that
McRae's position was held "with unexampled determination" until
captured, and Governor Connelly spoke of the great losses inflicted
upon the rebels by the battery defenders. Confederate Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Scurry told of his men making a charge "into a driving storm
of grape and cannister and musket balls sent hurling around [them]";
and another southern officer, Colonel Thomas Green, described how
his men made "a most desperate charge and in hand-to-hand conflict
11. Plympton to Henry R. Selden, February 24, 1862, part 1, entry 3183, Records
of the U.S. Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
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completely overwhelmed them, killing most of their gunners and driving the infantry into the river." 12
In order to attempt to determine whether Hubbell's and Mortimore's companies were indeed culpable, an analysis of their casualty
rate was made and compared to those of other units on the scene. A
compilation of the final fatality figures (which would include not only
those who died immediately but also those who perished within days
or a month or two as a direct result of wounds received that day) set
the total number of Union soldiers killed at 100. Of these, eighty were
members of the eight units used to support McRae's guns. Not all, but
most, were killed in the bloody few minutes during which the battery
was charged and captured. In addition, of the 122 Union soldiers listed
as wounded (and surviving) at Valverde, eighty-seven were among the
men clustered around the guns, as were forty-eight of the eighty-seven
listed as missing. 13
A breakdown by company was made to determine which of the
eight units suffered the heaviest casualties in proportion to its size. It
was immediately obvious that Company F of the Seventh U.S. Infantry
sustained the severest losses, by percentage, with nineteen men killed,
seventeen wounded, and six missing out of a complement of sixtynine. 14 Using the same measurements, it also became clear that the
long-vilified Hubbell's company of volunteers incurred the second worst
damage suffered by any Union company at Valverde during the combat.
Out of seventy-four fighters they lost nineteen killed, eleven wounded,
and eight missing-hardly statistics which are compatible with flight
in the face of the enemy. Surprisingly, McRae's individual command
12. War of the Rebellion, Series 1, 9: 515, 520.
13. Colonel Edward Canby originally reported three officers and sixty-five enlisted
men killed at Valverde and three officers and 157 enlisted men wounded. A number of
the wounded, however, succumbed in succeeding days and weeks. In an attempt to
determine, once and for all, the final cost in death and suffering for the Union troops
at Valverde, exhaustive searches, screenings, and cross-checking was done with the
following sources: the official reports of the Battle of Valverde, in War of the Rebellion; the
Fort Craig post returns; individual military service records of the volunteer soldiers
involved, in the National Archives; a report of killed, wounded, and missing U.S. troops
from the Battle of Valverde, which is part 1, entry 3183, Records of the U.S. Continental
Commands, 1821-1920, RG 393, National Archives; and "List of Officers and Enlisted
Men Killed and Died of Wounds Received at the Battle of Valverde in the Territory of
New Mexico Buried at Fort Craig," dated March 14, 1867, which was compiled by the
adjutant general's office in Washington for those involved in the planning for the Soldiers
Monument which was erected in the plaza in Santa Fe.
14. The company strength figures are approximate in the sense that it cannot be
determined beyond the shadow of a doubt that every single member of a particular unit
was present on the battlefield that day.
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of personnel actually manning the guns, long rumored to have been
heroes who "died down to the last man bravely protecting their weapons," was less damaged proportionally, with eighteen fatalities, fifteen
wounded, and eight missing out of approximately eighty-three men.
Mortimore's company, the other volunteer unit, lost four killed,
four wounded, and an unknown number missing. Exactly how many
of the company's men were present that day is uncertain since some
had been sent away to guard horses held at a grazing camp some miles
away, but the number was probably between forty-five and fifty. These
figures would make Mortimore's unit's casualties similar to several of
the regular army companies protecting the guns, although Mortimore
himself was wounded and one of his sergeants is known to have been
captured by the Texans.
While it is true that no one, other than those men who were present
on that particular portion of the battlefield that day, knows exactly
what happened, it is hard if not impossible to reconcile the Hubbell
company's record with that of a unit of cowardly deserters who fled
from the scene of action. If they were the ones Plympton was referring
to, then they were driven back after taking terrible casualties. If, instead, it was some portion of Mortimore's company which was the
culprit, then Hubbell's men should not have been covered by a blanket
castigation. And one is also left to conclude that several of the regular
army companies whose casualty rates were so similar to Mortimore's
may be those who also fled, yet no criticism of any of the regulars ever
seemed to find its way into print in the succeeding years in the histories
written by Anglo-Americans.
Using the figure of 100 men killed as a direct result of the Battle
of Valverde, as earlier established, it becomes clear that since twentynine of the dead were New Mexico volunteers they represent a significant percentage of total Union fatalities. In addition, at least twenty
New Mexicans can be documented as wounded.
Figures on the missing, however, cannot be accurately tabulated.
Some may have been stragglers who turned up later; others could have
-been captured and subsequently paroled; some may have been deserters; and still others could have been injured, like one private who
sustained a grave facial wound during the charge on McRae's guns,
staggered away from the field of combat, and made his way to a nearby
ranch. Found by the rancher, the profusely bleeding man, who was
barely able to speak, was taken to Socorro by wagon. From there, the
soldier was somehow transported to the village of Polvadera, where
he was observed lying in a wagon for several days, appearing to be at
death's door. At that point, the Texans arrived and captured the town,
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so he was technically a prisoner. The army, however, listed the man
as a deserter. Surprisingly, the private survived and eventually was
well enough to appeal his dishonorable discharge. He was exonerated
and awarded his back pay several years later. IS
Another of Canby's primary scapegoats was Colonel Miguel Pino's
Second Infantry Regiment of volunteers. This was the unit he accused
of failure to ford the river. This he pinpointed as the immediate cause
of the loss of McRae's battery and the subsequent retreat. In contrast,
Pino's official report stated that when the order to cross was received
he and his men began to comply. Pino, however, claimed that "while
this movement was being executed we were ordered back to form on
the western bank where we took our position and fired upon the enemy
until ordered to return to Fort Craig."16 At least one company from
Pino's regiment, along with part of another one, did manage to cross
the river before the general retreat began.
Several years later, an article in a Santa Fe newspaper disputed
Canby's criticism of Pino's regiment, saying:
Again, it was said that Col. Pino's volunteers did not do what
was expected of it [sic] at the battle of Valverde when the fact was
it did all that it was ordered to do on that day and if it did not
participate in the battle it was because it was assigned to other
duty in the early part of the day, in watching the enemy opposite
Fort Craig, and did not receive orders to march to Valverde until
it was too late for it to reach the battlefield before McRae's battery
was charged and taken and our forces on the retreat to the fort.
But two of his companies crossed the river. The charge upon the
battery was not made until some time after Col. Pino was ordered
to abandon his position on the opposite side of the river from Fort
Craig and proceed to the battlefield. His leaving that position relieved a reserve for the Texans .... They too were ordered up to
join the battle. Their line of march was nearly direct, whilst that
of Col. Pino was circuitous. The former consequently .reached the
scene of action first and it is supposed that that reserve formed in
the main the party which so daringly and successfully charged
McRae's batteryY
A thorough analysis of all the available accounts, both Union and
Confederate, and the application of some common sense, leads to the
15. Individual service record, Felipe Maes, Company A, Third Regiment, New Mexico Volunteers, National Archives.
16. War of the Rebellion, Series I, 9: 503.
17. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, May 9, 1863.
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Rafael Chacon, from Historia illustrada de' nuevo mexico.

conclusion that Pino's command was innocent of the charges leveled
against it. Confederate reports verify that troops earlier stationed across
from Fort Craig took an active part in the' final charge of the day. Pino's
men had been required to march at least seven miles while escorting ,
a slow-moving ammunition train, and were forced to ford the Rio
Grande twice-all time-consuming operations. Amazingly, even Canby's report itself seems to verify Pino's version. He said the unit "was
just coming up" when Hall's battery was attacked and that while the
Texans were being repulsed, "At this moment a formidable storming
party ... moved rapidly upon McRae's battery. "18
Canby's blanket denunciation of a militia that had been of "no
assistance" at Valverde failed to differentiate between several groups
of militiamen. He also failed to credit several which did excellent service
away from the actual battle site. Records are scarce, but it is known
that one group of organized militia was ordered to garrison Fort Craig
on the day of the battle and did so, exactly as told, thereby releasing
other troops to be used in the affray. A second group of three hundred
mounted militiamen of the Second New Mexico Militia, commanded
by Colonel Nicolas Pino, was sent to the west side of the Rio Grande
18. War of the Rebellion, Series I, 9: 490.
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where they encountered some Texans and exchanged fire with them.
The rebels then fled toward the battleground. Pino's men began to
pursue them, but received other orders to cut off some enemy wagons.
They discovered an abandoned Confederate ammunition train and
blew it up, destroying much of the Texans' supplies. By the time they
had completed this objective and returned to the fort, it was 10:30 p.m.
and the battle was long over.
In the days after the battle, the "blackwash" of the native soldiers
spread quickly. By February 28, the acting inspector-general in Santa
Fe wrote to General Henry Halleck in St. Louis:
Colonel Canby did everything which man could do to retake his
battery and thus save the day. He beseeched and begged, ordered
and imperatively commanded, troops to save his guns, and a deaf
ear met alike his supplications and commands .... It is needless
to say that this country is in a critical condition. The militia have
all run away, and the New Mexican volunteers are deserting in
large numbers. No dependence whatever can be placed on the
natives; they are worse than useless; they are really aids of the
enemy, who catch them, take their arms, and tell them to go home. 19
Canby also continued his campaign of indiscriminately sullying
the reputations of all the native troops. On March 7, he wrote to another
officer, stating baldly: "Do not trust the Mexican troops. If the Colorado
or Kansas or California troops have not joined you, do not risk an
engagement against the Confederates until they do."20 He reiterated
the warning throughout March in various pieces of correspondence,
that no reliance was to be placed on the New Mexican troops except
for garrisons or for partisan operations.
Once applied, the stigma stuck. In the years that followed some
outrageously distorted charges against the native New Mexican soldiers were disseminated, always from Anglo pens. One colorful example was a speech made by Joseph McC. Bell, a regular who had
been assigned to serve as a lieutenant with the Second New Mexico
Volunteers on the day of the battle. The talk, given to a fraternal organization of veterans twenty-five years later and ostensibly delivered
to give an accurate picture of the military campaign in New Mexico in
1862, was rife with incorrect facts and convoluted Victorian rhetoric.
Bell said:
19. Ibid., 634.
20. Ibid., 647.

CHARLES MEKETA AND JACQUELINE MEKETA

45

Of these two New Mexican Regiments [First and Second Volunteers] too little cannot be said of their valor nor too much of their
inefficiency. Before the insidious advances of the "tortilla" they
were invincible; the red hot chili colorado had no terrors for them,
~nd against whole batteries of canistered beans, Caesar was nowhere. But for anything indigestible, as grape, unfermented, they
retired with respectful celerity, which the demoralization of a single six-pound shot precipitated a stampede equaled only by a break
of terrified buffalo. This little tribute to our Mexican allies, ... I
cannot defer the pleasure of offering now, that there may be no
mistake as to the romantic notion that very much of the valiant
blood of the Hidalgos flows in the veins of the average New Mexican. 21
Further, Bell stated that "at an early moment in our first fight"
Colonel Carson's command, made up of native soldiers, forsook him,
departing and leaving him to fight alone. He further embellished the
story by saying that "Kit went in single-handed and fought the fight
out." Carson's regiment, Bell claimed, was never collected again after
they scattered, and as a result of these events the government awarded
Carson a promotion to general. 22
Bell's ridiculous allegations that the First Regiment of New Mexico
Volunteers ran illustrates how badly garbled many post-battle reports
tended to be. Some self-styled experts failed to distinguish between
Colonel Miguel Pino's Second Regiment of New Mexico Volunteers
and Colonel Nicolas Pino's Second Regiment of New Mexico Militia;
others attributed the sins of a small number of native troops to many
innocent warriors; and still others tended to tar all New Mexicans with
the same brush, while conveniently overlooking any shortcomings exhibited by Anglo soldiers.
It is imperative that historians utilizing Anglo-American sources
describing events during this period in New Mexico history evaluate
them with an understanding of the attitudes of that time. The same
racial and cultural convictions which had fostered the mentality of
Manifest Destiny were at work. Not only were the citizens of Mexican
21. Joseph McC. Bell, "The Campaign of New Mexico, 1862," War Papers (Milwaukee:
Burdick, Armitage and Allen, 1891), I: 47-71. Bell's account contains many statements
that research does not support, and should be approached with skepticism.
22. Many eyewitness accounts state that Kit Carson's First Regiment retreated across
the river and marched back to Fort Craig "in good order, almost as though they were
on parade." Some of those making these assertions were Captain Rafael Chacon, Captain
Edward Bergmann, Captain Louis Felsenthal, and Lieutenant Colonel J. Francisco Chaves,
all of the unit.
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background arbitrarily judged inferior as an entire body, but the volunteer soldiers were also denigrated by the professional army men.
The New Mexicans were relatively powerless, without influence or
contacts in high places in the government or military. They therefore
became the perfect targets for accusations and recriminations. Citing
them as the ultimate cause of the defeat diverted responsibility or blame
from the professional soldiers and safeguarded their future careers.
Long and tedious research has shown, time and time again, that
many contemporary source materials written by Anglo-Americans of
that era which claimed that native troops deserted, are false. 23 Other
sins of omission and comission are common, always, seemingly, to the
detriment of the New Mexicans. 24
The long duration and wide dissemination of these accusations
and untruths had to be frustrating and disturbing not only to the
stalwart fighters who gambled their lives in the service of the United
States, but also to their descendants.

23. Examples can be found in various places. On March 10, 1862, Major J. L. Donaldson, commander of the Santa Fe district, reporting on his march to Fort Union, said,
"Some volunteers also accompanied me, under Lieut. Col. Chavez [sic], but all of them
except the lieutenant-colonel and some officers deserted on the march." This has subsequently been reported as fact. However, research reveals that approximately one-half
of the men left because their six-month enlistment periods were up. Some were erroneously reported as deserters but several years later were exonerated when it was shown
that in fact they had completed their tours of duty. Alonzo lckis, in Mumey, ed., Bloody
Trails Along the Rio Grande, 86, wrote from Fort Craig that "Forty of Kit's men deserted
last night (March 6, 1862) they took ponies and arms with them." This was exactly the
time when approximately forty officers and noncoms from two of Carson's companies
were sent out, under orders, for northern New Mexico. The companies had been cannibalized for personnel to bring other units up to strength and the men went on recruiting
duty to refill them. Examinations of men's individual service and pension records also
turn up innumerable other cases where volunteers were erroneously or unjustly accused
of desertion.
24. Again, examples are numerous. Canby, in his report to Washington on April
11, 1862 (War of the Rebellion, Series I, 9:550), speaks of a skirmish at Albuquerque, stating
that "Captain Graydon's Spy Company, supported by the Regular cavalry," took part
but fails to include any mention of Rafael Chacon and his company. (See Meketa, ed.,
Legacy of Honor, 184.) Also, although never acknowledged in the official reports reproduced in the War of the Rebellion, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Chaves and a group of New
Mexico volunteers, including men from Chacon's company, fought the Confederates at
Apache Canyon on March 26, 1862, and also accompanied Major J. M. Chivington to
Johnson's Ranch on March 28 and took part in the encounter with the rebels when the
Confederate supply wagons were burned. Chivington listed the units which accompanied him in his official report but failed to mention Chaves by name or the New
Mexicans, even though it is known that Chaves led the colonel to the wagon train. See
Meketa, ed., Legacy of Honor, 183, 384.

The Battle of Glorieta Pass:
Was the Guide Ortiz or
Grzelachowski?
FRANCIS C. KAJENCKI

A Roman Catholic priest, identified by historians only as Padre Ortiz,
played a key role in the Battle of Glorieta Pass on March 28, 1862. It
was Ortiz who led Major John Chivington's force, which earlier had
destroyed the Confederate supply train, through the mountains in
darkness to the safety of the Union lines.
On March 26, 1862, advance elements of the Union and Confederate forces clashed at Apache Canyon in Glorieta Pass, thirty miles
southeast of Santa Fe. Chivington defeated the Confederates but broke
off the engagement and retired to his camp at Kozlowski's Ranch. Here
he was joined by the main Union command under Colonel John P.
Slough. Slough planned a two-pronged attack on Brigadier General
Henry Sibley's Confederate army, believed to be at Johnson's Ranch
in Apache Canyon. Slough marched 900 men from Kozlowski's along
the Santa Fe Trail toward the Confederate position. Meanwhile, Chivington with about 450 soldiers, and guided by Lieutenant Colonel
Manuel Chavez, followed a mountain trail to the high ground overlooking Johnson's Ranch. Slough's plan called for both columns to
converge on the enemy.
Francis C. Kajencki, a retired army colonel, lives in £1 Paso and is the author of a
biography of Civil War General Joseph Karge, Star on Many a Battlefield. He currently is
researching and writing about Poles in the nineteenth-century Southwest.
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Becoming impatient, Lieutenant Colonel William Scurry, the senior
Confederate officer at Johnson's, moved down the Glorieta Pass for
about six miles to near Pigeon's Ranch, where he collided with Slough.
They battled each other to near exhaustion for six hours. Although the
Confederates finally drove off the Union troops, their victory was only
temporary, since Chivington struck a devastating blow to their rear.
Arriving on the heights above Johnson's Ranch, he surprised the Con~
federate supply train, loaded with ammunition, clothing, commissary
items, medical supplies, and forage. His soldiers attacked and destroyed the train of sixty to eighty wagons. I
Leaving this scene of destruction, Chivington's raiders climbed
back up to the mountain summit from where they had first attacked.
They were met by Lieutenant Alfred S. Cobb, with orders from Colonel
Slough to rejoin the main command at Kozlowski's at once. Cobb
warned Chivington that the enemy held the trail he followed. Since it
was almost dark, there seemed to be no way to get back safely, and
Chavez knew only the trail along which they had come. He was unwilling to lead the strike force along any other path. William Clarke
Whitford narrates what happened next:
At this point in the deliberation, a Mexican Catholic priest on
a milk white horse, and who is now known to have been Padre
Ortiz, from a small hamlet near the Pecos ruin, rode into their
midst and saluted the officers in Spanish. He offered to lead them
to their camp over the mountain alongside the pass and by a
shorter course, and warned them that if they returned by the old
trail they would doubtless meet with some of Scurry's troops, and
have trouble in the night. Chavis [sic] was acquainted with this
priest, understood what he said, and advised Chivington to accept
his service. In intense darkness, over steep ridges, through narrow
defiles, and along a pathless route, he conducted the column in
safety to the main road near the Pecos pueblo, where the troops
had turned into the Galisteo trail in the morning.
Shortly thereafter Chivington's exhausted command reached Kozlowski's Ranch. Their comrades "joyously welcomed the victors and
eagerly listened to the account of their achievements."z
The destruction of the Confederate supply train turned the Battle
of Glorieta Pass into the decisive action of the Civil War in New Mexico.
1. Martin Hardwick Hall, Sibley's New Mexico Campaign (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1960), 158.
2. William Clarke Whitford, Colorado Volllnteers in the Civil War: The New Mexico
Campaign in 1862 (Denver: State Historical and Natural History Society, 1906), 122-23.

50

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

JANUARY 1987

John M. Chivington and John P. Slough, commanders of the First Colorado
Volunteers at the Battles of Glorieta and Apache Canyon. Courtesy Colorado
Historical Society.

Left without supplies, General Sibley became completely discouraged.
His army retreated to Texas and never threatened New Mexico again. 3
The crucial help of Padre Ortiz made the Union victory possible.
Had Chivington's force been captured or destroyed, Sibley might have
been encouraged to reach for his original goal of capturing Fort Union
and its military stock. The outcome of his New Mexico campaign could
have been much different.
Who was Padre Ortiz? Since this Hispanic surname is common,
what was his given name? Martin Hardwick Hall writes that Ortiz
came "from a small village near the Pecos ruins." Marc Simmons identifies him as "a priest from the village of Pecos." Reginald S. Craig, a
biographer of Chivington, places Ortiz at the Pecos Pueblo. These
historians, unfortunately, are not specific enough. They fail to provide
not only the priest's given name but also his assignment to a parish
or other religious duty.4
3. Hall, Sibley's Campaign. 140-60.
4. Hall, Sibley's Campaign, 159; Marc Simmons, The Little Lion of the Southwest: A Life
of Manuel Antonio Chaves (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1973), 185; and Reginald S. Craig, The
Fighting Parson: The Biography of Colonel John M. Chivington (Los Angeles: Westernlore
Press, 1959), 125.
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Given this uncertainty, this writer undertook to solve the mystery
of Padre Ortiz. The archives of the Catholic Archdiocese of Santa Fe
do not contain any such individual. Furthermore, Fray Angelico Chavez
in Archives of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, 1678-1900, lists four priests
named Ortiz: Fernando, Jose Eulogio, Juan Felipe, and Rafael. But they
all served prior to 1858. The national Catholic directory for 1855 shows
the mission church at Pecos, Nuestra Senora del Refugio, as attended by
the pastor at San Miguel del Vado, the Rev. Francisco Leyva. The 1855
directory also contains the name of the Rev. Fernando Ortiz at San Juan
de los Caballeros. This Indian pueblo is located approximately forty miles
north of Santa Fe, a considerable distance from Pecos.
The next available directory (1865) is devoid of the name Ortiz for
the Diocese of Santa Fe. Priests from Santa Fe made visits to the mission
church at Pecos, now called Nuestra Senora de los Angeles. s
The Rev. Philip Herndon, pastor of St. Anthony's Church in Pecos,
told this writer that the parish was established on October 7, 1862 (six
months after the Battle of Glorieta Pass). It was called initially Nuestra
Senora de los Angeles. The first baptism took place on the same date.
Father Herndon said the signature of the priest who recorded the
baptism is fairly long but illegible. However, he was certain the signature bears no resemblance to "Ortiz." He opined that it is a name
of French origin. Further entries in the church record book continue
until November 30, 1863, when a gap occurs, to 1870. This break explains why the church reverted to the status of a mission, since the
Catholic directory for 1865 shows that Nuestra Senora de los Angeles was
attended by priests from Santa Fe: 6
Could the name of Padre Ortiz be a mistaken identity? Historical
evidence points strongly to Padre Polaco, the Rev. Alexander Grzelachowski and Chaplain of the Second New Mexico Infantry Regiment,
as the priest who led Chivington's men over the pathless route to the
safety of Kozlowski's Ranch.
The Las Vegas, New Mexico, Daily Optic, March 14, 1881, gave
credit to Grzelachowski as the person who guided Chivington's men
5. Fray Angelico Chavez, Archives of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, 1678-1900 (Washington, D.C.: Academy of American Franciscan History, 1957), 260-61; The Metropolitan
Catholic Almanac and Laity's Directory, 1855 (Baltimore: Lucas Brothers, 1855),243-45; and
the same directory for 1865, 182-86.
6. Telephone interview with Rev:. Philip Herndon, pastor of St. Anthony's Church,
Pecos, New Mexico, February 19, 1985. Father Herndon served a number of years in
the Pecos area. In 1978 he was pastor of Our Lady of Guadalupe Church iil Villanueva,
a few miles south of San Miguel del Vado; Catholic Almanac, 1865, p. 183.

52

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

JANUARY 1987

through the mountains to Johnson's Ranch. Noting the nineteenth
anniversary of the Battle of Glorieta Pass, the Optic stated:
With the assistance of A. Grzelachowski, a Polander and at
the present day a prosperous merchant at Puerto de Luna, as a
guide through a secret pass, Chivington started out on his dangerous errand.... The Yankee sharpers reached the train, which
was composed of thirty-six wagons at 2 o'clock in the afternoon .... It was the work of a few minutes only to apply the
torch, and the rations and ammunition of the Texans were soon
sending up volumes of smoke.?
The Optic seems to have ignored the service of Manuel Chavez.
However, a chance discovery of primary source data confirms and
explains Grzelachowski's special role. These data are the facts contained in his letter to Captain Gurden Chapin, Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Department of New Mexico. Writing to Chapin on
August 4, 1862, Grzelachowski stated:
In the engagement between our troops, and the so-called confederate forces, at Canon del Apache, while accompanying Col.
Chivington's command, returning from the place where the enemy's train was by us destroyed, the horse I was riding, my private
property, died. Will you please to inform me if I have a right to
claim from the government an indemnification for my horse, and
if so, what course must I pursue to receive such indemnification. 8
That Grzelachowski's horse died from the ordeal of the march is
not surprising. Even Chivington dismounted and led his horse on foot,
as he stumbled behind the mounted priest. Grzelachowski undoubtedly had to ride his horse to be able to lead the soldiers through the
trackless mountains. 9
Additional evidence points to Grzelachowski as Chivington's guide.
7. "Trouncing the Texans," [Las Vegas] Daily Optic, March 14, 1881; Francis C. Kajencki, "Alexander Grzelachowski: Pioneer Merchant of Puerto de Luna, New Mexico,"
Arizona and the West, 26 (Autumn 1984), 248.
8. Chaplain Alexander Grzelachowski, Second New Mexico Volunteers, to Captain
Gurden Chapin, Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Department of New Mexico, August
4, 1862, microfilm F801R42 1980, reel 16, frame 0436, Register of Letters Received, Headquarters, Department of New Mexico, 1854-1865, University of New Mexico Library.
The author is indebted to Charles Meketa of Corrales, New Mexico, for "discovering"
the letter.
9. Craig, Fighting Parson, 125.
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The Battle of Glorieta Pass, March 26 and 28, 1862. Courtesy National Park
Service.

Whitford states that, when the priest rode up before Chivington and
his officers, he greeted them in Spanish, a language with which Grzelachowski was fluent. Although he was a natural linguist and spoke
several tongues, Grzelachowski preferred Spanish. Even late in life, he
continued to use that language in correspondence with his lawyer,
Louis Sulzbacher, and his merchant friend, Charles Ilfeld. lo
Whitford says that Manuel Chavez knew the priest. "Chavis [sic]
was acquainted with this priest," Whitford wrote, "understood what
he said and advised Chivington to accept his services." Indeed, Chavez
and Grzelachowski knew each other well. Chavez was the lieutenant
colonel, or second in command, of the Second New Mexico Volunteers
and Grzelachowski was the chaplain of this regiment. 11
Some historical accounts identify Chivington's guide as French.
This view would rule out the name "Ortiz." Grzelachowski may have
attended a French seminary, and he was in France at the time he was
10. Kajencki, "Alexander Grzelachowski," 243, 245, 256n.
11. Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 122; "List of Commissioned Officers," Second Regiment, New Mexico Infantry, Description Book of Military Units, 25-26, New Mexico
State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe.
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recruited for service in the Cleveland, Ohio, diocese. Grzelachowski,
therefore, could have been referred to as a "French priest."12
In his official report of the fighting in 1862, Chivington mentioned
an unnamed aide. In 1884, when he wrote his "Retrospective-The
Prospective," he did not identify the nationality of the aide but stated
that "a Roman Catholic priest had joined us at the top of the mountain...." In 1890, Chivington called the aide "a native Catholic priest"
(probably because the priest spoke in Spanish). The Colonel wrote: "I
wish to say of this priest-I wish I had his name-that he was the only
native priest that I saw during the entire campaign and our stay afterward in New Mexico who was loyal to the Federal Government."B
No Catholic priest called Padre Ortiz can be identified in the region
of Pecos, New Mexico, in 1862, when the Battle of Glorieta Pass was
fought. On the other hand, primary and secondary historical sources
prove that Grzelachowski took part in this decisive battle in the same
role attributed to Ortiz. It was indeed Chaplain Alexander Grzelachowski, or Padre Polaco as he was affectionately known, who performed the fateful task that saved Chivington's command from possible
capture and destruction.

12. Charles Gardner, "The Pet Lambs of Glorieta Pass," Civil War Times Illustrated,
15 (November 1976),35; Kajencki, "Alexander Grzelachowski," 244.
13. Chivington's Report, March 28, 1862, Official Records, Series 1, IX, 539; Colonel
John M. Chivington, "The Retrospective-The Prospective," Film P-L 12, Bancroft Library, University of California-Berkeley; J. M. Chivington, "The Pet Lambs," The Denver
Republican, April 27, 1890.

Oliver Otis Howard
ROBERT M. UTLEY

Among the luminaries of the Indian frontier, Oliver Otis Howard, the
one-armed "praying general" of Civil War fame, found himself overshadowed by such bright stars as George Crook, Nelson Miles, Ranald
Mackenzie, and George Custer. He achieved a brief and merited prominence in 1872 for making peace with the Apache, Cochise, and an
uncomplimentary notoriety in 1877 for his apparently futile pursuit of
Chief Joseph and the Nez Perces across Idaho and Montana. Less
visible but more creditable was his management of the campaigns against
the Bannocks and Paiutes in 1878 and the Sheepeaters in 1879. While
not in the front rank of Indian-fighting commanders, however, Howard's place in history does not rest solely on his frontier record. In
addition to his Indian service, he was a corps and army commander
in the Civil War, head of the Freedmen's Bureau during Reconstruction,
educator, humanitarian, churchman, author, and lecturer. He lived a
long and richly productive life, one that posterity has ample cause to
recall and record. l
Robert M. Utley of Santa Fe, New Mexico, is the dean of frontier military historians.
His most recent book is Four Fighters of Lincoln County (1986). He is presently writing a
biography of General George Custer.
1. The standard biography of O. O. Howard is John A. Carpenter, Sword and Olive
Branch: Oliver Otis Howard (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1964). See also O. O. Howard, Autobiography (2 vols., New York: Baker and Taylor, 1907);
and, for the Freedmen's Bureau, William S. McFeely, Yankee Stepfather: General O. O.
Howard and the Freedmen (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1968).
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The outbreak of the Civil War found Howard, at age thirty, a wholly
inconspicuous lieutenant of ordnance in the United States Army. A staff
billet in the little prewar army offered few opportunities for distinction,
and his seven-year career had not been notable. He had been married
for six years and had fathered three children. He had also found Christ,
and increasingly the ministry beckoned. But the bombardment of Fort
Sumter intervened, directing his destiny permanently, if not unwaveringly, in military pathways.
Two valuable assets spurred Howard's subsequent rise. He was
well educated, having attended Bowdoin College as well as the U.5.
Military Academy at West Point. But of even greater importance, he
was well connected with the political leaders of his home state of
Maine-Governor Israel Washburn, U.5. Representative Anson P. Morrill, and, most portentously, the Speaker of the Maine House of Representatives, James G. Blaine. The last, the Republican Party's "Plumed
Knight" of the 1870s and 1880s, became Howard's personal friend and
official supporter for more than three decades. Nevertheless, in a time
when military officers assiduously courted political help in securing
promotion, Howard seems not to have deliberately sought the favor
he enjoyed. Rather, creditable performance won the backing of state
leaders eager to nourish and be nourished by such military talent as
Maine could put forth.
As colonel of the Third Maine Volunteers, Howard fought at First
Manassas. Elevation to brigadier general followed at once. At Seven
Pines, on June I, 1862, two balls shattered his right arm. A surgeon
amputated it at the elbow, and for the rest of his life an empty right
sleeve hooked to a button, together with a Bible in his left hand, fixed
Howard's image in the public mind. Quickly back in the saddle, he
fought at Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg.
Promotion to major general came in November 1862.
A grievous setback at Chancellorsville and a controversial role at
Gettysburg damaged Howard in the Army of the Potomac and prompted
his transfer to the western theaters. Here he did well, serving William
T. Sherman and George Thomas as a quietly competent corps commander in the actions that led to the collapse of Atlanta. When James
McPherson fell in front of Atlanta, Sherman named Howard to command the Army of the Tennessee. In the celebrated "March to the Sea"
and the Carolina campaign that followed, Howard led his army with
an ability that fully met his chief's expectations. For both, the war
ended on May 24, 1865, when they rode side by side at the head of

ROBERT M. UTLEY

Oliver Otis Howard. Courtesy Oregon Historical Society.
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the western armies parading down Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington,D.C. 2
By the close of the war, Howard's distinguishing traits of character
had crystallized and become widely known to the public. The most
conspicuous of these, at times even ostentatious, was an all-pervading
religious outlook. This gave him courage, compassion, strong resolve,
and fixed purpose. Displayed like a conquering banner, however, it
also irritated more worldly associates. Sherman is quoted as declaring
on one occasion: "Well, that Christian soldier business is all right in
its place, but he needn't put on airs when we are among ourselves."3
Generals Joseph Hooker and George Crook made far less charitable
remarks, and a fellow corps commander under Sherman, General Jefferson C. Davis, whose vocabulary was a marvel of the western armies,
countered Howard's piety with spectacular exhibitions of profanity.
Those who penetrated Howard's reserve discovered that his religion
was not excessively prudish or moralistic and that a keen sense of
humor lurked within. Few, however, perceived as acutely as he did
himself the constant inner struggle between the humility decreed by
his religion and the hunger for public approval born in his youth and
encouraged by the military milieu.
A second notable characteristic, doubtless spawned by the first,
was a well-developed social consciousness that led Howard into a
lifelong crusade for the elevation of disadvantaged and minority peoples. He welcomed the assignment to head the Bureau of Refugees,
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands-the instrument fashioned by Congress to care for the recently freed slaves. This work in turn prompted
him in 1867 to help establish Howard University in Washington, D.C.
He served as its president from 1869 to 1874, while managing the
Freedmen's Bureau at the same time. During his frontier service, Howard tried to assume a similar humanitarian stance toward the Indian,
but in this he gained less success. The gulf separating his Christianity
2. In the postwar years Sherman and the regular army paid dearly for Howard's
elevation to army command. The heir apparent to McPherson's post, the Illinois political
general John A. Logan, concluded that he had been deprived of his rightful promotion
by the West Point fraternity, which in a sense he had. After the war he founded the
Grand Army of the Republic, chaired the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, and
devoted his considerable energies to exalting the militia tradition and assailing military
professionals and professionalism. His Senate seat afforded a firm platform for punishing
the regulars for thwarting his ambitions in 1864. In the final parade down Pennsylvania
Avenue, Howard rode next to Sherman in order to let the disgruntled Logan head the
Army of the Tennessee.
3. Lloyd Lewis, Sherman, Fighting Prophet (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company:
1932), 349-50.
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from the Indian's spiritual beliefs inhibited genuine communication.
Years later, near the end of his life, he labored in behalf of Lincoln
Memorial University, an enterprise dedicated to providing educational
opportunities for Tennessee's mountain whites.
General Sherman, head of the postwar regular army, in which
Howard had been commissioned a brigadier general, frowned on his
lieutenant's social work. He believed that the few soldiers permitted
the army should stick to soldiering and leave "education, charity and
religion" to civilian philanthropists. 4 He accurately forecast the grief
that the Freedmen's Bureau would bring to Howard once the politicians
got after him. In fact, Howard's loose administration and innocent trust
in unworthy subordinates hastened the reckoning. He emerged only
slightly tarnished, but happy enough at last to heed Sherman's advice
and to accept command of the Department of the Columbia, in 1874,
with headquarters in Portland, Oregon.
Howard did not come to his new duties a novice in Indian affairs,
for he was already widely known as the general who made peace with
Cochise. In 1872 President U.s. Grant had relieved him briefly from
his Freedmen's Bureau responsibilities and sent him on a special peace
mission to war-torn Arizona. His coming was welcomed neither by a
militant populace crying for extermination of the Indians nor by his
fellow army officers poised for a vigorous campaign against the hostile
Apaches. The department commander, General George Crook, especially resented Howard's interference at a critical juncture in his carefully designed operations. Crook's diary bears witness to the tension
between the two. By contrast, Howard's reports and his memoirs testify to cordial relations maintained, with God's help, despite the trouble-making efforts of unnamed parties. s
Howard made a second trip to Arizona in 1872 that proved more
significant than the first, for then he rode boldly into the Dragoon
Mountain stronghold of Cochise in an attempt to bring peace through
personal diplomacy. For more than a decade this wily and implacable
chieftain, wronged by a blundering young army officer, had waged
unrelenting war on Arizonans. When the general rode down from the
mountains he brought peace in exchange for a reservation in the Chiricahua Mountains. In his reminiscences Howard credits the crucial role
4. Sherman to Howard, November 29, 1873, William T. Sherman Papers, Library
of Congress.
5. Howard's reports and associated correspondence are in the Annual Report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1872 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1872),
148-78. For Crook's diary, see Martin F. Schmitt, ed., General George Crook: His Autobiography (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), 169-73.
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of Tom Jeffords, longtime friend of Cochise, in arranging the parley.
Unmentioned, however, were the peace talkers who preceded Howard
or the fact that Cochise had spent the previous winter at the Canada
Alamosa Reservation in New Mexico in his own quest for peace. Although the danger to the general may have been exaggerated, the feat
was nonetheless significant. For the first time since 1861, Cochise's
warriors posed no threat to settlers. 6
Howard took command in the Pacific Northwest early in the tortured sequence of moves by which the non-treaty Nez Perces were
deprived of their lands and driven to armed resistance. Because of his
triumph with Cochise and rocklike faith in divine guidance, he looked
upon himself as specially qualified to resolve the gathering conflict.
Throughout the preliminaries to war, therefore, he played a more active
part than required of him. His course turned out to be so basically
incompatible with his humanity and sense of justice that he must have
suffered great anguish. His writings are labored efforts to justify himself. Alvin Josephy, historian of the Nez Perces, has noted that as
history they are not very reliable, but that "as evidence of Howard's
personal distress they are more interesting; they reveal points of view
whose hollowness Howard himself could not have failed to recognize."?
Howard's writings about the Nez Perce War exalt Chief Joseph
into a master strategist and tactician, practitioner of "civilized warfare,"
and chief of all the non-treaty Nez Perces. Joseph was certainly a man
of stature and influence among his people and an appealing figure to
the whites. But he was neither the chief of all the non-treaties nor a
military genius. Indeed, he was not even a war chief. Until recently,
however, most histories relied heavily on Howard and thus perpetuated the legend-in the process, incidentally, helping to rationalize the
spectacle of eight hundred Indians leading a U.S. Army general a grueling chase across a thousand miles of mountains and plains.
Much has been written of the heroic flight of the Nez Perces across
the Bitterroot Mountains and the Montana plains, and of the equally
heroic efforts of Howard and his troops to overtake them before they
could reach sanctuary in Canada. Howard endured merciless press
criticism at the time and has not fared well from history since. In
retrospect, he seems to have delayed too long in starting the pursuit
6. For Howard's recollections see Oliver O. Howard, My Ufe and Experiences among
Our Hostile Indians (Hartford, Connecticut: Worthington, 1907), 120-225.
7. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Nez Perce Indians and the Opening of the Northwest (New
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1965), 475n. See Howard, My Ufe and Experiences, 267-300, and O. O. Howard, Nez Perce Joseph (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1881).
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and to have allowed his resolution to waver at critical times. Even so,
in spite of enormous logistical obstacles, sheer bad luck, and repeated
discouragements, he stayed on the trail to the very end. Colonel Nelson
A. Miles' troops intercepted Joseph's people just short of their Canadian destination and gained most of the credit for ending the Nez Perce
War. But as General Sherman pointed out, the "long, toilsome pursuit"
by Howard and his column "made that success possible." Miles' selfish
attempt to exclude Howard from the honors brought rejoinders from
Howard and led to a controversy that at length had to be stopped by
Sherman himself. 8
A perceptive estimate of Howard's course in the Nez Perce operations came from his immediate superior, General Irvin McDowell.
In a confidential letter to Sherman, written at the height of Howard's
pursuit, McDowell wrote:
I have a deep sympathy for Howard, who whilst doing his best
was hounded by the press and had all manner of abuse heaped
on him. But his orders seem addressed to another audience as
well as to his troops, and he cannot quite confine himself rigidly
to his mere soldier work. I think it is to this, in dealing with
Joseph's case in the beginning, that largely caused the attack on
him in the papers when the effort to put Joseph on the reservation
failed! Both your orders and mine required this work to be left
absolutely to the Indian Dept., he merely aiding with his military
force in case of need. But he could not keep in the background
and hence received the stings of the press when the effort failed. 9
Howard did far better the next year, in the Bannock-Paiute War
of 1878. This time he attended more scrupulously to his "mere soldier
work." His intelligence sources warned of approaching trouble, and
when it came his troops had been on alert for a month. Scarcely ha9.
the Bannocks broken from their Idaho reservation and united with
Paiutes in southeastern Oregon than Howard was in the field directing
the concentration of units. Diplomacy, attempted through the Paiute
"princess" Sarah Winnemucca, failed. A vigorous offensive succeeded.
Under Howard's eye, it was conducted over difficult terrain by the
8. For the Nez Perce War, see Josephy, Nez Perce Indians and the Opening of the
Northwest; Merrill D. Beal, "I Will Fight No More Forever": Chief Joseph and the Nez Perce
War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963); Mark H. Brown, The Flight of the Nez
Perce: A History of the Nez Perce War (New York: Putnam, 1967); and Robert M. Utley,
Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan,
1973), 296-321.
9. Irwin McDowell to Sherman, July 31, 1877, Sherman Papers.
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veteran Captain Reuben F. Bernard, one of the most effective field
soldiers produced by the frontier army. At Silver Creek and Birch Creek
the pursuing cavalry overtook and whipped the quarry, then chased
them to and fro across the Oregon deserts until they scattered and
ultimately straggled back to their reservations.
Throughout, Howard performed almost flawlessly. He was lucky
to have Bernard as his striking arm (in fact, may have shunted senior
officers entitled to the command out of the theater of operations). But
Howard alone deserves credit for manipulating many commands over
a large and rugged expanse of wilderness in such manner as to leave
the enemy no alternative but to fight or scatter. Walled in by these
maneuvers, they fought twice, then scattered. The mop-up operation,
too, was organized in a comprehensive fashion that led to the prompt
surrender of most of the fugitives.
The Sheepeater conflict of 1879 in Idaho's Salmon River Mountains
also reflected well on Howard, although it was conducted by subordinates without much oversight from department headquarters. Not
many warriors were involved, but the troops proved that they could
campaign successfully in some of North America's most tortuous country, and Howard and his superiors could take satisfaction in their
record. 10
Howard commanded the Department of the Columbia from 1874
to 1880. Besides his field service in the Nez Perce, Bannock and Paiute,
and Sheepeater operations, he conferred frequently with leaders of all
the tribes within his jurisdiction. In Portland as in Washington, he was
active in church affairs and YMCA work.
In 1880 Howard again plunged into controversy. Scandal involving
a black cadet rocked the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and
President Rutherford B. Hayes looked on Howard as equipped by
temperament and reputation to limit the damage. Summoned to Washington, D.C., he met with the President and emerged as superintendent of the academy. General Sherman, who had not been consulted,
bluntly informed Howard that the assignment was motivated by the
race question. "I believe the army and the country construe you to be
10. For Bannock, Paiute, and Sheepeater, see, in addition to Howard's My Life and
Experiences among Our Hostile Indians, R. Ross Arnold, The Indian Wars of Idaho (Caldwell,
Idaho: Caxton, 1932); George F. Brimlow, The Bannock Indian War of 1878 (Caldwell, Idaho:
Caxton, 1938); Don Russell, One Hundred and Three Fights and Scrimmages: The Story of
General Reuben F. Bernard (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Cavalry Association, 1936); W. C.
Brown, The Sheepeater Campaign (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1926); and Utley, Frontier Regulars, 322-43.
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extreme on this question," he wrote, and therefore he favored another
candidate for the post. 1l
The two years at West Point proved quiet, however, and in 1882
Howard returned to the West to command the Department of the Platte,
headquartered in Omaha. Promoted to major general in 1886, he moved
to San Francisco and assumed command of the Military Division of
the Pacific. He arrived just as General Nelson A. Miles was ending the
Geronimo outbreak in Arizona, but he exerted little influence on the
conduct of operations. Two years later, in 1888, Howard took command
of the Military Division of the Atlantic and settled his family on Governors Island in New York Harbor. In November 1894, retirement ended
his forty-four years of active service in the Army.
Settling in Burlington, Vermont, Howard continued to live an energetic and productive life. He wrote extensively, publishing magazine
articles and books-juveniles, biography, history, and reminiscence.
He lectured widely on the Civil War and on religious topics. And he
campaigned vigorously for the Republican Party in the national elections of 1896 and 1900. Church, YMCA, and educational work occupied
him to the end. Death came on October 26, 1909, two weeks before
his seventy-ninth birthday.
If General Crook can be credited, Howard believed himself divinely
commissioned to uplift the Indian. "I was very amused at the General's
opinion of himself," Crook wrote of Howard's visit to Arizona in 1872.
"He told me that he thought the Creator had placed him on earth to
be the Moses of the Negro. Having accomplished that mission, he felt
satisfied his next mission was with the Indian."12 Howard did not lead
the Indian to the promised land. Indeed, his religion and his ethnocentrism gave him a vision of the promised land quite at variance with
the Indian's. But in him the Indians found a kindly, sympathetic man
who usually treated them decently and who labored for their best
interests as he conceived them. It is for this, rather than for his failure
to develop insights that were also beyond his contemporaries, that he
should be judged. He was truly one of the frontier army's "humanitarian generals."

11. Sherman to Howard, December 7, 1880, Sherman Papers.
12. Schmitt, ed., General George Crook, 169.
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Black Soldiers at Fort Selden,
New Mexico, 1866-1891
MONROE BILLINGTON

Black soldiers played an integral role in opening the American West
after the American Civil War. In the process these soldiers escorted
trains, stage coaches, officers, government workers, and assorted visitors. They built roads, installed military telegraph lines, guarded water
holes, defended supply lines, protected railroad construction crews,
and drove cattle. When Indians and routine military duties were not
the center of their attention, they spent their leisure time on or near
the numerous military reservations throughout the West. Even when
they were not actively engaged in Indian campaigns, their presence in
the West was a deterrent to Indian attacks upon the new settlements.
In short, they aided in bringing a new civilization to western America.
For years books published on the military in the American West
overlooked black soldiers. In the last two decades, however, excellent
research has partially remedied that omission.! Unfortunately, most of
Monroe Billington is a professor of history in New Mexico State University and
author of Southern Politics Since the Civil War (1984) and The American South: A Brief History
(1971).
1. Recent volumes devoted in whole or in part to black soldiers in the West include
William H. Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1967); Arlen L. Fowler, The Black Infantry in the West, 18691891 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1971); John M. Carroll,
ed., The Black Military Experience in the American West (New York: Liveright Publishing
Corporation, 1971); William Loren Katz, The Black West (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1971); Joseph Norman Heard, The Black Frontiersman: Adventures of
Negroes Among American Indians, 1528-1918 (New York: John Day Company, 1969).
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these otherwise well-researched and well-written volumes have ignored or slighted black soldiers in New Mexico Territory. In fact; between 1866 and 1900 black soldiers were stationed at ten of New Mexico
Territory's nearly two dozen forts. Led by white commissioned officers,
the first black troops arrived in New Mexico in August 1866 when one
or more companies of the Fifty-seventh Infantry (Colored) and the One
Hundred Twenty-fifth Infantry (Colored) took stations at forts Bascom,
Bayard, Cummings, McRae, Selden, and Union. The last of these left
the territory inJuly 1900, when a company of the Ninth Cavalry (Colored) was transferred from Fort Wingate to the Philippine Islands.
During that time, between 3,300 and 4,100 individual black soldiers
served in New Mexico. 2
From 1866 to 1891, 400 black soldiers of the United States Regular
Army were stationed at one time or another at Fort Selden in southern
New Mexico. In addition, during that time a total of 600 more black
troops spent a few days there as they traveled to new stations or made
preparations to scout for Indians. 3 The experiences of black soldiers at
Fort Selden, a typical small fort in the southwestern territories of the·
United States, were similar to those of other black regiments on the
American frontier.
Fort Selden was established in April 1865, sixty miles north of
Franklin (El Paso), Texas. The primary responsibilities of troops stationed there were to protect settlers in the Mesilla Valley, immediately
south of the fort, and to watch over and escort travelers moving across
the lower end of a waterless expanse of desert known as the Jornada
del Muerto (Journey of Death).4
In August 1866 Companies A, E, F, and I of the One-hundred
Twenty-fifth Infantry (a Civil War volunteer regiment) arrived at SeIden. Thirteen commissioned officers, including post commander lieutenant Colonel Alexander Duncan, accompanied the 174 black troops.
In September Company A went on to Fort Craig, in October Company
E was transferred to Fort Stanton, and in November Company I left
2. Post Returns, Forts Bascom, Bayard, Craig, Cummings, McRae, Selden, Stanton,
Union, and Wingate, August 1866-December 1899, Records of the Adjutant General's
Office, from U.S. Military Posts, 1800-1916, Record Group 94, rolls 81, 87, 88, 89, 261,
262,275, 710, 1145-47, 1216-19, 1306, 1307, 1449-51, Microcopy Number 617, National
Archives. (Hereafter cited as Post Returns.) While not entirely accurate, a handy volume
for ascertaining troop stations and movements is S. C. Agnew, GarrisOIlS of the Regular
U.S. Army: New Mexico, 1846-1899 (Santa Fe: Press of the Territorian, 1971).
3. Post Returns, August 1866-January 1891, rolls 1145-47.
4. Timothy Cohrs, "Fort Selden, New Mexico," El Palacio 79 (March 1974), 13-14.
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for Fort Bayard. From that time through August 1867, Company F,
composed of about fifty enlisted men, constituted the black troops at
Selden. Serving with these men were an equal number of white troops
of the Third Cavalry. In September 1867 about ninety men composing
Company K, Thirty-eighth Infantry (one of four black regular army
regiments existing at that time) arrived at Selden. Shortly thereafter
the men of the One-hundred Twenty-fifty moved to Fort Riley, Kansas,
for discharge. From September 1867 to October 1869 Captain Edward
Bloodgood and his Company K (whose enlisted members numbered
from seventy-one to 114) served at Selden. Bloodgood served as post
commander for part of this time. 5
While Fort Selden was established in April 1865, not until May
did soldiers actually arrive at the post to begin their duties. Among
the first of their responsibilities was the construction of the post's
permanent buildings. Black troops of the One-hundred Twenty-fifth
Infantry joined with these white soldiers, civilian employees, and military prisoners to work on the building program. The last of the various
construction projects essentially was completed by January 1867. 6
During these early years at Fort Selden, black soldiers spent some
of their time on Indian expeditions. Within a few days after the arrival
of the One-hundred Twenty-fifth Infantry at Selden, Lieutenant Colonel Duncan sent a group of troopers on an eighteen-hour pursuit of
seventy-five Indians who had captured a hay team of eight oxen and
killed the teamster. The oxen were recovered but the Indians escaped
into the San Andres Mountains east of the fore A few months later,
Duncan reported that Indians had been committing "numerous depredations" between Selden and Fort McRae. s
In August 1868 Captain Bloodgood and a party of forty men from
Company K, Thirty-eighth Infantry and Company K, Third Cavalry,
including a Mexican guide and an interpreter (all mounted and with
fifteen days rations), went searching for Indian raiders. They crossed
5. Post Returns, August 1866-0ctober 1869, roll 1145.
6. J. G. Tilford to W. J. Mitchell, January 24, 1867, Tilford to E. A. Rigg, February
22, 1868, W. B. Lane to M. T. Ludington, May 14, 1869, Letters Sent from Fort Selden,
New Mexico, volume 7A-7, Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General, Record
Group 92, National Archives. (Hereafter cited as Letters Sent to Quartermaster General,
RG 92.)
7. Alexander Duncan to E. B. Willis, August 22, 1866, ibid.
8. Alexander Duncan to Cyrus H. DeForrest, October 3, 1866, Letters Received by
Headquarters, District of New Mexico, September 1865-August 1890, roll 2, Records of
U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393, National Archives.
(Hereafter cited as Letters Received by Headquarters, RG 393.)

MONROE BILLINGTON

69

Black cavalrymen in the West. Courtesy Montana Historical Society.

the Rio Grande two miles north of Fort Selden and traveled north to
Palomas! a Mexican settlement at the mouth of the Rio de Las Palomas!
marching about sixty miles in four days. At Palomas they found a
scouting detachment of twenty enlisted men of Company C, Thirtyeighth Infantry, under the unlikely command of William Ellis, a quartermaster's clerk out of Fort McRae. Ellis reported that he and his men
had accidentally encountered a party of one hundred or more Apache
Indians in a dry canyon twenty-five miles west of Palomas. Ellis had
been badly wounded in the encounter. When an Army surgeon from
McRae arrived to care for Ellis, Captain Bloodgood assumed temporary
command of Ellis' men and led the unified command out of Palomas
on a night march after the Apaches. Unfortunately a thunderstorm
prevented them from staying on the Indians' trail. 9
Sometimes Fort Selden served as a focal point for larger operations
against the Indians. In April 1869 six companies of the Thirty-eighth
Infantry arrived at the fort where leaders completed plans for launching
an expedition against the Indians. About one-half of Selden's Company
K was a part of the expedition when Captain Alexander Moore, seven
officers, and 197 enlisted men left the fort for the Guadalupe Mountains
in Texas to pursue a band of Mescalero Apache Indians who had been
9. Edward Bloodgood to Edward Hunter, September 18, 1868, Letters Received by
Headquarters, roll 10, RG 393.
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attacking civilian travelers. The expedition returned to Selden in June
after failing to find the Indians, and later that month the companies
went to their respective stations. lO
A notorious trouble spot was an area in the San Andres Mountains
to the east and slightly south of Fort Selden. Indians often attempted
to steal the animals of the ranches near San Augustin Springs (now
Aguirre Springs), and they sometimes interfered with travelers moving
through San Augustin Pass, a major mountain pass on the road into
the· Mesilla Valley from the east. Between September and December
1868 Selden's commander sent several scouting parties into that area.
Despite these forays, Indians drove away a herd of horses and mules
from a ranch near the pass. 11
In January 1869 Indians killed two civilians as they made their way
through San Augustin Pass. Selden's commander responded by establishing a temporary picket guard and escort composed of First Lieutenant E. A. Rigg and eleven men of Company K, Thirty-eighth Infantry
at Shedd's Ranch (presently the Cox ranch) near the eastern entrance
to the pass. 12 Shortly after this force was relieved, the Indians killed a
traveler in what was considered "the worst Indian country in this
vicinity. "13 Selden's commander reestablished the picket and from timeto-time thereafter black infantrymen and white cavalrymen out of Selden served as guards in the vicinity.
In May 1869 thirty to fifty Indians attacked three cavalrymen as
they were escorting a citizen through the pass. The corporal was killed
instantly and one private, the citizen, and two horses were wounded.
When word of this reached Fort Selden, all available cavalrymen and
infantrymen rode to retrieve the dead soldier's body and to drive the
Indians from the pass. 14
A larger picket of both white and black soldiers was stationed at
the pass for a time following these events, causing the Indians to avoid
the area. Although in August 1869 Selden's commanding officer reported, "Nothing noteworthy has transpired in the vicinity of the picket,"
the peace was shortlived. By October Selden's commander wrote that
the pass "is regarded by all as the most dangerous place in this section
10. Post Returns, April and June 1869, roll 1145.
11. Post Returns, September-December 1868, roll 1145.
12. Post Returns, January 1869, roll 1145.
13. W. B. Lane to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, District of New Mexico, April
19, 1869, Letters Sent to Quartermaster General, volume 7A-7, RG 92.
14. Post Returns, May 1869, roll 1145; W. B. Lane to Acting Assistant Adjutant
General, District of New Mexico, May 9, 1869, Letters Sent to Quartermaster General,
volume 7A·7, RG 92.
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of New Mexico." He was surely correct. In a period of fifteen months
Indians had killed twelve people near the area. IS
Sometimes the Indians were daring enough to attack on or near
the Fort Selden reservation. In November 1867 from twenty-five to
seventy-five Apaches seized the post's quartermaster herd of thirteen
horses and thirty mules. White cavalrymen and a few black infantrymen quickly mounted, chasing the Indians into the Dona Ana Mountains east of the fort. They killed three Indians and captured eight or
ten Indian ponies and all the stolen stock except three horses and three
mules. During this episode, the soldiers shot and killed a Mexican
haycutter whom they mistook for an Indian. 16 Less than three weeks
later the Indians attempted to take the post herd again, and later still,
they drove a mule herd from Fort Selden's reservation. In February
1869 they seized a herd of cattle two miles south of the post, and in
March they cut the ferry cable across the Rio Grande near the site of
Fort Selden, shot an officer's cow, killed a steer, and unsuccessfully
attacked the fort's wood train within the reservation. 17
In October 1869 Captain C. E. Clark and companies A, 0, and H
(out of forts Bayard, Craig, and McRae, respectively), and a detachment
of Company 1, Thirty-eighth Infantry passed through Fort Selden on
their way to stations in Texas. Moving out with those groups was
Selden's Company K. The post garrison had no black troops for the
next six years. 18
The problems black infantrymen at Selden had with Apaches in
the late 1860s were part ,of the larger story of conflict between Indians
and United States military troops throughout the American Southwest
in the post-Civil War era. Apache resistance to white encroachment
upon lands in West Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona grew as they
became conscious of the ultimate consequences of white migration
westward. In the face of increased resistance the army determined to
crush the Apaches.
In 1875 and 1876 Fort Selden served as a funnel for both white
15, Post Returns, June 1869, roll 1145; W. B. Lane to Acting Assistant Adjutant
General, District of New Mexico, May 11, 1869; Lane to William A. Kobbe, May 31, 1869;
E. A, Rigg to Shedd and Blake, July 26, 1869; Frank Stanwood to Acting Assistant Adjutant
General, District of New Mexico, October 28, 1869; D. R. Clendenin to William A. Kobbe,
June 5, 1870, Letters Sent to Quartermaster General, volume 7A-7, RG 92.
16. J. G. Tilford to Edward Hunter, November 22, 1867, Letters Received by Headquarters, roll 8, RG 393.
17. Santa Fe Weekly New Mexican, November'26, 1867; October 6, 1868; March 16,
1869; Post Returns, February 1869, roll 1145.
18. Post Returns, October 1869, roll 1145.
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and black troops reassigned to New Mexico as the army laid the groundwork for a grand offensive against the Apache. In November 1875,
under the command of Major James Wade, companies B, C, and L of
the Ninth Cavalry (plus the regimental band) paused at Selden en
route to forts McRae, Bayard, and Stanton, respectively. The companies
totaled 186. The movement of these troops into New Mexico was the
beginning of the transfer of the entire Ninth Cavalry regiment from
Texas to New Mexico. By early 1876 the remaining companies of the
Ninth had moved into the territory. On March 24, Major Albert P.
Morrow and four companies of the Ninth Cavalry arrived at Fort Selden. Company F, under the leadership of Captain Henry Carroll, remained at Selden, while companies A, 0, and M moved on to forts
Bayard, Union, and Stanton, respectively. In May 1876 companies I
and K and a detachment of G stopped at Selden for about a week
enroute from Fort Clark, Texas, to forts Wingate, Bayard, and Stanton,
respectively. In May 1876, Colonel Edward Hatch, commander of the
Ninth Cavalry and the Military District of New Mexico, toured the
New Mexico forts, including Selden, to view the conditions under
which his men would live and fight. 19
Along with white troops of the Fifteenth Infantry, the Ninth Cavalry's Company F (about forty men) remained at Selden from March
1876 through February 1877, before it moved to Fort Bayard. During
that time at Selden Captain Carroll did more than his share in attempting to control the hostile Indians. Marching 316 miles between
June 28 and July 8, 1876, Carroll, with both black and white soldiers,
scouted the Sacramento Mountains and the adjoining countryside seeking Mescaleros who had left the Fort Stanton reservation and were
committing depredations. The contingent found no Indians but it did
find good water and plentiful grazing. Carroll's report revealed the
problems his men often faced on such scouts. He reported eleven
horses and eight mules temporarily disabled from climbing over fallen
timber and large rocks, and other animals injured because of night
marching. 20
In September Carroll and his company scouted the Florida Mountains. They succeeded in surprising a party of Indians, killing one,
wounding three, and capturing eleven ponies. A black private was shot
19. Post Returns, November 1875, March and May 1876, roll 1146. See also Leckie,
Buffalo Soldiers, 176.
20. Post Returns, March 1876-February 1877, roll 1146; Henry Carroll to Acting
Assistant Attorney General, District of New Mexico, July 12, 1876, Letters Received by
Headquarters, roll 28, RG 393.
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in the arm during the engagement. This expedition marched a total of
274 miles, returning to the post after nine days.21 A month later Second
Lieutenant M. F. Goodwin and twenty-five black troopers entered the
Florida Mountains looking for Indians. Having gone as far as the Ojo
Caliente reservation, they marched 278 miles in six days. In November
a lieutenant of the Fifteenth Infantry led five men of Company F, Ninth
Cavalry and five Pueblo Indian scouts on a fifty-four-mile journey to
seek hostile Indians. During the last month of 1876, Goodwin, ten
enlisted men of Company F, and five Indian scouts made yet another
foray in search of renegade Indians. During January and February 1877
Company F conducted at least six more such expeditions. 22
Troop movements out of Selden in search of Indians in the mid1870s were a part of a concerted attempt on the part of the army from
1876 to 1886 to subdue the Apaches. During that decade both black
and white cavalrymen and infantrymen pursued Indians loyal to leaders such as Juh, Geronimo, Victorio, Nana, and Chatto. The high point
of this activity came in 1879 and 1880 when the Ninth Cavalry in New
Mexico and the Tenth Cavalry (Colored) in Texas fought the Warm
Springs Apache in the Victorio War. While the death of Victorio in 1880
did much to bring peace along the Mexico-New Mexico border, remnants of Indian raiding parties remained, and for another five years
black troops in New Mexico continued to operate against them. For
fifteen years after that, black cavalrymen and infantrymen in New
Mexico (most of them stationed at Fort Bayard) were used to force the
Indians to remain on their designated reservations.
While at Selden in the mid-1870s, black cavalrymen engaged in
activities similar to those which black infantrymen had performed in
the late 1860s. Escort duty continued. In June 1876 a sergeant and four
privates of Company F rode to Aleman Station, located north of Fort
Selden, to accompany a party of citizens who desired to explore nearby
Sierra Soledad. A few months later a sergeant and six black enlisted
men escorted an army paymaster to Fort Stanton, traveling a total of
274 miles. 23 Except for escort duties and occasional Indian scouts, life
normally centered around the dull routine of a small fort.
Military-civilian relations on the frontier were not always the best,
21. Post Returns, September 1876, roll 1146; Charles Steelhammer to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, District of New Mexico, September 18, 1876, Letters Sent to
Quartermaster General, volumes 8 and 9, RG 92.
22. Post Returns, October, November, and December 1876, January and February
1877, roll 1146.
23. Theodore Smith to George Williams, June 26, 1876, Letters Sent to Quartermaster
General, volumes 8 and 9, RG 92; Post Returns, June and December 1876, roll 1146.
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Fort Selden, New Mexico, ca. 1870. Courtesy Rio Grande Historical Collections,
New Mexico State University Library.

and the presence of black troops often heightened the tension. The
combination of troop boredom and civilian racial prejudice was present
on an afternoon in April 1876 when two enlisted men of Company F
became involved in an argument with one David Crockett and two
friends in Schwenck's saloon in Mesilla. That evening the two troopers,
joined by a third, returned to town and found the three white men in
a neighboring saloon at which time the six men engaged in a shootout, resulting in the deaths of the three troopers. 24
To some extent the boredom at Fort Selden was relieved in the fall
of 1876 when the entire fort became aware of an affair between a white
enlisted man and the wife of First Lieutenant M. P. Buffum of the
Fifteenth Infantry. Captain Charles Steelhammer, the post commander,
brought court martial charges against Buffum on the grounds that the
latter was cohabitating with an adultress (his own wife) and that he
was habitually drunk. Along with several other persons who witnessed
the charges and specifications against Buffum were two black enlisted
men of Company F, Ninth Cavalry.25
In February 1877 army officials instructed the commander of the
Military District of New Mexico "to remove the larger portion of the
force now at Fort Selden, New Mexico, to such other post in your
24. Mesilla News, April 8, 1876.
25. Charles Steelhammer to P. T. Swaine, December 28, 1876; Steelhammer to Thomas
Blair, January 6, 1877; Territory of New Mexico, County of Socorro, Exhibit A; Charges
and Specifications Preferred Against First Lieutenant M. P. Buffum, Fifteenth Infantry,
Letters Received by Headquarters, roll 30, RG 393; Henry Carroll to Steelhammer, January 24, 1877, Letters Sent to Quartermaster General, volumes 8 and 9, RG 92.
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district as you may deem best. ... "26 Most of Company F immediately
moved to Fort Stanton, followed in March by a lieutenant and the
remaining twelve enlisted men. With their departure, Selden was once
again without black troopS.27 The remaining white troops stationed at
Selden were gradually reduced,and in July 1878 the army ordered the
post abandoned. During the following September the garrison again
was reduced, and in May 1879 the fort was abandoned and the movable
property transported to Fort Bliss, Texas. 28
Approximately eighteen months later, military officials decided to
reactivate Fort Selden, and on December 25, 1880 Ninth Cavalry Captain L. H. Rucker and his fifty-eight-man Company M arrived at Selden,
joining Company K, Fifteenth Infantry which preceded them by a few
days.29 The effects of many months of neglect and lack of occupancy
of the fort's buildings were everywhere obvious to the incoming troops.
Many buildings were in complete ruins, while others had decaying
adobe walls and dirt roofs. In short, the physical condition of the post
was a disaster. Both black and white soldiers spent weeks repairing
and reconstructing some of the buildings, although several of the original ones were never restored. 30 White troops did the bulk of this
restoration because during most of February 1881 forty-eight men of
Company M were at Deming Station on the Southern Pacific Railroad
line protecting construction crews from Indians, road agents, and bandits. In addition, from April through October all but three of the black
cavalrymen stationed at Fort Selden were on detached service in the
26. Quoted in Cohrs, "Fort Selden," 28.
27. Post Returns, February and March 1877, roll 1146. Although Selden sheltered
no black troops during this time, occasionally such troops were in the Mesilla Valley.
Fort Bayard-based Captain C. D. Beyer and his thirty-one-man Company C. Ninth
Cavalry, after spending weeks in exhaustive pursuit of Indians, were ordered to Mesilla
for "field service," in this case the phrase being a euphemism for a well-deserved rest.
They were away from Bayard from August 14 to September 23, 1877, encamped near
Mesilla during the entire time. Post Returns, August and September 1877, roll 87. The
editor of a local newspaper praised these black troops for being "quiet, sober, polite,
and unobtrusive" and always under "perfect discipline." Mesilla Valley Independent, August
25, 1877,
28. Special Orders 64, from Acting Assistant Adjutant General's Office, July 25,
1878, District of New Mexico, Orders filed with A.G.O" volume 622, printed; Orders:
1879, from Headquarters, District of New Mexico, June 6, 1879, District of New Mexico,
Telegrams Sent, volume 141, p. 147, Records of U.S, Army Continental Commands,
1821-1920, Record Group 98, National Archives.
29. Post Returns, December 1880, roll 1146.
30. O. M. Poe to W. T. Sherman, March 17, 1881, Letters Received from Fort Selden,
New Mexico, rollS (1881), microcopy 689, Records of the Adjutant General (Main Series),
1881-1889, Record Group 94, National Archives (hereafter cited as Letters Received by
Adjutant General, RG 94); Cohrs, "Fort Selden," 30-31.
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Ute country of Colorado. In November Company M was transferred
to Fort Cummings. A final hiatus in the presence of black troops at
Selden occurred between that time and August 1888. 31
Because of the extension of railroads into the Southwest, permitting the army to rapidly move troops over long distances, political and
military officials decided to close many of the small forts in the region
and to concentrate their forces in a few large posts. Thus, in the early
1880s, serious consideration was given to turning Selden from a neglected, minor, one-company post into a permanent, major, twelvecompany fort. When it was decided to expand Fort Bliss instead, Fort
Selden was doomed. 32
In 1887 the army began Selden's final abandonment. In May 1888
the last full company of (white) troops stationed at the fort left, and
Selden became a subpost of Fort Bayard. In August ten men from
companies A, 0, and F of the Twenty-fourth Infantry (Colored) arrived
at Selden-on temporary duty from Fort Bayard-to close down permanently the neglectedand decaying fort. Company F's leader, First
Lieutenant James E. Brett, was post commander for all but five months
of the final two-and-a-half years of Selden's existence. 33
During this final period, the commanding officer and his men faced
a number of problems. Living conditions were admittedly wretched
because the adobe buildings were in such a state of disrepair and were
rapidly disintegrating under the influence of rain and wind. Furthermore, in October and November 1888 nearly twenty-four inches of rain
fell on the Mesilla Valley, endangering supplies and causing the fort's
dirt roofs to leak. 34
31. Post Returns, January-November 1881, roll 1146. For over two years of this
period, Thirteenth Infantry Captain Arthur MacArthur and his family, including the
future General Douglas MacArthur, lived at Selden.
32. P. H. Sheridan to R. C. Drum, February 1881; O. M. Poe to W. T. Sherman,
March 17, 1881; John Pope to R. Williams, January 18, 1882; Sheridan to Adjutant General
of the Army, April 12, 1882; R. T. Lincoln to John A. Logan, May 11, 1882, roll 5, Letters
Received by Adjutant General, RG 94; Sherman to Lincoln, March 30, 1882, roll 91, ibid.
For more details on the possibility and ultimate failure of Selden's expansion, see Cohrs,
"Fort Selden," 34-37, and Hugh H. Milton II, Ft. Seidell, May 1865-JlIlle 1891 (n.p.:
Privately printed, 1971).
33. Post Returns, May and August 1888, roll 1147. In June 1888 the army established
at Fort Bayard the headquarters of the Twenty-fourth Infantry, whose troops previously
served in Texas and Indian Territory. Troops were stationed not only at Bayard but also
at three forts and an Indian agency in Arizona. See Fowler, Black Illfalltry, 81.
34. James E. Brett to Post Adjutant, Fort Bayard, New Mexico, August 30, 1888;
Henry W. Hovey to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Arizona, December 3,
1888, Letters Sent to Quartermaster General, volume 14, RG 92.
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At 12:45 a.m. on the morning of June 7, 1889, Fort Selden experienced a disaster when a fire broke out in the quartermaster's corral.
Brett reported, "The rapidity with which the fire spread was, to say
the least, astonishing." After hearing the first shot of the sentinel, Brett
was at the corral within one minute, finding the· place already enveloped in flames and the animals "succumb[ing] with lightning rapidity."
"The heat was so intense," he reported, "that it was also impossible
to save much of the transportation." Brett acknowledged that "such a
holocaust, such agony, which was equal to Dante's description of Hell,
was previously beyond my description."
Despite the promptness, energy, and courage which all the troops
displayed, the fire gutted the corral, an adobe structure with a brush
roof "which burnt like cotton." Five horses and seven mules were lost,
as well as one Red Cross ambulance, four wagons, three carts, eleven
sets of harnesses, assorted wagon fixtures, and a quantity of lumber.
Several of the men were nearly burned to death in their desperate
efforts to extinguish the fire and save government animals and property. After the fire the post had only two horses, one mule, one escort
wagon, two water wagons, one buckboard, and some harnesses. Brett
borrowed three animals from the post trader for temporary use.
Brett theorized that the fire had been caused by a match accidentally dropped from a teamster's pocket and ignited by the foot of an
animal. The weather had been excessively warm but since the troops
had kept the stalls scr).1pulously clean, he discounted the possibility of
spontaneous combustion. Also, he dismissed the possibility of arson,
since he had seen no strangers around the corral and the troops had
no motive for incendiarism. Some suspicion of arson arose when troopers found two half-pound powder cans near the fire's origin, but they
were quite old and showed signs of rust and exposure. Brett conclud,eci
that the cans had probably been on the roof covered by rubbish for a
long time, only to be discovered by the burning of their covering. 35
An area newspaper argued that the force then at Seiden was too
small to take care of government property adequately. The army agreed
and shortly after the fire seven men of Company H, Twenty-fourth
Infantry out of Fort Bayard temporarily joined the troopers already
35. These paragraphs on Selden's fire are based upon Brett to Acting Assistant
Attorney General, District of New Mexico, June 7, 1889 (telegram); Brett to Acting As~
sistal1t Attorney General. District of New Mexico, June S, 1889, Letters Received by
Headquarters, roll 65, RG 393; Las Cruces Daily News, June 8, 1889. All quotes are from
Brett's June 8 letter.
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Officers' Quarters, Fort Selden, New Mexico, ca. 1870. Courtesy Rio Grande
Historical Collections, New Mexico State University Library.

there. But this numerical strength did not last long for Selden's enlisted
force was soon reduced to ten men again. 36
Generally poor conditions and the fire were not all the discomforts
these men had to endure. From April to July 1890 a smallpox epidemic
occurred in Las Cruces and Dona Ana, causing Fort Selden's surgeon
to quarantine the small garrison, a restriction which no doubt added
displeasure if not discomfort to men assigned to an already isolated
post. 37
The unpleasant conditions at Selden were probably factors in a
crime committed by two soldiers. In April 1890 privates Thomas Crow
and Frank Butler were charged with unlawfully stealing and killing a
calf belonging to the Detroit and Rio Grande Live Stock Company of
Las Cruces. While the two men languished in the Las Cruces jail,
Lieutenant Brett recommended that they be discharged from the military service because Private Crow had previously exhibited moral turpitude and untrustworthiness and Private Butler frequently had been
arrested for similar offenses. Brett described the latter as "weak, trifling,
half willed and comparably worthless." In October 1890 a civilian court

36. [Las Cruces] Rio Grande Republican, June 15, 1889; Post Returns, June 1889, roll
1147.

37. Brett to Post Surgeon, Fort Selden, July 15, 1890, Letters Sent to Quartermaster
General, volume 15, RG 92.
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convicted and sentenced the men to two years' confinement and fined
them $500 and costs. In November the army officially discharged them
while they were in New Mexico's penitentiary.3H
Selden's remaining black enlisted men often gambled, sometimes
with tragic results, even though gambling was officially prohibited. In
September 1890, immediately after receiving pay checks for two months,
the majority of the fort's enlisted men began to gamble in an old house
behind the main barracks. During the course of the day Private John
Hobson lost most of his money, while Sergeant J. W. Scott won about
eighty dollars. After an argument developed between these two men,
Scott struck Hobson with a stick of wood, fracturing his skull. Hobson
died later that day and Scott was charged with murder. Lieutenant
Brett relieved Scott from duty and delivered him into the hands of the
civil authorities in Las Cruces, who were still in charge of him when
Fort Selden was finally closed. 39
As the end of Fort Selden's life drew near all of the men aided in
crating and shipping to Fort Bayard all serviceable property, including
a field howitzer, several other guns and cannon, cartridges, clothing,
a box of medical books, and miscellaneous equipment. The troopers
tore lumber from the old buildings in order to pack these items for
shipment. They shipped to Bayard all usable doors, windows, and
window frames. The soldiers then helped dispose of tents, firewood,
hay, coal, and similar items by auction. Fort Bayard did not need
Selden's pack-covers, aparejos, riding saddles, pack-saddles, or water
wagons, and they were either sold or taken to other posts. Some worthless items were destroyed. 40
38. The paragraphs on Crow and Butler are based upon Brett to Post Adjutant, Fort
Bayard, New Mexico, May 2, June 1, and October 3,28, 1890; Brett to Adjutant General,
July 12, 1890; Brett, fifth endorsement on L.S. #122, Fort Selden, New Mexico, July 25,
1890, Letters Sent to Quartermaster General, volume 15, RG 92. [Las Cruces] Rio Grande
Republican, July 19, 1890; T. R. Bliss to AssistantAdjutant General, Department of Arizona,
July 19, 1888; C. J. Crane to the Warden of the Penitentiary, Santa Fe, New Mexico,
November 19, 1890, Letters Sent by the Post Commander at Fort Bayard, New Mexico,
1888-97, rollI, microcopy T-320, RG 98. (Hereafter cited as Letters Sent by Fort Bayard,
RG 98.) The quote is from Brett's July 12 letter.
39. Brett to Post Adjutant, Fort Bayard, New Mexico, September 18, 21, 1890, Letters
Sent to Quartermaster General, volume 15, RG 92; Crane, first endorsement on Brett's
request that Sergeant John W. Scott be relieved from duty at Fort Selden, December 17,
1890; Bliss to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Arizona, February 9, 1891,
Letters Sent by Fort Bayard, roll 2, RG 98.
40. Henry W. Hovey to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Arizona, March
2, 1889; Brett to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Arizona, June 20, 1890; Brett
to Post Adjutant, Fort Bayard, New Mexico, September 2, 1889; Brett, first endorsement
on L.R. #115, Fort Selden, New Mexico, August 2, 1890, Letters Sent to Quartermaster
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When the hospital corps detachment at Fort Selden was reassigned
for duty at Fort Bayard in October 1890, closing the medical department, the end for the entire post was clearly at hand. It came three
months later. In a final report Brett wrote, "All [movable] public property having been disposed of, the post was abandoned on January 20,
1891." Brett left one non-commissioned officer and three privates to
guard the post's buildings "until such time as the Interior Department
shall take charge of them." In June 1891 the members of this black
guard were removed to Fort Bayard, and on March 30, 1892 the Fort
Selden military reservation was transferred to the Department of the
Interior. 41
Black troops were garrisoned at Selden for eight of the nearly
twenty-six years of its existence. Several dozen black soldiers arrived
about a year after its founding; about 1,000 passed through or were
stationed there during the course of its life; a handful were present at
its demise. Fort Selden's presence in south-central New Mexico helped
to permanently secure that area for settlement, and black soldiers played
no small role in that important achievement.

General, volumes 14-15, RG 92; Bliss to Assistant Adjutant General, Division of the
Pacific, August 11, 1890; Bliss to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Arizona,
November 23 and December 7, 1890; Bliss to Quartermaster General, October 12, 1890,
Letters Sent by Fort Bayard, rolls 1 and 2, RG 98.
41. Post Returns, October 1890, January 1891, roll 1147; Robert W. Frazer, Forts of
the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), 103.

The Victorio Campaign of 1880:
Cooperation and Conflict on the
United States-Mexico Border
BRUCE
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On August 21, 1879, Victorio and a small band of Warm Springs Apaches
bolted from the Mescalero reservation near Fort Stanton, New Mexico.
The following day, Major Albert P. Morrow set out from Fort Bayard
on a grueling pursuit across the United States border into Mexico and
a futile assault upon the Indians' fortified position near the Corralitos
River. Colonel Edward Hatch, commanding the District of New Mexico,
belatedly requested permission for United States troops to cross into
Mexico and urged concerted action between the armed forces of the
two countries. The first of dozens of such requests from American
officials, Hatch's proposal fell on deaf ears in Mexico City. For the next
year, Victorio and his followers spread panic and destruction throughout southern New Mexico, West Texas, and northern Chihuahua. Among
the significant advantages enjoyed by the swift-moving Apaches was
their ability to create confusion by cutting across military and political
borders-in particular, the international boundary separating Mexico
and the United States. Ultimately, the Victorio campaign became a test
Bruce J. Dinges has published extensively on frontier military history. His biography
of Benjamin H. Grierson appears in the anthology Soldiers West: Biographies from the
Military Frontier (1987). He is editor of The Journal of Arizona History.
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Apache leader Victorio. Courtesy Arizona Historical Society.
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of the flexibility of the Army command structure in the Southwest and
a significant episode in United States-Mexican relations.!
The Victorio outbreak erupted during a period of strained relations
along the border dating back almost to the close of the Civil War. When
the Mexican government proved unable-or unwilling-to deal with
Kickapoo raids on Texan cattle and horses, the Grant Administration
in 1873 had adopted an aggressive posture as it surreptitiously authorized Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie to invade Mexican territory and
strike the Kickapoo villages in Coahuila. 2
Mackenzie's stunning military success was not lost on Brigadier
General E. O. C. Ord, who assumed command of the Department of
Texas in April 1875. Ord devoted much attention to the Rio Grande
frontier-so much attention, in fact, that one of his subordinates halfjokingly commented that "Old Ord has got the Mexican border troubles
on the brain."3 When raids by Lipan and Mescalero Apaches from
Mexico into Texas increased in 1875 and 1876, Ord dispatched Lieutenant Colonel William R. Shafter and his resourceful subaltern, Lieutenant John Lapham Bullis, on repeated forays into northern Mexico
at the head of black troopers, infantry, and Seminole-Negro scouts.
Preoccupied with the political upheaval that elevated Porfirio Dfaz to
the presidency in late 1876, the Mexican government was impotent
either to halt Indian incursions from its territory into the United States
or object strongly to American violations of its territorial sovereignty. 4
With the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes as president in March
of 1877, a protracted diplomatic chess game commenced, with the new
chief executive holding out the carrot of recognition to the Dfaz government in return for a remedy to longstanding American grievances,
1. The standard biography of the Apache leader is Dan L. Thrapp, Victoria alld the
Mimbres Apaches (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974). For military operations
during the Victorio campaign, see William H. Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of
the Negro Cavalry ill the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 210-29.
2. A survey of the military aspects of the Mexican border conflict, 1870-1881, is in
Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army alld the Indian, 1866-1891 (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973), 353-77. For Mackenzie's incursion into
Mexico, see R. G. Carter, 011 the Border with Mackellzie (New York: Antiquarian Press,
1961), 416-72; and Ernest Wallace, Rallald 5. Mackellzie all the Texas Frolltier (Lubbock:
West Texas Museum Association, 1964), 92-114.
3. Benjamin H. Grierson to Alice Grierson, July 31, 1877, Box 1, Fort Davis National
Historic Site Papers, Southwest Collection, Texas Tech University, Lubbock.
4. Shafter's activities are described in Paul H. Carlson, "William R. Shafter: Military
Commander in the West" (doctoral dissertation, Texas Tech University, 1973), 182-231.
See also Edward S. Wallace, "General John Lapham Bullis, Thunderbolt of the Texas
Frontier," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 55 (July 1951), 77-85.
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including the chaotic border situation. Diaz, on the other hand, hinted
that Mexico might be willing to negotiate an agreement permitting
border crossings, but only after the United States granted recognition.
No sooner, however, had Dfaz sent a capable commander, General
Geronimo Trevino, to the northern frontier, than Secretary of War
George W. McCrary issued an order of June 1/ 1877/ authorizing Ord/s
troops to cross the Rio Grande when in hot pursuit or on the fresh
trail of marauders. Outraged, the Mexican government two weeks later
instructed Trevino /Ito repel with force the crossing of American troops
into Mexican territory." United States recognition of the Diaz regime
the following April and increased activity of the Mexican military on
the northern frontier eased tensions perceptibly between the two governments/ until the Victorio outbreak dramatically reopened old diplomatic sores. 5
Victorio quickly demonstrated that he was no respecter of nationalities as he terrorized the area around Chihuahua City in Mexico from
his stronghold in the Candelaria Mountains. Following the ambush
and double massacre of civilians from Carrizal, Mariano Sameniego, a
powerful political figure in northern Mexico residing at Paso del Norte,
called for a retaliatory raid by his fellow citizens on the Mescalero
reservation in New Mexico. Louis H. Scott, the American consul at
Chihuahua, reported that the "entire country north of the city" had
been demoralized by the Indian raids. Lieutenant George R. Baylor
and a small party of Texas Rangers and civilian volunteers from Mexico
and the United States appeared to be the only armed force in the field
south of the border. 6
As early as October 1/ the United States Department of State had
instructed its consul at Mexico City, John W. Foster, to press the Mexican government for cooperation between the military forces of the
two countries in pursuit of Victoria's band. Eager to end the destruction
5. John W. Foster to William M. Evarts, January 17, 1878, in Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1878 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1878), 541. Utley, Frontier Regulars, 360-61. The subject of diplomatic relations between
the United States and the Dfaz government is discussed in Daniel Cosio Villegas, The
United States Versus Profirio Diaz (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963).
6. Louis H. Scott to W. Hunter, November 28, 1879, enclosed in Evarts to Alexander
Ramsey, Dece~ber 16, 1879, Victorio Papers, Special File, Letters Received, Military
Division of the Missouri, RG 393, National Archives. Thrapp, Victoria, 255-56. Baylor'S
report of the Carrizal massacre appeared in the New York Times, January 17, 1880. The
activities of the Texas Rangers during the Victorio campaign are described in James B.
Gillette, Six Years with the Texas Rangers, 1875-1881 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1925), 161-69, 180-89.
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and bloodshed on Mexican soil, Dfaz appeared receptive to the American proposal. By early December, General Trevino was organizing a
campaign with500 regulars to drive Victorio back across the Rio Grande.
Consul Scott advised "concerted action" on the part of Hatch's troops
in New Mexico, and became a vocal advocate of permission for troops
to cross into Mexico. "This thing of one side chasing them [the Indians]
across the line, and then in a month have the other side chase them
back again," he prophetically observed, "is in my opinion a poor way
to fight them."? In response to a request from the governor of Chihuahua, Brigadier General John Pope, commanding the Department
of the Missouri at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, deployed Major Morrow's. command in southern New Mexico and requested assistance
from Brigadier General Orlando Willcox, his counterpart in Arizona,
to intercept the Apaches should Trevino drive them back across the
border. 8 To the east, General Ord instructed Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson of the Tenth Cavalry, commanding the District of the Pecos in West
Texas, to cooperate with the proposed movement and to relay information on Victorio's whereabouts to the Mexican commander through
Sameniego in Paso del Norte. This awkward and uncertain passage of
intelligence would continue fitfully throughout the coming campaign. 9
Despite the apparent willingness of the Dfaz government to coordinate military movements against Victorio, politics were uppermost
in the mind of the Mexican leader. Consul Foster toured the frontier
states in the winter of 1879-1880 and found unprecedented peace and
order. He cautioned, however, that presidential elections were on the
horizon and that political violence could be expected. General Trevino
had only recently put down a rebellion in the Chihuahua capital, and
Dfaz could be expected to place the suppression of domestic disorder
above Indian troubles. "While we must recognize the good intentions
of the Mexican authorities and give them due credit for the measure
7. Hunter to Foster, October 1, 1879, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States. 1880 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880),708. Scott to
Hunter, November 28, 1879, Victorio Papers.
8. John Pope to W. D. Whipple, January 9, 1880, Victorio Papers.
9. Telegram, Thomas M. Vincent to District Commander, Fort Concho, Texas, December 11, 1879, Letters Received, District of the Pecos, RG 393, National Archives. For
Grierson's frontier military career, see Bruce J. Dinges, "Benjamin H. Grierson," in Paul
Andrew Hutton, ed., Soldiers West: Biographies from the Militan) Frontier (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 157-75. Grierson's family life is portrayed in William
H. Leckie and Shirley A. Leckie, Unlikely Warriors: General Benjamin H. Grierson and His
Family (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984).
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of peace and order now existing," he cautioned, "we can have no
guarantee that such a state of affairs will long continue."lo
On the opposite side of the river, General Ord was impressed
enough with the improvement of conditions on the Mexican frontier
to recommend in his 1879 annual report that the order of June I, 1877,
be rescinded. In light of the Victorio outbreak and political unrest in
Chihuahua, however, the Texas commander called for more troops to
patrol the north bank of the Rio Grande and requested that, for the
time being, the order authorizing border crossing by U.S. troops "not
be modified in any way whatever."lI
Trevino's campaign fizzled, and in early January, 1880, Victorio
crossed back into New Mexico. While Hatch's troopers rode their mounts
into the ground in fruitless pursuit of the Apaches, Hatch's superior,
General Pope, lashed out against the Department of the Interior for
turning reservations into safe havens for hostile Apaches, and announced his intention to disarm and dismount the remaining Indians
on the Mescalero reservation to prevent them from joining Victorio. 12
The attempt to corner Victorio in the Black Mountains of southwestern New Mexico demonstrated that coordination of troop movements could be as difficult across military jurisdictions as across
international boundaries. Hatch's plan called for Captain Curwen B.
McLellan, with troopers of the Sixth Cavalry and Lieutenant Charles
B. Gatewood's Apache scouts from the Department of Arizona, to
cooperate as Hatch moved north with Morrow's command toward the
Mescalero reservation, striking Victorio along the way. Meanwhile,
Colonel Grierson and 280 troopers of the Tenth Cavalry marched north
and west from the Department of Texas to cut off escape in that direction and assist in disarming the Mescaleros. Unfortunately for Hatcn,
Victorio sprung the trap on April 7, when he surprised and severely
mauled Captain Henry Carroll's command in Membrillo Canyon. Hatch
and Grierson converged on the Mescalero reservation on the appointed
day, April 12, but botched the operation. Fourteen warriors were killed
in the ensuing melee and at least two dozen escaped.
Their tasks completed, McLellan and Grierson returned in early
May to their respective departments, leaving Hatch to continue his
backbreaking pursuit of Victorio through the arid and mountainous
10. Foster to Evarts, December 27, 1879, Foreign Relations, 1880, 726-27.
11. E. O. C. Ord to Adjutant General, Military Division of the Missouri, November
28, 1879, Letters Sent, Department of Texas, RG 393, National Archives.
12. Pope to Whipple, January 9, 1880, Victoria Papers.
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reaches of southern New Mexico. To his evident chagrin, the overworked soldiers shared none of the honors for finally driving the Apache
raiders out of the territory. Rather, on May 24, Henry K. Parker and
a company of Indian scouts jumped Victorio near the head of the
Palomas River. Parker reported killing thirty men, women, and children
and capturing seventy-four head of cattle. Perhaps wounded, and his
band severely crippled, Victorio limped back to the safety of Mexico. 13
In the aftermath of the abortive New Mexico operation, the army
high command nearly committed a fatal blunder. In response to repeated requests from Colonel Hatch, Lieutenant General Philip H.
Sheridan, commanding the Division of the Missouri at Chicago, in late
May dispatched three companies of the Tenth Cavalry from Fort Sill
to West Texas and ordered Grierson to proceed to Fort Stanton, New
Mexico, where he would hold the country east of the Rio Grande while
Hatch operated against Victorio in the west. Confusion resulted for
several weeks as Ord insisted that while detached to the Department
of the Missouri, Grierson remain subject only to orders emanating from
headquarters, Department of Texas. Grierson strongly protested the
move to New Mexico, arguing persuasively that it would lay West Texas
open to devastation should Victorio cross the Rio Grande east of El
Paso. Fortunately Sheridan, who harbored a low opinion of Grierson,
relented and rescinded the order. Grierson immediately deployed his
troops at strategic waterholes to counter Victorio's next move. 14
Meanwhile, the administration in Washington adopted a somewhat conciliatory attitude toward Mexico, while continuing to press
for permission for United States troops to pursue Victorio onto Mexican
soil. Despite Ord's earlier warnings the new Secretary of War, Alexander Ramsey, on February 24, 1880, revoked the order of June 1, 1877,
which allowed army contingents to cross the border in hot pursuit. In
relaying the information to the Mexican consul in Washington, Secretary of State William Evarts expressed the satisfaction of President
Hayes that "the efforts of the Mexican military in guarding the frontier
13. Reports of Hatch's campaign and the disarming of the Mescaleros are in Annual
Report of the s.ecretary of War, 1880 (4 vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1880), 1, 93-104, 154-58. The activities of Gatewood's scouts are recounted in Thomas
Cruse, Apache Days and After (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1941), 53-81. See also,
Thrapp, Victoria, 268-74.
14. Telegrams, Vincent to District Commander, Concho, May 24, 28, 1880; Ord to
Adjutant General, Chicago, June 2, 3, 1880; Ord to District Commander, Concho, June
28, 1880, all in Letters Sent, Department of Texas; Grierson to Assistant Adjutant General,
San Antonio, Texas, June 4, 1880, Telegrams Sent, District of the Pecos, RG 393, National
Archives.
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make the order no longer necessary" and hoped that "no future occurances on the border" would disturb cordial relations between the
two countries. The Mexican representative responded that this action
had dispelled the "only shadow that darkened the northern horizon
of our republic," and accepted it as proof of the Hayes Administration's
desire to establish cordial relations. IS
That the mutual cordiality was more apparent than real became
quickly evident when Victorio exited New Mexico and took refuge in
Mexico for the second time. On June 21, the new American consul, P.
H. Morgan, presented to Mexico's foreign minister, Miguel Ruelas, a
formal request for permission for American troops to cross into Mexico.
Morgan assured Ruelas that upon capture of Victorio's band American
soldiers would immediately withdraw to their own soil and during
their stay would not interfere with the rights of Mexican citizens. "Let
us act now," he pleaded, "and negotiate hereafter."16
Still resentful of Hayes's tardiness in according recognition to his
government and careful not to arouse the wrath of the Mexican electorate on the eve of a presidential election by allowing American troops
on Mexican soil, Diaz stalled. Congress, Ruelas informed Morgan, had
authorized the Mexican president to negotiate a convention providing
for reciprocal crossings by both Mexican and U.S. forces. This Diaz
was prepared to do. He could not, however, allow United States military units unilaterally to cross the border in pursuit of Indians. The
refusal, Ruelas carefully explained, was "not for want of will, but for
the want of legal authority." In the meantime, Mexico's War Minister
had instructed army units nearest the point where the Indians had
crossed into Mexico to undertake pursuit on Mexican soil, "placing
themselves in accord, if this should be possible, with the forces of the
United States, in order to make their mutual cooperation more efficacious."l?
Diplomatic relations grew heated when President Hayes expressed
regret at Diaz's refusal to permit American border crossings and directed Morgan to inform the Mexican government that the United
States would not be held responsible for depredations committed by
Victorio in Mexico, but that it would hold Mexico culpable for damages
should the Indians return to American soil. 18 Terminally ill, Ruelas rose
15. The pertinent correspondence is in Foreign Relations, 1880, 735-36, 744, 781-83.
16. P. H. Morgan to Miguel Ruelas, June 21, 1880, enclosed to Morgan to Evarts,
June 29, 1880, ibid., 759.
17. Ruelas to Morgan, June 23, 1880, enclosed in ibid., 760-61.
18. Evarts to Morgan, July 23, 1880, enclosed in Morgan to Evarts, July 13, 1880,
ibid., 756-57 and 762, respectively.
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from his sickbed to outline his government's position. Mexican refusal
to allow American troops in Mexico could not be considered granting
asylum to Indians, as those very Indians then committed murders and
robberies on Mexican citizens. Nor could Mexico reasonably be held
responsible for future depredations Victorio's warriors might commit
in the United States. Suppressing Indian raids was equally in the best
interests of both countries, and the Mexican government was prepared
to negotiate for reciprocal border crossings to accomplish that end. In
the meantime, the Diaz administration was doing everything in its
power to capture Victorio's band. As examples of Mexico's earnestness,
Ruelas pointed to General Trevino's lackluster campaign the previous
winter and to Colonel Adolfo Valle's expedition just getting under way
in Chihuahua. 19
Attention swiftly shifted back to the military as at 9 a.m. on July
25 Colonel Valle telegraphed Colonel Grierson from the Sierra Borracho, via Fort Quitman, Texas, that Indians had attacked his pickets
in the Sierra Pino, killing one soldier, wounding three others, and
running off ten horses. Valle was marching north and requested that
Grierson cover the passes along the Rio Grande. 20
A violent storm disrupted telegraph communications between United
States and Mexican forces shortly after Grierson received Valle's communication. To his dismay, a ragged and starving army encamped
opposite Fort Quitman on July 29. Valle informed his American counterpart that he was authorized to cross into the United States in pursuit
of Victorio. But the swollen river and the weakened condition of his
command, not having eaten in three days, precluded further operations, even if Grierson had allowed the crossing. Instead, the American
commander issued 3,000 pounds of flour and 1,130 pounds of grain to
the destitute Mexicans and rushed east to intercept Victorio's warriors
in the vicinity of Eagle Springs. 21
19. Ruelas to Morgan, July 23, 1880, enclosed in Morgan to Evarts, July 24, 1880,
ibid., 764-65. Ruelas died eight weeks later, on September 22. John Hay to Morgan,
October 20, 1880, ibid., 780.
20. Telegram, Adolfo F. Valle to Grierson, July 25, 1880, Letters Received, District

of the Pecos, RG 393, National Archives.
21. Telegram, Grierson to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Texas, July
20, 29, 1880, Telegrams Sent, District of the Pecos, RG 393; Receipt for supplies received
by Valle, July 29, 1880, Letters Received, District of the Pecos, RG 393. Grierson to
Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Texas, September 20, 1880, in Annual Report
of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 159. Robert Grierson, the colonel's son, describes a dinner
hosted by the American officers for their Mexican counterparts. See Robert K. Grierson,
"Journal Kept in the Victorio Campaign in 1880," 11-13, typescript, copy in author's
files.
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Benjamin Grierson. Courtesy Fort
Davis National Historic Site, National Park Service.
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Edward Hatch. Courtesy Fort Davis
National Historic Site, National Park
Service.

Grierson's troop dispositions.guarding precious waterholes in arid
and barren West Texas quickly proved their worth. Unlike Hatch, who
wasted manpower and horseflesh in chasing an elusive foe, Grierson
was able to predict Victorio's movements and block his path. On July
30, the colonel, along with Lieutenant William H. Beck, six troopers of
the Tenth Cavalry, and his teenage son who was on vacation from
school, held the waterhole at Tenaja de las Palmas west of Eagle Springs
until help arrived and drove the Indians back across the Rio Grande.
Expecting to trap the fleeing Apaches between his own troops and
those of Colonel Valle, Grierson sent frantic messages to the Mexican
commander to block Victoria's passage south of the river. To his consternation, Valle had marched off in the opposite direction toward £1
Paso to refit and reprovision his command. 22
22. Telegrams, Grierson to Commanding Officer Mexican Troops opposite Quitman,
July 31, 1880; William H. Beck to Palmer, telegraph operator, Quitman, July 31, 1880,
Telegrams Sent, District of the Pecos; Valle to Grierson, August 4, 1880, Letters Received,
District of the Pecos, RG 393. Grierson to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of
Texas, September 20, 1880, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 160. The most
comprehensive study of Grierson's engagement is Douglas C. McChristian, "Grierson's
Fight at Tenaja de las Palmas: An Episode in the Victoria [sic] Campaign," Red River Valley
Historical Review, 7 (Winter 1952), 45-63.
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Within days Victorio reappeared north of the Rio Grande and
commenced a headlong dash toward New Mexico. In a ride reminiscent
of his Civil War cavalry days, the hero of Grierson's Raid outdistanced
the Apaches in a sixty-five-mile, twenty-one-hour march to Rattlesnake
Springs, north of Van Horn. Arriving before Victoria, the black troopers
once more drove the astonished Indians back across the Rio Grande,
only to discover that Colonel Valle had withdrawn his troops entirely
from the frontier to put down a revolution in Chihuahua. "If the Mexican troops had been ready and in condition to attack the Indians when
they were forced across the Rio Grande," Grierson lamented, "or if I
had had authority to pursue them into Mexico ... there is little doubt
that Victorio and his band would have been captured and destroyed."
Like most military men along the border, he concluded that the Mexican
government had failed to take "decisive measures" to expel the Apaches
from Mexican soil, and he remained pessimistic that the Diaz government would ever allow American troop crossings because of the uproar
it would create among the Mexican people. "In any event," he concluded, "no effective co-operation need be expected, on account of the
defective material and organization of the Mexican troops."The colonel
contented himself with holding the waterholes in his sprawling district
and dispatched civilian interpreter Charles Berger and a handful of
Pueblo Indian scouts to trail Victorio into Mexico. 23
Despite Grierson's pessimistic appraisal, the Hayes Administration stepped up diplomatic efforts to pry permission for troop crossings
out of Diaz. On September 15, Acting Secretary of State William Hunter
instructed Consul Morgan once again to press upon Mexico the urgent
necessity of allowing United States soldiers to operate south of the
border or to shoulder responsibility for future acts of violence by Victorio's warriors. 24 The following day, President Diaz in his address to
the opening of Congress informed the assembled delegates that Mexican regulars had driven the Indians north of the Rio Grande and were
operating in conjunction with American forces, with the distinct understanding that neither side would violate the territory of the other.
Evidently Grierson's successful strategy in West Texas appealed to the
Mexican chief executive, as he announced plans to set up military
23. Grierson to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Texas, September 20,
1880, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, 161-62. Grierson's campaign, the only
one he ever conducted against hostile Indians, is described in Leckie, Buffalo Soldiers,
223-29. Berger reported his scout in Mexico to William H. Beck, August 23, 1880, Letters
Received, District of the Pecos, RG 393.
24. Hunter to Morgan, September 15, 1880, Foreign Relations, 1880, 768.
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colonies at waterholes in northern Mexico to block further Apache
incursions. 25 Approached by Morgan several days later, Diaz continued
to hold out for a treaty allowing reciprocal border crossings. 26
While diplomatic negotiations stalemated, the military seized the
initiative. In late August, Luis Terrazas, governor of Chihuahua, ordered his cousin Colonel Joaquin Terrazas and Colonel Valle into the
field to hunt down and destroy Victorio's raiders. Competent, energetic, and ambitious, Colonel Terrazas embraced the assignment with
vigor and determination. 27
In New Mexico, meanwhile, Colonel George P. Buell of the Fifteenth Infantry had for some time been restless to follow the Apache
marauders into Mexico. His opportunity arrived when Captain Henry
Brinkerhoff, commanding at Fort Bliss, Texas, forwarded to Colonel
Hatch a copy of instructions, in Spanish, from the Mexican war minister
to Colonel Valle. Translated into English, the letter suggested to Hatch
that the Mexicangovernment had approved cooperation between United
States and Mexican forces, without regard to national boundaries. Eager to seize the initiative, the New Mexico commander recommended
to General Pope that joint operations be undertaken. Pope concurred
and on September 10 ordered Buell and requested Colonel Eugene Carr
from Arizona to converge in Mexico and coordinate their movements
with those of Colonel Terrazas, who was marching north toward Victorio's reported encampment in the vicinity of Laguna de Guzman. 28
Caught between Mexican forces moving north, Carr's meandering
Arizona column, and Buell's command (which included Lieutenant
Baylor's volunteers and Berger's Pueblo scouts) driving south and east,
Victorio withdrew into the fortified recesses of the Candelaria Mountains. At the same time, however, authorities on both sides of the Rio
Grande were questioning Buell's presence in Mexico. Urged by the
impetuous colonel to join the pursuit in Chihuahua, Colonel Grierson
responded, "Latest information I have received from Department
Headquarters inform me that there is no authority for United States
troops to cross into Mexico.... [U]ntil I have proper authority to cross
25. Diaz's speech is enclosed in Morgan to Evarts, September 16, 1880, ibid., 76874.

26. Morgan to Evarts, September 21, 1880, ibid., 774-76.
27. For a description and evaluation of Joaquin Terrazas, see Thrapp, Victoria, 293.
28. Valle to H. R. Brinkerhoff, August 9, 1880, enclosed in Edward Hatch to Headquarters, Department of the Missouri, August 18, 1880; telegram, George P. Buell to
Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, October 15, 1880, both in
Victorio Papers. A copy of Buell's dispatch appeared in the New York Times, October 28,
1880.

BRUCE

J.

DINGES

93

my troops into Mexico, will certainly not do so, and regret I cannot
comply with your request. "29
The State Department also was puzzled by Buell's incursion across
the border. Correspondence moved slowly through bureaucratic channels and it was September 20 before the Secretary of State was able to
examine the Mexican war minister's letter of August 9 to Colonel Valle
and relay his opinion, through the Secretary of War, to General Sheridan. The original translation, the secretary reported, was flawed. Instead of authorizing United States troops to cross the international
boundary, the communication only urged cooperation and continued
communication between American and Mexican units on the frontier.
The Dfaz government had, in fact, reiterated its insistence that military
operations be conducted with scrupulous observance of territorial limits. Buell's presence in Mexico clearly violated international law, and
on October 9 or 10, General Pope cryptically telegraphed the colonel
to return "as soon as he can do so, without compromising Terrassas."3o
By the time he received Pope's order, Buell was already moving
north. It is unlikely that without the Americans' help Terrazas would
have cornered Victorio, and he was openly grateful for their assistance.
Nevertheless, he was also aware of the public outcry and the political
repercussions that would ensue should the American troops participate
in the capture of the Apaches on Mexican soil. Consequently, on the
night of October 9, he notified Colonel Buell that the further advance
of United States forces into Mexico was objectionable. Although disappointed at being robbed of the kill, Buell and Carr, along with Baylor's eclectic force, promptly broke off their pursuit. Within a week,
Terrazas brought down the final curtain on the campaign when he
attacked and killed Victorio in the Tres Castillos Mountains. 3!
Although the Victorio campaign ended without a resolution of the
29. Grierson to Buell, October 6,1880, Letters Sent, District of the Pecos, Letterbook,
RG 393. Buell's report is in Martin L. Crimmins, "Colonel Buell's Expedition
into Mexico in 1880," New Mexico Historical Review, 10 (April 1935), 133-42. Eugene Carr's
operations are discussed in James T. King, War Eagle: A Life of General Eugene A. Carr
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 190-95; and Cruse, Apache Days and After,
81-87. Baylor's report to John B. Jones, October 28, 1880, is in Texas Adjutant General's
Office Transcripts, 1879-1880, Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas, Austin.
30. Hunter to Ramsey, September 15, 1880, Victorio Papers. Pope's undated order
is quoted in telegram, Nicholas Nolan to Assistant Adjutant General, San Antonio, Texas,
October 10, 1880, Telegrams Sent, District of the Pecos, RG 393.
31. Buell to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, October 15,
1880, Victorio Papers. Baylor to Jones, October 28, 1880, Texas Adjutant General's Office
Transcripts, Barker Texas History Center. Victorio's last battle is described in Thrapp,
Victoria, 293-314.
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United States-Mexican border crossings, it nonetheless represented an
important episode in diplomatic and military relations between the
two nations. By rescinding the objectionable order of June 1, 1877, and
adopting a somewhat less high-handed policy toward Mexico, the Hayes
Administration had removed major stumbling blocks to calmer relations along the border. Poor communications and political upheaval
in Chihuahua made military cooperation difficult. Never'theless, it
brought American and Mexican officers into close contact-often for
the first time-and fostered a measure of mutual understanding and
respect. Few any longer doubted Diaz's sincerity when he pmmised
to resolve the Indian pmblem on his country's northern fmntier. Finally, although the question of border crossings remained unresolved,
the two governments had laid the gmundwork for a future resolution
of the problem. On July 29, 1883, new administrations in Washington
and Mexico City, unburdened by the mutual mistrust and political
tensions of the Diaz and Hayes presidencies, signed an agreement for
recipmcal crossings of troops over the border in pursuit of hostile
Indians.

Paper Medicine Man and the
Renaissance in Frontier Military
History: A Review Essay
PAUL L. HEDREN

Captain John G. Bourke is an exemplary example of that small corps
of nineteenth-century literate soldiers who, in multifaceted careers,
were both agents of change on the Indian frontier and also compulsive
chroniclers of dying cultures. Bourke and his few peers believed that
theirs was a last opportunity to chronicle aboriginal societies before
they disappeared altogether. During his career Bourke authored numerous ethnological and historical works, all of which have stood the
test of time, yet the man himself has remained a shadowy figure in
western historiography. Before Joseph c. Porter's Paper Medicine Man,
Bourke was known to students by only one short monograph, in several
minor biographical articles, or hardly at all.
Porter, a curator of Western American History and Ethnology at
the Center for Western Studies, Joslyn Art Museum, is both diligent
in his research and artful in his prose. The combination produces an
eloquent portrait of Captain Bourke. A compulsive diarist and a remarkably productive historian-ethnologist, Bourke left a mountain of
insightful data for his future biographer. Porter mastered this paper
PaulL. Hedren is National Park Service superintendent of the Fort Union Trading
Post National Historic Site, North Dakota. He has authored numerous articles, two
books on the Great Sioux War, and has recently completed a detailed study of Fort
Laramie, Wyoming, during the Great Sioux War.
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Paper Medicine Man: John Gregory Bourke and His American West. By Joseph c.
Porter. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986. xviii + 362 pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $29.95:)
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monster, and through it effectively penetrated his subject's mind. Porter helps us understand Bourke's thought processes, and we learn
about the relationships and context of events that forced his actions.
We soon come to appreciate the sense of urgency which relentlessly
drove him throughout his life. Few Old Army biographers have succeeded so well in comprehending their subjects and recreating their
lives. William S. McFeely's 1981 study of Ulysses S. Grant and Paul
Andrew Hutton's 1985 biography of Philip H. Sheridan'come to mind
as comparable. Surely Porter's biography will rank among these finest. 1
Bourke was indeed a complex soldier. An excellent education in
languages and the classics before the Civil War provided him with a
natural foundation for later literary and intellectual achievement. His
service in the enlisted ranks of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Volunteer
Cavalry from 1862 to mid-1865 was seldom mentioned in later years,
but Bourke was awarded a Medal of Honor for gallantry at Stones
River, Tennessee, and he did attract the attention of Major General
George Thomas, who endorsed his appointment to the United States
Military Academy in 1865. Four years at West Point further ho I1 ed
Bourke's language and intuitive skills. His assignment in 1869 to the
Third Cavalry, which was then stationed in the American Southwest,
hardly suggested the creative and professional opportunities awaiting
him. It was chance, in fact, that brought two unique personalities, John
G. Bourke and George Crook, together.
Crook, promoted to brigadier general and transferred to Arizo.na
in 1871 to defeat the Apaches, sought out staff officers with organizational and administrative skills. Among the first to join him was
Bourke, then twenty-five years old. For the next fifteen years Bourke
and Crook were inexorably linked at the center of the army's role in
Western expansion. Their personalities meshed nicely, so that Crook
soon came to rely on his aide-de-camp as an observer, advisor, confidant, and press agent.
In the 1870s Crook was the army's most successful Indian fighter
and Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan directed him from one scene
of conflict to another. Never distant from the limelight, Bourke observed Crook's successful resolution of the early 1870s Apache Indian
war. Transferred to command the Department of the Platte in Omaha,
Crook quickly organized the 1875 Black Hills scientific expedition to
reevaluate George Custer's findings of the previous year. Bourke went
to the hills· as Crook's personal observer.
1. William S. McFeely, Grant: A Biography (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981); Paul
Andrew Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His Army (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985).
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John G. Bourke. Courtesy Nebraska
State Historical Society.
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George Crook. Courtesy Custer
Battlefield National Monument,
National Park Service.

On the northern plains in 1876-1877 Bourke played a key administrative role in Crook's three consecutive Great Sioux War field expeditions. He was a participant in the four major clashes between
Crook's troops and the allied Sioux and Cheyennes. He witnessed the
surrenders at Camp Robinson, Nebraska, in the late winter and early
spring of 1877 as this protracted conflict finally drew to a conclusion.
Close contact throughout the war with Crows, Shoshonis, and later
Sioux and Cheyennes instilled a new consciousness in Bourke. His
contact with Apache scouts in Arizona had already initiated an enlightened view of native culture, but during and after the Great Sioux War
he came to admire and respect Indian intelligence, courage, and strength,
and to see qualities in Indian culture comparable to features that he
respected in his own culture. This budding interest in the field of
. ethnology led him to keep notes about his native contacts and to collect
pictographs and other artifacts. This growing interest shaped his views
of government Indian policy. After the spring of 1877 he believed that
the "great danger of the future is not from the red man's want of faith
as much as the indifference of our Government to the plainest requirement of honor" (p. 64). This view never drifted from the context of
social evolution held during his age, yet he saw events like the killing
of Crazy Horse as far beyond military necessity. While many of his

PAUL L. HEDREN

99

brother officers remained unconcerned or scornful of Indians, Bourke
became increasingly fascinated.
While persevering on an already demanding administrative schedule, Bourke soon broadened his personal studies to include the eth~
nological literature of the day. He opened contacts with prominent
American ethnologists. John Wesley Powell of the Smithsonian Institution's Bureau of Ethnology encouraged Bourke and helped him to
develop guidelines for future field work. Moreover, Bourke sought and
received endorsement from Lieutenant General Sheridan, commanding the Division of the Missouri, to pursue Indian studies. Sheridan
and others in the army's command shared the notion that white settlement was destroying native traditions, and these should be recorded
before they disappeared. In a sense, Bourke and his scholarly-inclined
contemporaries were "salvage anthropologists desperately trying to
retrieve details about aboriginal life from the inexorable movement of
history" (p. 80).
Bourke's ethnological curiosity germinated on the northern plains
among the Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Shoshonis, but his greatest scholarly productivity came from tours through the Southwest beginning in 1881. He was particularly intrigued by the Pueblo Indians
and he also traveled and lived among the Nilvajos, Zunis, Apaches,
and Hopis. Few cultural matters escaped his journals. Daily diary entries were basic to Bourke's routine. Few contemporaries, perhaps
limited to Charles King of the Fifth Cavalry, shared Bourke's compulsive and comprehensive diary keeping. Into his daily journals went a
careful pattern of observations, notes, and opinions. He also laid in
newspaper clippings related to these events, as well as original photos
and pictographs. Bourke usually worked on his journal late into the
evening after others had dropped from exhaustion. One Apache considered it bizarre that Bourke was always "writing, writing, writing."
Why did he do this, the Apache demanded, was he a "paper medicine
man?" (p. 181).
Bourke's ethnological work between 1881 and 1886 intermixed with
administrative and field service with Crook, who was reassigned in
late 1882 to the Department of Arizona to deal with renewed Apache
outbreaks. Campaign service actually provided an excellent opportunity to engage in ethnological study, and Bourke seized every opportunity. On the war front Bourke participated in the continuing struggles
in Apacheria. These eventually led to the subjugation of the Chiricahuas and the unceremonious replacement of Crook by the egotistical
Nelson A. Miles. Bourke was tainted by the imbroglio between these
two officers, to his ultimate embitterment, while personally he basked

100

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

JANUARY 1987

in the glory of repeated scholarly publication and an increasing ethnographic peer recognition for his Indian studies.
Bourke's first major work, The Snake Dance of the Moquis of Arizona,
was published in 1884. Every several years thereafter, other significant
publications appeared, as did dozens of essays, notes, and commentary. Bourke's most enduring book, On the Border With Crook, appeared
in 1891. Although the general and his former aide shared an estranged
relationship in the late 1880s owing to matters of promotion, On the
Border was a fitting memorial to Crook, who died in March 1890. The
book was a creative release for a story about the Apache and Sioux
wars that had been fomenting in Bourke's mind for half a decade. On
the Border With Crook quickly became, and still remains, a classic of
Western American literature and history, in print to this day.
John G. Bourke died in 1896. His final years were filled with frustration over matters of health, the lack of promotion beyond the grade
of captain, and feuds with the War Department over diminished support for his scholarly pursuits. Remarkably, he continued diary notation to the very day of his death.
Bourke functioned at the center of military, administrative, intellectual, and humanitarian concerns with the Western frontier. He deserves to be remembered as an intelligent, active, compassionate soldier
whose field work and writings are a permanent contribution to ethnology and American history. Porter's Paper Medicine Man successfully
presents Bourke in this light.
Paper Medicine Man is also an example of the new vigor of frontier
military history. A solid foundation was created nearly two decades
ago with the publication of Francis Paul Prucha's and Robert M. Utley's
outstanding frontier military overviews in the Macmillan Wars of the
United States series. 2 The careful analysis and insightful interpretations
presented by Prucha and Utley will not quickly be challenged, but they
also pOinted out needs in the field. Porter's Bourke biography meets
one of these needs.
Military biography, for example, is a wide-open field, where numerous leading soldiers deserve comprehensive study. Men like Sheridan, Crook, Miles, Ranald Mackenzie, Charles King, and George Custer
played major roles in the military West. Custer, despite numerous
2. Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier,
1783-1846 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1969); Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue:
The United States Army and the Indian. 1848-1865 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967);
Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1890 (New
York: Macmillan Company, 1973).
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publications, remains a mystery in many ways. Robert M. Utley is
presently working on a short, interpretive biography of Custer. Progress in frontier military biography is marked by Hutton's work on
Sheridan and his new anthology on military figures, as well as recent
books on Wesley Merritt, Benjamin Grierson, and William Hazen, but
the field remains relatively untapped. 3
Prucha and Utley, while providing useful introductions to many
individual Indian campaigns, still left detailed analysis to others. One
of the finest western campaign studies, as a prototype and a chronicle,
remains James L. Haley's The Buffalo War, the story of the Red River
War of 1874. 4 Dan L. Thrapp's several volumes on the conquest of
Apacheria does comparable justice to that subject. 5 Remarkably, considering its international appeal, the Great Sioux War of 1876-1877 is
still without a suitable, comprehensive overview despite. one noteworthy attempt and the existence of numerous battle studies. 6
Non-campaign aspects of the Western military experience have
been the focus of other recent scholarship. Edward M. Coffman's The
Old Army might appear to be short of frontier focus but, in fact, virtually
everything that happened to the army from the time of its founding
to the turn of the twentieth century occurred because of or on the
3. Paul Andrew Hutton, ed., Soldiers West: Biographies from the Military Frontier (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987); Don E. Alberts, Brandy Station to Manila Bay:
A Biography of General Wesley Merritt (Austin: Presidial Press, 1981); Willliam H. Leckie
and Shirley A. Leckie, Unlikely Warriors: General Benjamin H. Grierson and His Family
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984); Marvin E. Kroeker, Great Plains Command:
William B. Hazen in the Frontier West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976).
4. James L. Haley, The Buffalo War, The History of the Red River Uprising of 1874 (New
York: Doubleday, 1976).
5. Dan L. Thrapp, General Crook and the Sierra Madre Adventure (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1972); Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1967); Dan L. Thrapp, Victoria and the Mimbres Apaches (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1974).
6. John S. Gray attempted a detailed overview of the Great Sioux War in his Centennial Campaign, The Sioux War of 1876 (Fort Collins: Old Army Press, 1976), but his
sound synthesis lost direction after a recounting of the Custer battle. Since that conflict's
great field and political actions occurred after June 25, 1876, a chronicle cannot stop
there, regardless of how luring the Custer intrigue. Singular battle studies remain one
of the strengths of scholarship on this prolonged war and an essential Sioux War bibliography must include these secondary works: J. W. Vaughn, The Reynolds Campaign on
Powder River (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961); J. W. Vaughn, With Crook
at the Rosebud (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Company, 1956); Edgar I. Stewart,
Custer's Luck (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955); Paul L. Hedren, First Scalp
for Custer: The Skirmish at Warbonnet Creek, Nebraska, July 17. 1876 (Glendale, California:
Arthur H. Clark Company, 1980); and Jerome A. Greene, Slim BUlles, 1876: An Episode
of the Great Sioux War (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982). Each of these books
contains exhaustive bibliographies.
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western frontier. Some of Coffman's story has seemingly already been
told by Don Rickey, Jr., in Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay, Jack D.
Foner in The United States Soldier Between Two Wars, and Patricia Y.
Stallard in Glittering Misery, but as he explained, he built upon these
and other standard references by asking different questions of his sources.
The Old Army will undoubtedly rank as a masterwork. 7
Robert W. Frazer's Forts and Supplies: The Role of the Army in the
Economy of the Southwest, 1846-1861, William E. Unrau's Tending the
Talking Wire: A Buck Soldier's View of Indian Country, 1863-1866, E. B.
Long's The Saints and the Union: Utah Territory During the Civil War, and
Darlis Miller's The California Column in New Mexico carry military"scholarship into geopolitical contexts. 8 These excellent monographs and others
of their type advance the field while helping to redefine it.
The frontier military experience must also be told from the Native
American perspective. Imagine the insights possible from a carefully
synthesized examination of Indian accounts of a battle such as the
Little Big Horn. Two such studies are underway. In this subfield Robert
Utley has again paved the way in his masterful 1984 book The Indian
Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890. Thomas W. Dunlay's 1982 Wolves
for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States
Army, is already widely regarded as a standard in the field as well. 9
The field of western military history profits from related interdisciplinary work either completed or now in production. An understanding of the physical culture of the frontier army was enhanced by the
7. Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime,
1784-1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Don Rickey, Jr., Forty Miles a Day
on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1963); Jack D. Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars: Army
Life and Reforms, 1865-1898 (New York: Humanities Press, 1970); Patricia Y. Stallard,
Glittering Misery: Dependents of the Indian Fighting Army (Fort Collins: Old Army Press,
1978).
8. Robert W. Frazer, Forts and Supplies: The Role of the Army in the Economy of the
Southwest, 1846-1861 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983); William E.
Unrau, Tending the Talking Wire: A Buck Soldier's View of Indian Country, 1863-1866 (Salt
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1979); E. B. Long, The Saints and the Union: Utah
Territory During the Civil War (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981); Darlis A. Miller,
The Califomia Column in New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1982).
9. Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1984); Thomas W. Dunlay, Wolves for the Blue Soldiers:
Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860-90 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1982).
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Surrender conference between General Crook and Geronimo, Canyon de los Embudos, March 25, 1886. Seated left
to right: Samson Lane Faison, Cyrus Swan Roberts, Geronimo, Concepcion, Nana, Naiche, Marion P. Maus, Jose
Maria, Antonio Besias, Jose Montoya, John G. Bourke, George Crook, and Charles D. Roberts.
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1978 publication of Robert M. Herskovitz's Fort Bowie Material Culture,
a profusely illustrated analysis of the archaeological debris uncovered
at this important southwestern military post. The recent systematic
archaeological surveys of Montana's Custer Battlefield National Monument, coupled with the introduction of new technological analysis,
promises dramatic information on the character of this famous battle.
More generally, the question of firearms in Indian and military possession has received careful examination by Louis A. Garavaglia and
Charles G. Worman in their encyclopedic two-volume study of firearms
of the American West, 1803-1894. This varied scholarship may not force
a reinterpretation of Fort Bowie history, or provide final insight into
the last moments of Custer's life on that dusty Montana hillside, but
they nevertheless help frame exciting perspectives in a most active
field. 10
Books on Bourke, Sheridan,the Old Army, Indian scouts, and
military archaeology are notable additions to the field that is, paradoxically, derided by many who are sure that Prucha and Utley have
already had the final word. To the contrary, military history is undergoing a renaissance, and surely this would have pleased a soldier-scholar
like Captain John G. Bourke.

10. Robert M. Herskovitz, Fort Bowie Material Culture (Tucson: University of Arizona
Press, 1978). Louis A. Garavaglia and Charles G. Worman, Firearms of the American West,
1803-1865 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984); Louis A. Garavaglia
and Charles G. Worman, Firearms of the American West, 1866-1894 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985).

Book Reviews

The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898. By Edward
M. Coffman. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. ix + 514 pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $35.00.)
Edward Coffman is one of the nation's leading military historians. In this
thick volume, richly detailed and well illustrated, he turns his talents to characterizing and personalizing the "Old Army"-the regular establishment that
took root under the Confederation and endured through the nineteenth century until the Spanish-American War. As the subtitle indicates, this is a portrait
of the peacetime army. It does not address the War of 1812, the Mexican War,
or the Civil War; nor is it a history solely of the Indian-fighting army, although
that commands major attention. The Old Army drew its main justification from
the Indian frontier, but it also garrisoned the coastal fortifications, explored
and mapped the continent, engineered rivers and harbors, constructed other
public works, imposed Reconstruction on the South after the Civil War, and
served other national purposes.
This is institutional history, not a history of campaigns and battles. In
eight long chapters, arranged with the Civil War as the rough dividing point,
Coffman dissects and analyzes the institution. He examines organization and
composition, command and staff, logistics, discipline, morale, desertion, training and education, politics and professional rivalries, and all the other institutional dimensions that gave distinctive identity to the Old Army. He assesses
the origins, competence, and performance of the officer corps and the enlisted
complement. Social history is essential to his characterization, and chapters
dwell at length on the daily lives of officers, enlisted men, and women and
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children in rude and isolated frontier forts, in coastal fortifications, and in the
refined surroundings of urban centers.
Coffman has produced a work of admirable professionalism and enduring
significance. Research is broad and deep, in official sources, private papers,
and published reminiscences. His lengthy study of nineteenth-century military
affairs equips him to write with assured authority. Interpretations and conclusions are sound and fortified by illuminating detail and anecdotal illustration.
The specialist will find little to dispute and will welcome a treatment more
thorough than any other. The lay reader may be intimidated by a text that
could have been profitably slimmed, but persistence will be rewarded with an
unrivaled understanding and appreciation of the subject.
The Old Army is destined to take rank as one of a handful of standard
accounts of America's regular army, and the only one of such comprehensive
scope. It is unlikely to be superceded for a generation or more.
Robert M. Utley
Santa Fe

Arms, Indians, and the Mismanagement of New Mexico: Donaciano Vigil, 1846. Edited
by DavidJ. Weber. (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1986. xx + 50 pp. Illustration,
notes. $10.00 cloth, $5.00 paper.)
Donaciano Vigil is well known to most nuevomexicanos. As soldier, statesman, landowner, and patron, his life spanned the last years of Spanish New
Mexico through the entire Mexican period into the first thirty years of the
United States territorial era. He campaigned against "indios barbaros," rebels
who murdered Governor Albino Perez, and tejanos who invaded New Mexico;
served as secretary to Manuel Armijo and as a member of the department's
Assembly; participated in the early U.S. territorial government as secretary
and acting governor; became governor in 1847-1848; served three years as
territorial secretary; and finally was a long-time rancher in the vicinity of Pecos
Pueblo. With such activity, involvement, and his friendship toward norteamericanos, it is understandable that Vigil has been a controversial figure, then
as now.
David J. Weber, well-known professor and chairman of the history department in Southern Methodist University and eminent scholar .of New Mexico, brings to light in this brief monograph two of Vigil's petitions to the
Assembly in June 1846. Vigil requests in the first address that Mexico permit
arms to enter New Mexico duty free from the United States to counter the
depredations of raiding Indians. In the second petition he urges that only
native-born nuevomexicanos be appointed to governmental positions since the
unhappy experience of three outside officials in the preceding decade had
resulted in mismanagement, misunderstanding, disharmony, and rebellion.
The two documents were found in the Ritch Collection at the Huntington
Library and in the Mexican Archives of New Mexico at Santa Fe.
Vigil's petitions are published for the first time in this bilingual study.
Following the editor's introduction discussing the proposals, Vigil's life, and
Weber's methodology, the first document is presented in English and then in
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Spanish, preserving the abbreviations and original terms of the handwritten
manuscript. The same approach is used for the second petition. The reader
may thus compare the editor's translations with Vigil's Spanish and refer to
Weber's extensive notes in the final section for additional information and
sources.
Although neither petition was granted, both are documents of considerable importance. As primary sources, they describe conditions in New Mexico
just before the war between Mexico and the United States. They also show
the divided opinion of nuevomexicanos toward norteamericanos. Furthermore, they are of more than regional interest because they reveal weaknesses
in Mexican administration and defensive measures for New Mexico. Finally,
Vigil's own language is depicted in them, including his use of such phrases
as "indios barvaros" and "hijos del Paiz." As an hijo del pais himself, he
naturally expresses his concerns for New Mexico, his patria chica.
The Texas Western Press of the University of Texas at El Paso again has
demonstrated its dedication to high quality work pertaining to Southwestern
Americana. Weber's extensive contributions make this bilingual monograph
truly valuable to laymen, scholars, and researchers.
Oakah L. Jones
Purdue University

Nelson A. Miles: A Documentary Biography of His Military Career, 1861-1903. Edited
by Brian C. Pohanka. (Glendale, California: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1985.
327 pp. Illustrations, notes, index. $35.00.)
Few army officers of the late nineteenth century equalled the accomplishments of Nelson A. Miles. A native of Massachusetts, Miles entered the volunteer forces as a private at the outset of the Civil War. Forty years later he
retired as lieutenant general after a career spanning the Civil War, Indian
campaigns, and the Spanish-American War. A "brave peacock," as Theodore
Roosevelt once called him, Miles proved a conscientious and practical soldier,
though one prone to contentiousness to the extent that it flawed his otherwise
distinguished service. Given such characteristics, the man would seem an
attractive candidate for a major biographical study. Although several biographies of Miles exist, none fully explores his complexities and motives.
The present volume offers more fodder for such a project. Building on a
manuscript located in the U.S. Military Academy Library, editor Brian C. Pohanka has crafted a useful documentary chronology of Miles's army life. The
book covers his service in the Civil War, Reconstruction, the Red River War of
1874-1875, the 1876-1877 Great Sioux War, the Nez Perce War, the Geronimo
campaign, the Wounded Knee crisis, and the Spanish-American War. Appropriately enough, the volume is heavily weighted toward the Indian wars, the
area where Miles made his most lasting contributions. Each section contains
relevant orders, circulars, and official reports highlighting his various promotions, assignments, and accomplishments.
Of special value are the interesting and well-written introductory passages
prepared by the editor to enhance and provide perspective to the reproduced
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documents, although a few errors exist. Captain Frank D. Baldwin's fight with
Sitting Bull's Hunkpapas occurred on a tributary of Redwater River, not on
Redwood Creek, and it was December 18, rather than December 23, 1876.
Pohanka's comment that the Wolf Mountain battle of January 8, 1877, was
indecisive (p. 90) must be disputed. The battle was strategically important
because it reinforced Miles's policy of segregating the respective followers of
Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse on opposite sides of the Yellowstone River. After
Wolf Mountain, Crazy Horse's disheartened Sioux drifted south and surrendered at the Nebraska agencies.
Despite the general excellence of presentation, two concerns exist. First,
the identity of the author/compiler of the Miles manuscript has not been clearly
established nor discussed. Was it indeed Miles, as is intimated in this volume,
or did one of his associates pull together the documents presented here? Second, much of the manuscript's narrative concerning Miles's derring-do among
the Indians comprises verbatim excerpts from Record of Engagements with Hostile
Indians within the Military Division of the Missouri from 1868 to 1882, compiled at
the behest of General Philip H. Sheridan and published in 1882. This reproduction somewhat neutralizes the anticipated originality of the manuscript.
The documentary record is augmented with numerous photographs of
Miles, many previously unpublished. In sum, Pohanka has rendered an important service in making this record available. The volume makes it clear,
however, that Miles warrants comprehensive biographical treatment.
Jerome A. Greene
National Park Service

Custer for President? By Craig Repass. (Fort Collins, Colorado: Old Army Press,
1985. vii + 127 pp. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $37.50.)
Americans fancy themselves a big-hearted people with a special fondness
for gallant losers. They have forgiven George Washington for his blunders at
Long Island and Germantown, Robert E. Lee for Antietam and Gettysburg,
and Douglas MacArthur for the loss of the Philippines. Nevertheless, the
public's compassion can be oddly selective. America still holds a grudge against
George Armstrong Custer for losing a relatively minor battle at the Little Big
Horn on June 25, 1876.
It is not enough to say that Custer met defeat because he underestimated
the size, prowess, and tactical skill of his opposition-errors occasionally made
by even able commanders. Americans need to believe that there was something
terribly flawed in Custer to justify his downfall. He has been depicted as a
glory-hunting egotist and as a uniformed clown whose earlier successes were
the results of dumb luck. In the 1950s and 1960s, such respected Western writers
as John Humphreys Miller and Mari Sandoz asserted that Custer let political
aspirations cloud his military judgment. They alleged that Custer drove his
Seventh Cavalry to the point of exhaustion and flung it against impossible
odds in the hope of winning a big enough victory to secure for himself the
1876 Democratic presidential nomination. This theory instantly embedded itself in the popular imagination, and it has been further popularized by the
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1970 film, Little Big Man, and Evan Connell's recent best-seller, Son of the
Morning Star.
In Custer for President?, Craig Repass traces the Custer-White House myth
to its sources, the uncorroborated hearsay testimony of an Arikara scout given
thirty-six years after the battle. According to Repass, the elaborate conspiracy
theories spun by Miller, Sandoz, and Connell are fabrications, and in this
instance, his arguments are convincing. By examining contemporary newspapers and manuscript collections in the National Archives and the Library
of Congress, Repass also reveals how the Grant Administration and certain
army officers sought to evade any responsibility for the Little Big Horn disaster
by turning Custer into a scapegoat.
Unfortunately, Custer for President? possesses an unbalanced and amateilfish character. Repass is such an unabashed Custerphile that one is forced
to question many of his minor conclusions. While defending Custer from a
host of unsubstantiated charges, Repass levels some equally reckless accusations at his hero's critics. Finally, the author failed to bolster his case by reading
widely in the rich and voluminous literature on Reconstruction and Gilded
Age politics or by examining the personal papers of many prominent politicians
who played important roles in the election of 1876.
While not without some merit, the irritating defects found in Custer for
President? limit its usefulness.
Gregory J. W. Urwin
Ul1iv~rsity of Central Arkansas

Ten Days on the Plains. By Henry E. Davies. Edited by Paul Andrew Hutton.
(Dallas: DeGolyer Library/Southern Methodist University Press, 1985. xvi +
178 pp. Illustrations, map, notes, il1dex. $21.95.)
The post-Civil War conquest of the West was to many an Easterner a
sojourn into the exotic, whether considered from the point of view of financiers,
artists, or soldier-authors such as Henry E. Davies. In one sense that is what
this small journal of one such "trip into the wilds" was. Organized by Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, it included journalists, social luminaries,
and businessmen from New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago, along with several of Sheridan's old military friends, including Davies.
A holiday spirit prevailed as the group departed Chicago, and they agreed
that trophy cups would be purchased and awarded to the first to kill a buffalo
and an elk. They took the train as far west as Platte City, Nebraska, where
Colonel William H. Emory of Fort McPherson met them. Here the famous
scout William F. "Buffalo Bill" Cody, selected by Sheridan to guide the hunt,
joined the group, and they began their ten days on the plains. By the time
they reached Fort Hays, Kansas, the plains were littered with the carcasses of
more than 600 buffalo and hundreds of elk, antelope, and wild turkeys that
the hunters had slaughtered; Davies closed his journal by pronouncing the
hunt successful and great fun.
In another sense, however, this book is a document of the conquest and
amalgamation of the West into Americansociety during the troublesome, post-
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Civil War years. Calling upon extensive research compiled for his recentlypublished Phil Sheridan and His Army, Paul Andrew Hutton, of the University
of New Mexico, shows how the hunt was indicative of a close, working relationship between the business community and the military establishment,
how Sheridan's policy of destroying the "Indians' commissary" (the great herds
of bison) led to the final defeat of the plains Indians, and how Buffalo Bill, a
popular frontiersman and scout, began the transition to theatrical star and
American hero.
The book is the second volume in the DeGolyer Library Publications Series
and is handsomely produced by Southern Methodist University Press.
Ron Tyler
Texas State Historical Association

War, Revolution, and the Ku Klux Klan: A Study of Intolerance in a Border City. By
Shawn Lay. (El Paso, Texas: Texas Western Press, 1985. xi + 201 pp. Maps,
notes, index. $20.00.)
Shawn Lay's book is the kind of close, detailed study of the Ku Klux Klan
in the 1920s that probably tells us more about why the secret order became so
powerful in so many places, and why its power usually proved so ephemeral,
than studies undertaken on a national or regional scale are apt to do. To explain
as fully as possible what it was that made the Klan attractive to thousands of
El Pasoans in the early twenties, Lay goes far back into the city's past, back
to the Mexican War and the beginnings of Anglo-American settlement. Of the
159 pages of text in Lay's book, nearly a third have to do with the pre-1920
history of El Paso. For some readers, that may seem a bit too much by way of
background. For this reader, though, the treatment of El Paso's social heritage,
of the effects of the Great Revolution in Mexico after 1910, and of the superpatriotism and vigilantism inspired by the First World War provides a clear
understanding of the complex circumstances into which Klan organizers moved
and made rapid headway in 1921.
.
Lay sees substantive, plausible reasons why El Paso men would be drawn
to the Klan. The city did have a lengthy history of corrupt and unresponsive
government. Vice of virtually every kind flourished openly across the Rio
Grande in Ciudad Juarez and inescapably affected the moral life of El Paso
itself. Many of the city's newcomers had migrated from the southern United
States and thus were especially susceptible to the Klan's calls for white supremacy, understood locally as Anglo supremacy over the huge Hispanic population. Despite its militant rhetoric, Frontier Klan Number 100 was generally
law-abiding and non-violent, content to make itself felt mainly in local politics.
Yet outside of one local schoolboard election, El Paso Klansmen had little
success at the ballot box. Heavily Catholic and non-Anglo, El Paso continued
to be "socially and economically dependent on peaceful coexistence" and thus
ultimately a place where "moderation and common sense prevailed" (p. 159).
By mid-1924 the EI Paso Klan was in eclipse.
Lay relies primarily on local newspapers in putting together his basic
narrative. Yet he has also resourcefully used census data, local government
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and school records, personal interviews with a few survivors from the Klan
years, and a variety of other materials. If the story he tells is mainly local, he
also is able to put what he has to say in its appropriate national context. The
result is an exceedingly thorough monograph, one of the best studies in Klan
history done up to now.
Charles C. Alexander
Ohio University

The Last Frontier: A History of the Yukon Basin of Canada and Alaska. By Melody
Webb. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985. xiv + 416 pp.
Illustrations, bibliography, notes, index. $24.95 cloth, $1'2.95 paper.)
The challenge of Alaskan history, like the challenge of any frontier is to
blaze new trails through uncharted territory. Melody Webb's book, The Last
Frontier, is a pioneering and thoughtful analysis of the history of the Yukon
basin in northwestern Canada and Alaska. Anyone familiar with Alaskan literature realizes that the shortage of solid secondary works upon which historians can draw makes it very difficult to construct a "meaningful synthesis"
of Alaska's frontier history (p. xi). But at the risk of sounding like a stock
broker who describes the collapse of the market as an "excellent buying opportunity," it is the sparseness of the secondary literature which makes Alaskan
history such an exciting field, and the author has done an excellent job of
meeting the challenge.
Webb's goal in this book was "to perceive the history of the Yukon as an
extension of the westward movement" (p. xi). The framework upon which her
history is built is the Turner Thesis, and especially Turner's theories of successive frontiers. "While no one theory can explain or define human behavior,"
she admits, "Turner's metaphorical concept of successive frontiers provides a
highly effective scheme for organizing complex and contradictory information
into a meaningful synthesis" (p. xi).
The evolution of the Yukon Valley, from a trading frontier to the "enduring
frontier" of wilderness Alaska today, is the story told in these pages. She
describes the economic and technological advances, as well as the new "frontiers" which came with traders, missionaries, miners, road and railroad builders, steamboat men and bush pilots. The story is grounded in rich detail, and
the author shows a sure knowledge of the facts of wilderness life. Her years
of service with the National Park Service in Alaska undoubtedly helped the
author appreciate the hardships suffered by the pioneers, such as mosquitoes,
which continue to plague anyone who sets foot in Alaska in the summer.
Certainly the mosquito is part of Alaska's "enduring frontier" heritage, and
the author has found some excellent quotations to give a feel for what they
are like. Bishop Charles Seeghers' 1877 description could have been written
in 1987. He said the little pests are "uncooth [sic] enough to fill your spoon
before you take it to your lips, you open your mouth either to speak or breathe
and and half a dozen of mosquitoes sail into your throat and give you a fit of
coughing" (p. 73).
Webb has used previously untapped sources in the National Archives and
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elsewhere, and the book includes lengthy footnotes and an admirable bibliography. This book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the history
of Alaska or the American frontier.
Terrence Cole
Anchorage, Alaska

The Birth of the National Park Service: The Founding Years, 1913-33. By Horace M.
Albright as told to Robert Cahn. (Salt Lake City: Howe Brothers, 1985. xii +
340 pp. Illustrations, index. $19.95 cloth, $10.95 paper.)
When Stephen Mather, first director of the National Park Service, died in
1930, a congressman concluded, "There will never come an end to the good
he has done." Among the greater of Mather's contributions was his success
in 1915 in convincing twenty-fivecyear-old Horace M. Albright to remain as
his assistant as together they worked for the establishment of the National
Park Service. In 1917, a year after the Service was created, Albright, the youngest member of the Park Service's headquarters staff, became its acting director
when Mather was sidelined due to illness. When Mather returned in 1919,
Albright took on a dual assignment as superintendant of Yellowstone National
Park and as Mather's special field assistant. For the next decade Albright divided his time between Washington and Yellowstone. In so doing he developed
a great fund of credit with scores of dignitaries, including presidents and
members of Congress, whom he conducted through the nation's western parks.
With Mather's retirement in 1929, Albright took over as director. At that time,
as an accomplished lobbyist masking as tour guide, he knew personally about
one hundred members of Congress, including nearly all who served on committees that authorized and appropriated Park Service funds. In 1933, Albright
retired from the National Park Service, but his involvement with the nation's
parks continued for another half century.
Albright's memoir comes as a rich and entertaining supplement to Donald
Swain's 1970 scholarly biography. Initially reluctant to produce stich a work,
Albright in 1984, well into his nineties, agreed to cooperate. The success of
the undertaking flows from the importance of Albright's contributions, the
acuity of his memory, and the persistence of his collaborator, Pulitzer Prizewinning-journalist Robert Cahn. For twelve years Cahn conducted with Albright a series of oral history interviews, which he then converted to this
absorbing and gracefully written first-person account.
Albright devoted his public career to upgrading national parks, acquiring
private property within their borders and reducing the encroachments of livestock and timber interests. Occasionally the encroachments came from supposed allies. Such a situation occurred in 1921 when Secretary of the Interior
Albert Fall proposed an "All-Year National Park" near his ranch in New Mexico's Three Rivers area. Albright comments, "Fall was fond of saying that this
would be a different kind of national park. Indeed it would be, allowing hunting, grazing, timber cutting, irrigation projects, and mining, thus introducing
intb a national park nearly every possible form of commercial exploitation" (p.
130).
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One might have expected a more thorough treatment of Park Service
conflicts with the Department of the Interior's Reclamation Bureau and the
Department of Agriculture's Forest Service. Despite this minor shortcoming,
Albright's memoir is assured a place among major studies of the twentiethcentury-conservation movement.
Richard Allan Baker
Historian, United States Senate

Yellowstone: A Wilderness Besieged. By Richard A. Bartlett. (Tucson: University
of Arizona Press, 1985. xiv + 436 pp. Illustrations, map, notes, bibliography,
index. $24.95.)
Since its creation in 1872, Yellowstone National Park has fascinated and
inspired Americans. It is the oldest park, and, with the possible exception of
Yosemite, the most majestic and romantic. Most histories of the park constitute
little more than grab-bags of stories and anecdotes. Although Richard Bartlett's
survey is by far the best researched and contains much valuable information,
it suffers from many of the same weaknesses. Whatever the entertainment
value, the most important questions concerning the park's past and future
receive little attention.
Students of national parks will not find any major new interpretations or
ideas in this book. The same themes appear in the standard works of Ise,
Runte, Reiger, Haines, and others: Congress' initial neglect; the park's early
isolation; the depletion of game by commercial hunters; the defacement of
natural wonders; the role of the army in policing the park before 1916; the
dominance of private enterprise in running the lucrative concessions; the railroad's role in attracting tourists; and the transforming influence of the automobile.
This is an excellent mosaic of life at Yellowstone, richly detailed. But as
in any mosaic, the detail often obscures larger form and substance. The writing
is breezy, high-spirited, jocular, and occasionally banal and corny. At one point
dollars become "shekels" for some reason (p. 317). We learn that "[p]eople
have their idiosyncracies" (p. 220). Mountain lions demonstrate a "lethal pounce"
(p. 330). We discover the license number of the first automobile to enter the
park (p. 86). We find out where those who owned the first photo concession
in the park were born (p. 153), and we get not just a biography of the architect
who designed the Old Faithful Inn, but a discussion of whether he had a
drinking problem (pp. 180-81, 184). The book concludes with a sentimental
story about how a future president of the United States, "one of the great
ones," might catch his or her first glimpse of the park from "the mattress in
that tiny bunk area over the truck cab while mother and teenage sister sit inside
it beside dad, who is driving. Propped on his elbows, hands on his ruddy
cheeks, the boy gazes at the pines, the mountains, the geysers, thrills at the
sight of an elk or a moose, and observes Old Glory waving in the breeze at a
ranger station" (p. 398). This detail may well captivate visitors to park bookstores, but professional historians will find much of it bloated and tedious.
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Bartlett's book is divided into five parts: visitors, concessionaires, superintendents, "raiders and defenders," and a brief history of the park since 1940.
About seventy-five percent of the book is devoted to the period before 1916,
when the National Park Service was created. Although the volume is subtitled
"A Wilderness Beseiged," there is virtually no discussion of the threat posed
by too many visitors, nor does the author spend much time looking at the
park as anything other than a pleasure ground for tourists. We do not find
out what the park might have been or might become. Nor do we ever discover
how the vision of environmental groups concerning the park's future differed
or differ from that of the National Park Service. The author deserves credit for
meticulous scholarship in the most important primary sources, including the
Yellowstone Park Archives and National Archives in Washington, but this book
will do little to provoke thought about the past and future of the national parks
in the United States.
Donald J. Pisani
Texas A&M University

River Runners of the Grand Canyon. By David Lavender. (Tucson: Grand Canyon
Natural History Association/University of Arizona Press, 1985. 147 pp. Illustrations, bibliography, index. $27.50.)
Grand Canyon National Park Superintendent Richard Marks recently complained that commercial helicopter and other aircraft excursions into the Grand
Canyon of the Colorado were disrupting the park's tranquility. In 1985, forty
charter firms operated along the periphery of the Grand Canyon, carrying
sightseers down to the river below and often disrupting hikers and floaters
with the sound of rotor blades and aircraft engines. These modern-day problems associated with use of the Colorado River were unforeseen by the heroes
of David Lavender's River Runners of the Grand Canyon. As late as 1954, only
200 people had traversed the length of the Colorado since John Wesley Powell's
expedition in 1869. By 1970, the number of river floaters had risen to 10,000
a year.
Lavender focuses on river-running pioneers between 1869 and 1960. He
recounts the exploits of the most notable Grand Canyon explorer, John Wesley
Powell, who journeyed down the Colorado three times, beginning in 1869.
The value of Lavender's work, however, is found in his discussion of less wellknown, but equally important, adventurers. George Flavell, who floated down
the Colorado from Green River, Wyoming, to Needles, California, in 1896,
experimented with a new method of running rapids by rowing into them sternfirst. A year later, Nathaniel Galloway used the same technique to maneuver
his specially designed, narrow-beamed, low draught craft down the Colorado.
Subsequent rivermen capitalized on the lessons learned by these experimenters
to develop the present-day Colorado River craft and river-running techniques.
The first explorers on the Colorado River had various motives for braving
its perils. River runners such as Charlie Russell and Ellsworth Kolb in 1907
hoped to produce a documentary motion picture of the river. United States
Geological Surveyors during the 1920s investigated the river solely for its
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hydroelectric potential. Still other, later day expeditions, such as those sponsored by Norman Nevills and Otis ("Dock") Marston, capitalized on the national interest in recreational floating through the Grand Canyon. Whatever
the explorers' goals and objectives, Lavender finds the Colorado an able leveler
as various parties negotiated the river's treacherous rapids.
Lavender is able to bring these early Colorado River expeditions to life
through a rich use of historical materials and his gift as a writer. His synthesis
of works found in three manuscript collections-the Huntington Library, the
Utah Historical Society, and the Grand Canyon National Park Library-provides a valuable contribution to Colorado River lore. The author is obviously
well-versed in the geography of the river, and this knowledge is imparted to
the reader. Exploring expeditions of the magnitude related in this book are
often laborious affairs, punctuated by moments of sheer terror and exhilaration.
Lavender carries the reader down the Colorado River in much the same manner. He conveys the monotony of each expedition without depriving one of
the excitement and danger of running the Colorado's challenging rapids.
With River Runners of the Grand Canyon, David Lavender continues a tradition of providing historical works for both a general and a professional
audience. Neither group will be disappointed with his latest work and will see
in it the author's unusual ability to document little known historical events
with the romance and color of a great western novelist.
Alan S. Newell

Missoula, Montana
The Long Campaign: A Biography of Anne Martin. By Anne Bail Howard. (Reno:
University of Nevada Press, 1985. xiii + 220 pp. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $12.95 paper.)
Anne Bail Howard's The Long Campaign, a biography of Anne Martin, is
not a historical analysis of her place in American history, nor is it a political
analysis of her campaigns for the United States Senate. The author appears to
have a strange love/hate relationship with her subject. Howard seems to identify positively with the young Martin growing up with a father who did not
force her into the limiting contemporary stereotypical role for women. However, when Martin as a young woman is unable to find her place in society,
largely because of her non-traditional upbringing, Howard becomes critical of
her decision to enjoy the upperclass social life of Europe. When Martin finally
finds her life work and joins Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughters in the
English women's movement, the author is as unsympathetic to the radical
Martin as she is to the socialite Martin. Only in old age when the state of
Nevada finally honors Martin for her work on behalf of women's suffrage in
Nevada, does the author once more seem sympathetic to her subject.
There is little empathy for the woman who led the Nevada Suffrage Association to victory after a three-year battle. There is almost no sympathy for
the campaigner for the United States Senate. While the enormity of the task
facing Martin is acknowledged, the reader gets the impression that Martin
was a fool to try for the Senate. This reviewer, who was involved in the fight
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for equal rights for women in several states and in the nation has been "foolish"
enough to run for Congress and now lieutenant governor, finds herself empathizing constantly with Martin, page after page, and sensing in the author
that strange phenomenon of women being antagonistic toward women politicians, judging them by male standards, and not understanding that for women
politicians, the rules are different from those applied to men. The question
needs to be asked, when have new goals ever been achieved without "foolish"
risktakers?
The book is an interesting first biographic study of Martin's life. Someone,
perhaps a historian of women, ought to make a comparative study of the
nation's first women to seek Congressional office and analyze the factors which
inhibited some and permitted others, such as Jeannette Rankin, to win. A
study comparing the candidates following the passage of the federal SUffrage
amendment with those of today, following the passage of the New Mexico
equal rights amendment and the defeat of the federal amendment, might reveal
if women in politics have advanced their goal of being part of the decisionmaking process which affects their lives.
Marjorie Bell Chambers
Los Alamos, New Mexico

Plains Woman: The Diary of Martha Farnsworth, 1882-1922. Edited by Marlene
Springer and Haskell Springer. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.
xxv + 322 pp. Illustrations, index. $27.50.)
When I first discovered Martha Farnsworth's diaries in the Kansas State
Historical Society'S Manuscript Division several years ago, I was struck by the
author's energy, tenacity, and perspicuity. An avid journal keeper, Farnsworth
left sixteen volumes totaling 4000 pages and covering thirty years except 19001902 for which the volumes are inexplicably missing. There is no doubt in my
mind that the Farnsworth narrative will entice, indeed enthrall, anyone interested in western women's social, domestic, and early Kansas history.
Farnsworth's personal story is an engrossing one. Born in Iowa in 1867,
Farnsworth moved with her family to Winfield, Kansas at age five. At age
twenty, she moved again, this time on her own to Topeka in 1887. Two years
later she married a man wracked by consumption, alcoholism, jealousy, and
an unmanageable temper. She endured three miscarriages, the death of a child,
and murder threats from her husband before he died after six years of a
miserable marriage. Although Farnsworth vowed that she would never marry
again, she did so within seven months. This union lasted twenty-nine years
and produced happiness, but no children, for the couple. During these years,
Farnsworth faced the challenges and trials of a wife, mother, teacher, waitress,
nurse, social worker, and suffragist.
Farnsworth's writings are not just the history of an individual woman,
but reflect an era as well. They begin with rural life in Kansas of the 1880s and
conclude with descriptions of the suffrage movement and prohibition in the
state during the 1920s. Supplemented by an author's introduction, explanatory
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notes, and illustrations, the diaries reveal the development and progress of
Kansas from frontier to modern state.
By resurrecting and publishing the writings of Martha Farnsworth, the
Springers have performed a real service to the many scholars and other readers
who probably would have never discovered her as long as she remained,
unedited and unknown, in Topeka.
Glenda Riley
University of Northern Iowa
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The Adventures of Captain Bonneville, U.S.A., in the Rocky Mountains
and the Far West. By Washington Irving. Edited by Edgeley W. Todd.
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986. liv + 421 pp. Illustrations, maps, appendixes, notes, bibliography, index. $12.95.) This reprint of this classic account of the Rocky Mountain fur trade has a new
foreword by James P. Ronda.
The Galvanized Yankees. By Dee Brown. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986. 233 pp. Illustrations, map, notes, bibliography,
index. $7.95.paper.) Reprint of the 1963 edition that told of Confederate
prisoners who were recruited into the Union Army to serve on the
frontier.
General George Crook: His Autobiography. Edited by Martin F. Schmitt.
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986. xxiv + 326 pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $9.95 paper.) Reprint of the
1946 edition with a new foreword by Joseph c. Porter.
The Custer Myth: A Source Book of Custeriana. By W. A. Graham.
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986. xxii + 413 pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $35.00 cloth, $14.95 paper.)
This reprint of the 1953 edition makes readily available this invaluable
collection of memoirs and documents pertaining to Custer and his last
119
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battle. Fred Dustin's comprehensive bibliography is indispensable to
Custer researchers.

With Custer's Cavalry. By Katherine Gibson Fougera. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986. 285 pp. Illustrations, $23.95 cloth, $7.95
paper.) This reprint of the 1942 edition makes available one of the
classic frontier army memoirs. Katherine Gibson, the author's mother,
was an admirer of George and Elizabeth Custer, and the book provides
insights into their lives as well as those of less famous military families
of the 1870s and 1880s.
An Army Doctor's Wife on the Frontier: The Letters of Emily McCorkle
FitzGerald from Alaska and the Far West, 1874-1878. By Emily McCorkle
FitzGerald. Edited by Abe Laufe. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1986. xi + 352 pp. Illustrations, map. $9.95 paper.) This Indian Wars
memoir tells of life on the military frontier, with particular emphasis
on the 1877 Nez Perce War. Joan I. Biddle has written the foreword.

Fort Griffin on the Texas Frontier. By Carl Coke Rister. (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1986. xv + 216 pp. Illustrations, maps,
notes, index. $7.95 paper.) Reprint of the 1956 edition with a new
foreword by William H. Leckie.
Texas. By Mary Austin Holley. (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1985. viii + 410 pp. Map, table, appendix. $17.95 cloth, $9.95
paper.) This is a facsimile reprint of the 1836 classic published by G.
Clarke and Company of Kentucky. Marilyn McAdams Sibley has written a new introduction for the book.
Early Times in Texas or, the Adventures of Jack Dobe/l. By John C.
Duval. Edited by Mabel Major and Rebecca W. Smith. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986. xxiv + 284 pp. Illustrations, notes.
$22.95 cloth, $7.95 paper.) Reprint of the 1936 edition of this classic
memoir of the Texas Revolution.
Dream of Empire: A Human History of the Republic of Texas, 1836-1846.
By John Edward Weems. (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press,
1986. xxi + 363 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. $22.50 cloth, $10.95
paper.) Reprint of the 1971 edition, with a new foreword by Joe B.
Frantz.

The WPA Guide to Texas. (Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1986. xxxiii

+ 718 pp. Illustrations, maps, appendixes, bibliography, indexes. $24.95
cloth, $14.95 paper.) This reprint makes readily available once more
the 1940 Federal Writers' Project guide to Texas. Don Graham of the
University of Texas has provided a new introduction.
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The Great Frontier. By Walter Prescott Webb. (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1986. xviii + 433 pp. Map, charts, tables, notes,
bibliography, index. $9.95 paper.) Reprint.
The Great Salt Lake. By Dale L. Morgan. (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1986. 432 pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography,
index. $28.50 cloth, $10.95 paper.) Reprint of the 1947 edition.
Historic Sketches of the Cattle Trade of the West and Sou thwest. By Joseph
G. McCoy. Edited by Ralph P. Bieber. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1985. 459 pp. Illustrations, notes, index. $29.95 cloth, $9.95 paper.) Reprint of the 1939 edition.
The Wagonmasters: High Plains Freighting from the Earliest Days of the
Santa Fe Trail to 1880. By Henry Pickering Walker. (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1986. xii + 347 pp. Illustrations, maps, tables,
notes, bibliography, index. $11.95 paper.) This is a third printing of
the 1966 edition.
Robber and Hero: The Story of the Northfield Bank Raid. By George
Huntington. (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1986. xliii
+ 125 pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, index. $5.95 paper.) This reprint
of the 1895 edition of the classic account of the raid of the Jesse James
gang on Northfield, Minnesota, has a new introduction by John
McGuigan.
Sand in My Eyes. By Seigniora Russell Laune. (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1986. 256 pp. Illustrations. $7.95 paper.) This reprint of the 1956 edition, with a new foreword by Anne Hodges Morgan, makes this delightful account of pioneering in Woodward,
Oklahoma, available once more.
Uncle Valentine and Other Stories: Willa Cather's Uncollected Short Fiction 1915-1929. Edited by Bernice Slote. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986. xxx + 183 pp. Appendix. $6.95 paper.)
The Horsecatcher. By Mari Sandoz. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1986. 192 pp. $16.95 cloth, $5.95 paper.) Reprint of the 1957
edition.
Basic Horse Care. By Eleanor F. Prince and Gaydell M. Collier. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1986. xvi + 314 pp.
Illustrations, charts, tables, appendix, bibliography, index. $19.95.)
Morgan. By Leo P. Kelley. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday &
Company, 1986. 183 pp. $12.95.) Fiction in the Double D western series.
The Ham Reporter: Bat Masterson in New York. By Robert J. Randisi.
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(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1986. 178 pp. Bibliography. $12.95.) Fiction in the Double D western series.

Back to Malachi. By Robert J. Conley. (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday & Company, 1986. 179 pp. $12.96.) Fiction in the Double
D western series.
The Third Reel West. Edited by Bill Pronzini and Martin H. Greenberg. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1986. ix + 177
pp. $12.95.) This collection of short stories that were made into western
films includes works by Bret Harte, Peter Kyne, O. Henry, John M.
Cunningham, James Warner Bellah, and Dorothy M. Johnson.
Judy Dater: Twenty Years. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press/De
Saisset Museum, University of Santa Clara, 1986. xxv + 128 pp. Illustrations, bibliography. $50.00.) James L. Enyeart provides an introduction to this retrospective of the photographer's work.

News Notes

Teresa Melton, a senior at Sandia High School, has recently completed a mentorship with the New Mexico Historical Review. As part of
the Mentorship Program coordinated by Peggy Robinson, teacher of
gifted students at Sandia, Miss Melton spent one afternoon a week
learning the editorial process under the guidance of the editor and
staff. The Mentorship Program is designed to introduce high school
students to career opportunities and options.
"Murder on the Santa Fe Trail," the story of a true crime of the
American frontier, has earned New Mexico historian Marc Simmons
the C. L. Sonnichsen Book Award for 1986. The $1,000 award is offered
annually by Texas Western Press for an outstanding manuscript dealing
with the history, literature, or cultures of the Southwest. Simmons'
award-winning book will.be published in 1987 by Texas Western Press
of the University of Texas at El Paso.
Texas Western Press is currently accepting entries for the 1987
award. The competition is open to both academic and non-academic
authors. Entries must be received at the Press by April 1, 1987. For
more information, write Texas Western Press, University of Texas at El
Paso, El Paso, Texas 79968-0633.
The Los Alamos Historical Museum announces a full schedule of
events for early 1987. On January 16, Aaron and Ethel Armstrong will
123
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lecture about the Santa Fe Trail in conjunction with the Smithsonian
Traveling Exhibit (SITES) at the museum. A second SITES exhibit, "Perfect in Her Place: Women at Work in Industrial America," is scheduled
for February 15 to March 14. University of New Mexico professor of
history Richard Etulain will lecture on "Women in the West" on March
11, 1987, as part of the observances of WOl\len's Week in Los Alamos.
All the events are free and open to the public. Call the museum at
(505) 662-6272 for more information.
Geographic names are an important component of a region's history. With this in mind, the geographic names subcommittee of the
New Mexico Geographic Information Advisory Committee has been
recently activated to handle problems with place names in the state.
The subcommittee's responsibilities include making recommendations
to the U.s. Board on Geographic Names when disputes arise as to
which names are to appear on federal maps and publications. The
subcommittee also makes recommendations regarding new names proposed in the state. Because historical information often is critical in
making these decisions, the subcommittee would like to hear from
historians who might be able to provide background about geographic
names in their areas. Anyone interested in collecting and preserving
geographic name information may contact the subcommittee as well.
For more information, contact Bob Julyan, Rural Route 5, 31 Avenida
Almendro, Albuquerque 87123 (298-8420) or Robert R. White, P.O. Box
101, Albuquerque 87103 (247-3138).
Arthur St. George of the sociology department in the University
of New Mexico is currently researching aspects of the Butterfield Trail
and the Butterfield Overland Mail. Anyone with knowledge of station
locations, trail sections with clearly visible tracks, or stories associated
with travel over the trail may write to St. George, Department of Sociology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque 87131.
Ever thought about what it would be like to relive history? Civil
War Reenactors of New Mexico represent the Fourth Texas Mounted
Volunteers Company E and the Seventh U.s. Infantry Company C.
We also represent women and children of the West. Our organization
has something for everyone. We have living history events, we travel
to different states for battle reenactments, and we attend tactical events
around the state of New Mexico. The ladies have socials and make
crafts of the era. We give lectures to all age groups, elementary through
university levels. We are active in historical preservation. If any of
these things interest you, then Civil War Reenactors of New Mexico is
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the organization for you. For more information contact Civil War Reenactors of New Mexico, % Cynthia Wilson, 401 Carlisle NE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87106.
The 125th anniversary of the Battle of Glorieta will be reenacted
on June 20 and 21, 1987, Fathers' Day weekend. There will be a living
history encampment on Saturday, June 20, 1987. This will be open to
the public from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. You will have the opportunity
to observe camp life and activities. The encampment is located on
Highway 50 at the original battlesite. The battle reenactment will commence on Sunday, June 21, 1987 at approximately 10:00 a.m. There will
be a short ceremony immediately following the battle at the Pigeon's
Ranch house. For further information contact Civil War Reenactors of
New Mexico, % Cynthia Wilson, 401 Carlisle NE, Albuquerque, New
Mexico 87106.
The 1987 annual meeting of·the Historical Society of New Mexico
will be headquartered in the Sally Port Inn, Roswell, April 9-12, 1987.
The Chaves County Historical Society will host various events and
activities throughout Roswell during the four-day event. Tom Chavez
and Charles Bennett are chairmen of the program committee and may
be contacted at (505) 827-6473/6476.
The University of New Mexico Special Collections Department has
recently added two new archives to its manuscript collection. The White
House Collection (MSS BC 444) consists of the business papers for the
White House merchandi~e store, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and its associate companies. The collection presents a complete view of business
and economic conditions in the retail clothing and shoe trade in New
Mexico from 1912-1945. A unique feature of this collection is the private
correspondence of the owners, Emil Uhlfelder, Johanna Uhlfelder Blatt,
and Morris Blatt.
The Concha Ortiz y Pino de Kleven Collection (MSS BC 457) documents
the career of a lifelong resident of New Mexico. Ms. Kleven has been
extensively involved in the political, social, and cultural life of New
Mexico. The main focus of the collection is a photocopy of her personal
scrapbook which includes photographs, documents, and ephemera
relating to her years in the New Mexico State Legislature. Recent correspondence documents her current social activities.
To commemorate the 100th anniversary of Geronimo's surrender,
ending the Indian wars in the Southwest, a rare book of photographs,
Geronimo, the Apache Chief, has been republished. In 1886 photographer
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c. S. Fly of Tombstone, Arizona Territory, photographed Geronimo
and his band in camp and in the field. Fly's widow, Mollie, later published the album in a small edition. Bruce J. Dinges and Joan Metzger
of the Tucson Westerners have added background information on Geronimo and the Flys for the republication. The album is bound in stiff ,
paper covers similar to the original. A centennial edition of only 500
numbered copies, containing thirty photographs, is available for $20
per copy (check or money order) from the Adobe Corral of the Westerners, P.O. Box 44220, Sun Station, Tucson, Arizona 85733-4220.
The Western History Association recently honored Ferenc Szasz
and Sandra Schackel, both of the University of New Mexico, at their
annual meeting in Billings, Montana, October 15-18, 1986. Szasz, professor of social and intellectual history, received the Robert G. Athearn
Award for his recent book, The Day the Sun Rose Twice. Published in
1985 by the University of New Mexico Press, the book is reviewed in
the July 1985 issue of the New Mexico Historical Review by Richard Lowitt.
The press and the author will share the $1000 prize.
Sandra Schackel, a doctoral student in the American West and
assistant editor of this journal, was presented with the Walter Rundell
Graduate Student Award. The award was established in recognition of
Rundell's commitment to graduate education and his service to the
Western History Association and Westerner's International. The $1000
prize is intended for dissertation research. Schackel's work focuses on
the social welfare activities of women in New Mexico between 1920
and 1940 and is co-directed by Richard Ellis and Jane Slaughter.
Peggy Pond Church, noted New Mexican author, died at her home
in Santa Fe on October 30, 1986 at the age of eighty-two. She was the
author of eight collections of poetry including The Birds of Daybreak
published in 1985. The previous year Pond had received the Governor's
Award, the state's highest award for artistic achievement. Her House
at Otowi Bridge, a memoir of the life of Edith Warner, whose tearoom
was a favorite gathering place for Los Alamos scientists, is regarded
as a southwest classic and a work of enduring importance.
Throughout her active life, Pond sought to contrast the ancient
spirit of the Southwest with the harshness of the nuclear age. Her
beloved Pajarito Plateau was a central metaphor for much of her work.
As a child of "the hill," we can mourn her passing by recalling the
prophetic words of Mabel Dodge Luhan: "Though she had passed from
stillness to sunshine through a great storm of upheaval, she had come
to peace through the basic knowledge of power that is superior to
destruction. "

